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Preface
Knowledge about the body is constantly increasing, generating new 
treatments, therapies, and policies for our commonest diseases. At 
the same time, these are changes that create entirely new and at 
times revolutionary views of what it means to be human. Concerned 
with the social, cultural, and aesthetic factors in medical science, 
the medical humanities address such issues. One of its approach-
es is to examine how knowledge flows between different actors, 
whether researchers and the public, medical experts and patients, 
or within the global flow of knowledge in general. These are the 
tides and currents in which medical knowledge of individuals and 
communities takes shape. In this volume, humanities researchers 
follow the ebb and flow of knowledge between different actors and 
contexts, and argue for a review of modern medicine.
The volume is the product of a number of research collabora-
tions within the Cultural Studies Group of Neuroscience at the 
Department of Arts and Cultural Sciences, Lund University. The 
group’s members are involved in a number of multidisciplinary 
environments, and we would like to express our warmest thanks 
to all the research environments concerned for the opportunities 
for a rewarding scientific collaboration. The first is Bagadilico, a 
research consortium funded by the Swedish Research Council 
from 2008 to 2018, which conducts fundamental medical research 
on Parkinson’s disease and Huntington’s disease. The acronym 
Bagadilico is taken from the first two letters of each of the words 
Basal Ganglia Disorders Linnaeus Consortium, the basal ganglia 
being the part of the brain where some nerve cells die, leading to 
the development of these two diseases. The second is LUC3—Lund 
University Child-Centred Care—at Lund University, which is funded 
by FORTE, whose fundamental health science research looks at how 
movement of knowledge
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health services can best support children with long-term illnesses, 
promoting good health for life. Our research group has also had the 
good fortune to collaborate with ‘Falsified medicines in a multi-
cultural society: Importance of knowledge exchange between the 
public and expertise’ funded by the LMK Foundation, a research 
node that focuses on fundamental medical and pharmaceutical 
research into counterfeit medicines in modern society.
We would like to extend our thanks to all our research col-
leagues for many enthusiastic discussions. Such collaborations 
are what make it possible to share in the everyday life of research 
laboratories and clinics. There have been any number of meetings, 
seminars, interviews, and observations, without which our research 
and this volume would not have been possible. We look forward 
to similarly fruitful collaborations in future. We owe a great debt 
of thanks to the Joint Faculties of Humanities and Theology at 
Lund University. And finally, we wish to thank our reviewers for 
their careful reading of earlier drafts of this book, while singling 
out Daniel Normark of the Centre for Science and Technology 
Studies at Uppsala University and the Unit for Medical History & 
Heritage at the Karolinska Institutet for his kind efforts in seeing 
the volume to completion.
Kristofer Hansson, Malmö, 2020
Previous publications by the Cultural Studies Group of Neuroscience include 
The atomized body (edited by Susanne Lundin, Max Liljefors & Andréa 
Wiszmeg, 2012), Modern genes (Niclas Hagen, 2013), Interpreting the brain 
in society (Kristofer Hansson & Markus Idvall, 2017), a special issue of 
Culture Unbound on ‘The unbound brain’ (guest-edited by Peter Bengtsen 





Introducing medical humanities perspectives 
on medicine, science, and experience
Kristofer Hansson & Rachel Irwin
Medical knowledge is always in motion. It moves from the lab to the 
office, from a press release to a patient, from an academic journal 
to a civil servant’s desk and then on to a policymaker. Knowledge 
is deconstructed, reconstructed, and transformed as it moves. The 
dynamic, ever-evolving nature of medical knowledge has given rise 
to different concepts to explain it: diffusion, translation, circulation, 
transit, co-production. At the same time, its movements—and the 
ways in which we conceptualize and describe them—have material 
consequences. For instance, value judgements on the validity of 
certain forms of knowledge determine the direction of clinical 
research. Policy decisions are taken in relation to existing know-
ledge. The acceptance or rejection of treatment protocols based 
on medical ‘facts’ impacts patients, dependents, health providers, 
and society at large. Simply put, knowledge and the movement of 
knowledge matter.
How do they matter, though? The contributors to this volume 
examine the complexity of medical knowledge in everyday life. We 
demonstrate not only the pervasive influence of knowledge in med-
ical and public health settings, but also the range of methodol ogical 
and theoretical tools to study knowledge. Ours is a multidisciplinary 
approach to the medical humanities, presenting both contemporary 
movement of knowledge
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and historical perspectives in order to explore the borderlands 
between expertise and common knowledge. The medical humanities 
have a long history of addressing questions of context, experience, 
and representation in medical and public health settings (Cole et 
al. 2015), and thus have an enduring interest in the relationships, 
and expectations of these relationships, among the various actors 
who have a part in the motion of knowledge, whether medical 
specialists, policymakers, or, of course, patients and their carers.
Many of the chapters have an empirical basis in southern 
Sweden. The research has been carried out in close collaboration with 
medical researchers, practitioners, and patients, and thus reflects 
a specific form of healthcare setting which is strongly influenced 
not only by the ‘traditional’ Swedish welfare model, but also by the 
neoliberalization of this model in recent decades (see also Nord-
gren & Hansson 2019). In this way, our research can be framed as 
something that Peter Keating and Alberto Cambrosio (2006) define 
as a biomedical platform, or a set of activities where biomedical 
research, meetings between professionals and patients, the com-
munication of medical information, and so forth take place. Such 
a platform ‘is more than an instrument or device, but is a specific 
configuration of instruments and individuals that share common 
routines and activities, held together by standard reagents’ (23). 
One of our themes is how medical knowledge is part of common 
routines and activities, and we also consider how these kinds of 
platforms influence and are influenced by the configurations of 
globalization and neoliberalization. The discourses and practic-
es of clinical trials, diagnostics, and policymaking take similar 
forms wherever one is in the global scientific community, yet at 
the same time we see how these processes are situated in specific 
local contexts. In this way, the volume contributes not only to the 
development of medical humanities perspectives in Sweden, but 
is also relevant to international scholars.
Each of the chapters highlights the need to reflect on the move-
ment of knowledge and to create a bridge between different dis-
ciplines, thus widening the opportunities for the humanities and 
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sciences to collaborate. Medical knowledge influences everyday life, 
both in medical settings and beyond. We argue that an interdis-
ciplinary approach will not only improve the handling of clinical 
encounters, but will also improve everyday life outside the clinic 
(Mol 2008). In this introduction we look at how medical knowledge 
can be addressed in the medical humanities vis-à-vis the main 
empirical themes of the volume. The wide range of approaches 
is a reflection of the multifaceted nature of the concepts used to 
describe the movement of knowledge. This is further evident as we 
present the chapters, which provide a breadth of perspectives on 
medical knowledge, illuminating different aspects of the journey 
and offering ways forward.
Conceptualizing knowledge
The medical humanities have a role in the continuously evolving 
world of biomedicine, for mediating and scrutinizing the new and 
unstable knowledge produced in different arenas. In this volume, 
we borrow the concept of multistability from the post-phenomeno-
l ogist and philosopher of science Don Ihde (2012), which, when 
applied to knowledge, acknowledges that it is used by different 
actors for different purposes, and that it has different and multiple 
meanings in different periods and contexts. This becomes apparent 
in the study of medical knowledge in contemporary healthcare 
and biomedicine.
At the same time, the concept of multistability must be contextual-
ized, for there is a long research tradition in both the humanities and 
the social sciences of focusing on questions concerning the nature 
and production of knowledge (Pickstone 2000). For instance, society 
entered a post-industrial era in the 1950s and 1960s, characterized 
by growing health and education sectors—and a transformation 
of how knowledge was valued and handled (Drucker 1969; Bell 
1973). This is explored in Anna Tunlid’s chapter on how prenatal 
diagnosis changed not only the production of knowledge in medical 
research, but also public debate: new medical knowledge from the 
movement of knowledge
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rapidly expanding biomedical research field resulted in new views 
on the prenatal body.
In the late 1970s and 1980s postmodernism came to dominate all 
kinds of solid knowledge, instead arguing that there were no longer 
any knowledge values that were superior to others (Lyotard 1979). The 
postmodern theory of knowledge posited by social constructionism 
also provides a starting point for critiquing the relationship between 
knowledge and power. In the humanities this perspective has had 
a significant influence on both research methods and theories, not 
least in the medical humanities. In fact, this change has been funda-
mental to the medical humanities as a field, and all the chapters in 
this volume relate to social constructionism to some degree.
This intimate relationship between knowledge and power is also 
found in the work of Michel Foucault (1980), one of the most influ-
ential researchers in the field of medical humanities. For instance, 
the chapters in this volume address how knowledge is controlled 
and used to control, while at the same time influencing power 
structures—that is, knowledge bases are used to justify courses 
of action (Gutting 2005). This is writ large in healthcare settings, 
where a body of evidence can promote certain policies over others. 
Kristofer Hansson’s chapter, for example, focuses on how technology 
and medical knowledge in diabetes care are used to justify certain 
actions, and how technology and knowledge mediate relationships 
between the families of children who have been diagnosed with 
diabetes and health professionals.
Others have focused on authoritative knowledge. What counts 
or does not count as knowledge is a long-standing concern in the 
social sciences, science and technology studies (STS), anthropol-
ogy, and sociology. Many scholars have critiqued biomedicine as 
an unquestioned and now dominant cultural system (see Latour 
& Woolgar 1979; Mishler 1981; Starr 1982; Jordan 1983; Hahn & 
Gaines 1985). Using Sheila Jasanoff ’s term ‘co-production’ (2004) 
we would argue that knowledge is not only socially and culturally 
produced, but that it also generates the sociocultural context in 
which researchers are situated. Jasanoff defines scientific knowledge 
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as something that ‘both embeds and is embedded in social prac-
tices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and 
institutions’ (2004, 3). Several of the chapters in this volume expand 
upon Jasanoff ’s co-production concept, and similarly we argue 
that there is a need for a focus on the myriad connections between 
all the actors in the biomedical platform. The individual chapters 
provide examples of this co-production, but it is when we take a 
view of the whole platform that a broader analysis is possible. We 
cannot separate knowledge from the lifeworld in which we live 
(Husserl 1972), which means that knowledge is closely linked to 
and depends on power and culture, science, medicine, and soc i-
ety. The  philosopher Ian Hacking (1996) discusses looping effects: 
how knowledge not only gives us new perspectives on life, but also 
changes actual life practices. In medicine, new categorizations—
for example, a new way of measuring or defining disease—also 
means that we as researchers, medical professionals, and patients 
act in new ways. The anthropologists Margaret Lock and Mark 
 Nichter (2002) pursue this idea by drawing on Foucauldian motifs 
to describe the export of biomedicine as a form of governmentality 
and neo-colonialism. They write that the processes of moderni-
zation and Westernization have imposed norms for ‘what counts 
as evidence, legitimacy in policymaking, privileged knowledge, 
definition of disease categories’ (3–4, 10), which in turn causes ten-
sions ‘between traditional values that define identity and the forces 
of modernization and globalization’ (8) and fuels a debate about 
the dominance of a specific paradigm, evidence-based medicine.
Knowledge and evidence-based medicine
It is through the lenses of power, knowledge, and authority that 
specific developments in evidence-based medicine have been 
described. We use evidence-based medicine as an umbrella term to 
describe developments—over roughly the past thirty years—in how 
knowledge is validated, and the use of ‘robust’ testing to produce 
knowledge. Evidence-based medicine is often defined as ‘the process 
movement of knowledge
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of systematically finding, appraising, and using contemporaneous 
research findings as the basis for clinical decisions’ (Roberts & 
Yeager 2006, 68; see also Rosenberg & Donald 1995), and we 
analyse it from a variety of theoretical and empirical perspectives. 
Originating from medical science, evidence-based medicine is 
considered first-rate knowledge with ostensibly objective verifica-
tions of reality, and as such is the kind of methodologically robust 
knowledge that medical professionals and biomedical researchers 
value. At the same time, this knowledge, when it is circulated 
and shared, is juxtaposed with practical relevance (Bohlin & 
Sager 2011), as discussed in Rachel Irwin’s chapter here. Medical 
knowledge does not always reflect the lived experience of health 
professionals, patients, and carers.
The push for evidence-based medicine in healthcare from the 
turn of the twenty-first century has radically changed the medical 
care offered to patients, as well as changing the work environment in 
hospitals and laboratories (see also Bohlin & Sager 2011; Berner & 
Kruse 2013). This same perspective on knowledge is finding its way 
out from healthcare, something that is addressed in Karolina Lindh’s 
chapter on the role of press releases about the latest science discov-
eries in how knowledge produced in laboratories reaches the public.
A closely connected development is the ongoing digitalization 
of life, which is transforming how we relate to and process evi-
dence-based knowledge. New digital tools are an important part of 
the development of contemporary biomedical research and medical 
practice (Beaulieu 2004; Dumit 2004; Carusi & Hoel 2014). Digital 
patient registers, digital monitoring, digital diagnostic tools, and 
other technologies change the ways nurses and doctors work, and, 
in a broader sense, healthcare has been reorganized to accommod ate 
evidence-based medicine about the patient and the patient’s body. 
It is crucial in both hospitals and laboratories ‘that we can talk 
about a new form of medicine—informatics medicine—with its 
own practices of knowledge and development’ (Eklöf & Normark 
2018, 345). At the same time, this informatics medicine offers 
important social arenas and global markets in which patients and 
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others can discover new knowledge and treatments that are not 
offered by their local healthcare systems.
From a medical humanities perspective, we see major advantages 
in revisiting classic studies to gain new perspectives on the latest 
developments in medicine. The study of evidence-based medicine 
with the concept of authoritative knowledge was developed by the 
medical anthropologist Brigitte Jordan in her study, Birth in Four 
Cultures from 1978 (1993), in which she demonstrates how techno-
logy created a ‘regime of power’ in the birth process by generating 
authoritative knowledge and delegitimizing indigenous knowledge 
about the birth process. Authoritative knowledge is ‘the knowledge 
that is constructed and displayed by members of a community of 
practice as the basis for legitimate decision-making’ (xiii). In any 
given domain, parallel knowledge systems exist, but one often gains 
primacy (150–1). Authoritative knowledge emerges as the ‘natural’ 
way of things, even though it is a cultural system that is consciously 
and unconsciously reproduced. In this framework, some kinds of 
knowledge count and others do not, regardless of ‘truth value’ (149). 
In the example of birth and reproduction, Jordan finds that doctors 
often rely on technology (such as foetal heart monitors) rather than 
the mother’s experience or the experience of (non-professional) 
midwives. In a contemporary perspective, evidence-based medicine 
can be said to be a form of authoritative knowledge, as discussed 
here in Rui Liu and Susanne Lundin’s chapter on the grey market 
in medicines and how different knowledge regimes challenge one 
another. We would argue that a key methodological perspective in 
the medical humanities is to understand evidence-based medicine 
relative to what can be called everyday experience.
Knowledge in everyday experience
Everyday experience provides a starting point when questioning 
traditional doctor–patient relationships or patients’ and carers’ 
lived experiences, both of which are crucial to understanding the 
movement of knowledge and whose knowledge ‘counts’ (Frykman & 
movement of knowledge
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Gilje 2003; Normark 2019). The span is wide. They can be patients 
with Parkinson’s disease understanding informed consent in a 
medical trial, as in Markus Idvall’s chapter; they can be parents 
whose children have recently been diagnosed with diabetes and 
are trying to understand care practices, as in Hansson’s chapter. 
In terms of phenomenology, a focus on the knowledge created 
from everyday experience provides insight into what it means to 
be human in varying medical practices (Becker 1992; King et al. 
2017). In this vein, the philosopher Julia Kristeva and her colleagues 
have invited us to rethink the medical humanities:
A new programme for the medical humanities should involve a 
radical concern with cultural dimensions of health as more than a 
subjective dimension outside the realm of medical science. We will 
explore the notion that all clinical encounters should be considered 
as cultural encounters in the sense that they involve translation 
between health as a biomedical phenomenon and healing as lived 
experience. Hence, our assumption is that the cultural crossings 
of care are not an exception but the norm. Given this, every clin-
ical encounter should involve a simultaneous interrogation of 
the patient’s and the doctor’s co-construction of new and shared 
meanings that can create realities with medical consequences, not 
‘mere’ symbols of ‘real’ medical issues. (Kristeva et al. 2018, 57)
Much of the focus of the present volume is the public reconstruction 
of knowledge from medicine and science (Rose 2007; Gottweis 
2008; Hansson 2017). It can be a person sitting at a computer try-
ing to understand online knowledge; a patient meeting a doctor 
or nurse; a member of the public reading a press release about a 
new medicine; a person sitting in front of a piece of art as in Max 
Liljefors’s chapter. It is from such a perspective that some of the 
multistability of knowledge can be understood. Taking a more 
philosophic perspective, it becomes clear that the question is cen-
turies old. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s admission ‘I don’t merely have the 
visual impression of a tree: I know that it is a tree’ (On Certainty, 
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§267) is central, but when do we know? In this volume we are not 
interested in what can be defined as truth and knowledge per se; 
instead, our methods are designed to gauge the lifeworlds of those 
who interpret the knowledge that surrounds them.
Borrowing from the historian James A. Secord (2004), we discuss 
knowledge in transit. Secord’s proposed change in perspective on 
knowledge has been central for humanities research in recent years 
(Östling et al. 2020), and we find the move away from knowledge as 
a communicative action to knowledge as a form of doing of science 
to be a fruitful one. Specifically, Secord writes that ‘we need to shift 
our focus and think about knowledge-making itself as a form of 
communicative action’ (2004: 661), and in discussing knowledge 
in transit he argues that knowledge should always be seen as a 
form of communication. Indeed, the communicative aspects of 
knowledge are increasingly central considerations in medicine, 
healthcare, and public health.
We offer examples of the communicative aspect to science trans-
mission between researchers, between researchers and the public, 
and between civil servants and policymakers. Such practices are 
central not only to any understanding of how science and medicine 
produce knowledge, but also to how knowledge production is a form 
of knowledge in action (see Schütz & Parsons 1978). For instance, 
as medical knowledge circulates it is also enacted. This enactment 
consists of what people do with ‘information artefacts’—how press 
releases, articles, and books are not only embedded in a context, 
but also are used in different ways (Buckland 2012), as examined 
in Åsa Alftberg’s and Lindh’s chapters. For the medical humanities, 
a central question is therefore how knowledge from biomedicine 
and healthcare is set in motion in the everyday lives of patients or 
relatives (Kleinman 1988).
The relationship ‘between health as a biomedical phenomenon 
and healing as lived experience’ (Kristeva et al. 2018, 57) is not 
unproblematic. Modern medicine has long viewed biomedical 
phenomena as ‘largely free from values, meaning and desire, as 
opposed to the afflicted laypeople’s views’ (Wiszmeg 2017, 74). This 
movement of knowledge
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begs the question of which actors have the best arguments: Is it the 
researchers or the public? Is it the medical doctors or the patients 
(Wynne 1996; Pellizzoni 2001)? Recent years have seen a change, as 
the contradictions between science and alternative facts, especially 
in the social media, are exposed, which is considered here in Liu 
and Lundin’s chapter about falsified medicines. Digitalization has 
led to the spread of knowledge and is a platform for creating and 
resolving differences of opinion. For example, we find communities 
of so-called fact resisters who are seemingly impervious to facts that 
contradict their own perception. This has given rise to movements 
that rally to the defence of medical knowledge and its significance 
for a modern, progressive society (see Frans 2017), which may 
involve practitioners where, for example, advocates of alternative 
approaches argue that vaccination programmes are risky, invoking 
alternative information in social media. Communication is also 
often discussed in relation to the questioning of evidence-based 
medicine by, for example, the anti-vaccination movement.
While it is important to defend medical knowledge, in the humani-
ties we are interested in understanding the various actors’ perspectives 
rather than criticizing them (see also Haraway 1985; Latour 2003; Rose 
2013; Hansson & Lindh 2018; see also Hansson, Nilsson & Tiberg in 
this volume). While fact resistance and online discussions may lead 
to illegalities—such as purchasing counterfeit medicines online as 
Liu and Lundin describe in this volume—they also highlight what 
is missing in society. As Lindh asks in her chapter, what happens 
when evidence and popular understanding, politics and ideology, 
conflict? From a medical humanities perspective, we argue that 
studying differences of opinion or the lack of trust in biomedicine 
offers key insights into the ways in which medical knowledge moves.
Presentation of the chapters
The volume falls into four sections, each addressing a specific 
issue of how medical knowledge relates to biomedical platforms. It 
begins with a section—‘Medical knowledge and the political’—that 
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focuses on the biomedical platform as part of a sociopolitical con-
text, investigating relations between communities and healthcare 
systems, and with medical knowledge seen as something that moves 
between them, affecting political decisions which, in turn, affect 
the healthcare system. The next section—‘Circulating and sharing 
medical knowledge’—focuses on how medical knowledge circulates 
in biomedical platforms and how researchers share knowledge with 
other researchers or the public. The third section—‘Co-creation of 
medical knowledge’—focuses on the ethical tools and co-creation 
of evidence-based medicine as a way to bridge between the pos-
ited circulation of ‘objectified’ knowledge and therapeutic know-
ledge. Finally, section four—‘Knowledge in everyday experience’— 
develops therapeutic knowledge and its interface with patient and 
patient families with a focus on self-knowledge.
The first section starts with Anna Tunlid’s chapter, ‘Prenatal diag-
nosis: Co-production of knowledge and values in medical research 
and public debate’, a discussion of how social, political, and ethical 
factors formed an integral part of foetal diagnostics when they were 
developed and used in a clinical context in the 1960s and 1970s, 
as well as how these factors affected the public debate about foetal 
diagnosis in the early 1980s. Informed by Jasanoff ’s conclusions 
about co-production (2004), Tunlid analyses the interplay between 
the development of knowledge and societal norms and values. The 
purpose is to show how medical knowledge of chromosomes, syn-
dromes and disabilities was embedded in norms, values, and prac-
titioners, and how the perception of foetal diagnosis was affected. 
This included everything from how healthcare practitioners should 
inform parents about foetal diagnosis to views on abortion. The 
medical knowledge and practical technology (foetal diagnostics) were 
interpreted differently in different social contexts. A dominant view 
in medicine is that cultural, social, and political values are barriers 
to be overcome; however, given co-production, Tunlid demonstrates 
that these values are integral to how biomedical technology, such as 
foetal diagnostics, is applied and regulated in society.
Regulation is also the topic of ‘Evidence-informed policymaking 
movement of knowledge
20
at the World Health Organization’, in which Rachel Irwin looks at 
how knowledge, evidence, and experience are used in the WHO’s 
policymaking process. She compares two WHO recommenda-
tions—the UNICEF/WHO International Code of Marketing of 
Breastmilk Substitutes from 1981 and the Set of Recommendations 
on the Marketing of Foods and Non-alcoholic Beverages to Children 
from 2010—using interviews with key stakeholders, participant 
observation at the WHO’s headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, 
and archival material. As the UN’s specialized agency for health, the 
process of drafting recommendations considers systematic reviews 
of scientific literature, recommendations set by expert committees, 
and data on disease trends and burdens. At the same time, the WHO 
is a political organization, and major policies must be agreed by all 
194 member states who, in turn, are influenced by a range of private 
sector and civil society actors. Irwin examines how knowledge—in 
the form of evidence and experience—is used in the policy process, 
demonstrating with extended, historical case studies the changes in 
the type and quality of evidence used in policymaking, the different 
standards applied to determine what counts as knowledge, and the 
challenges of setting policy in the absence of evidence and experience. 
In the second section—‘Circulating and sharing medical know-
ledge’—the contributors’ empirical base is modern biomedical 
settings, for example laboratories or communication professionals 
who translate the latest discoveries into press releases. Åsa Alftberg’s 
chapter ‘Sharing knowledge: Neuroscience and the circulation of 
knowledge’, uses neuroscientists’ reflections on how they share 
knowledge and findings, and especially the challenges, opportunities, 
and ethical dilemmas, to examine the knowledge circulation of cut-
ting-edge neuroscience. A central topic is how scientific knowledge 
is sometimes seen as personal property that can be problematic to 
share with other researchers, but on other occasions sharing can 
be seen as something positive, with multiple career benefits for the 
individual researcher or for a research group. By examining the 
view that knowledge and knowledge circulation are the preserve of 
a privileged group—the creators of knowledge—Alftberg highlights 
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the complexities of knowledge circulation. She also discusses how 
and why knowledge circulates, and what happens when knowledge 
ceases to be the exclusive property of a particular group and is used 
and transformed by other groups.
This perspective on circulation is further elaborated on by 
 Karolina Lindh in the chapter ‘Press releases as medical knowledge: 
Making news and identification in medical research communica-
tion’. Medical knowledge about the brain is not confined to labs, 
clinics, or the neuroscientific community. One way in which such 
knowledge leaves the labs and scientific communities and reaches the 
public is in the form of press releases. This chapter contributes with 
understandings about the negotiations that occur in the practices of 
writing these press releases. Press releases are understood here as a 
genre that facilitates social action. This implies that those involved 
in creating press releases must have a shared understanding of how 
press releases are written and read, and how the readers make sense 
of them. The chapter is based on interviews with communication 
professionals and neuroscience scholars working at two different 
Swedish universities. In this empirical material, Lindh examines 
the negotiations between different actors that occur as medical 
knowledge is transformed into press releases.
In the third section—‘Co-creation of medical knowledge’—
action is considered to be something that is co-created. Markus 
Idvall examines informed consent procedures in clinical trials for 
Parkinson’s disease treatment in ‘The co-production of informed 
consent: How mutual trust is negotiated between scientists and 
participants in clinical trials’. Using ethnographic fieldwork at a 
university hospital, including observations, focus-group discus-
sions, and interviews with doctors, nurses, patients with Parkinson’s 
disease, and their carers, he looks at the knowledge process which 
the informed consent procedure triggers between scientists and 
participants. Drawing on Jasanoff (2004), he uses the concept of 
co-production to describe the process as informed trust, rather than 
informed consent. Specifically, he demonstrates how this process is 
not limited to the actual signing of an informed consent document, 
movement of knowledge
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but rather how trust is negotiated—and renegotiated—between 
the patient and scientists before, during, and after the trials. These 
relations build on the interplay of the scientists’ expert knowledge 
and the embodied experience of patients and their carers and their 
lay knowledge, as scientists and patients exchange sets of knowl-
edge in the course of the trials. There are expectations on both 
sides. A ‘good’ research subject is a knowledgeable one, who takes 
responsibility; the responsibilities of the scientist include sharing 
information about the trial and the state of research on Parkinson’s. 
However, the fragility of the consent process is undeniable.
Various processes of co-production and co-creation are also 
addressed in ‘The co-creation of situated knowledge: Facilitating 
the implementation of care models in hospital-based home care’ by 
Kristofer Hansson, Gabriella Nilsson, and Irén Tiberg. They argue 
that the evidence-based care models introduced into healthcare are a 
form of ontology that calls for specific ways of treating concepts such 
as healthcare, patient, treatment, and care. Such models aim to create 
a certain kind of explanation of a complicated reality where they 
are intended to work, but often there are so-called epistemological 
breaks, as a result of which the models are perceived incorrectly, 
create the opposite effect, or have unintentional consequences. 
These epistemological breaks are manifest during the implemen-
tation of new care models, when evidence-based medicine meets 
the older knowledge contained in the healthcare professionals’ 
existing practices, habits, and performances. The chapter sets out an 
ethnographic method that can be used during such implementation 
processes to help bring together evidence-based care models and 
older knowledge as new care practices. The method focuses on how 
best to support the facilitator of the implementation of the group 
when they have to address any epistemological breaks that may arise; 
as the authors point out, knowledge is something that all involved 
must work on actively throughout the implementation process, 
truly creating situated knowledge together, and understanding that 
these different knowledges are the way forward.
The last section—‘Knowledge in everyday experience’—continues 
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with the healthcare context with Kristofer Hansson’s chapter ‘A Num-
ber in Circulation: HbA1c as standardized practice in diabetes care’. 
HbA1c is a blood value that measures how much sugar is bound to 
the red blood cells—haemoglobin (Hb)—which, since the red blood 
cells are broken down after about 120 days and newly formed, can 
be used to assess the effectiveness of diabetes treatment. HbA1c 
readings are expressed in numbers, but these numbers are interpret-
ed, translated, and understood in different ways depending on the 
context in which they are presented and used. In an ethnographic 
study, Hansson examines how the numbers are discussed in meetings 
both between health professionals and newly diagnosed children and 
their parents, and in working group meetings of health professionals. 
It is found that figures in medicine form normative guidelines, with 
numbers perceived as different types of knowledge depending on 
how they are used in practice. Specifically, the chapter considers the 
value 52 as a matter of knowledge—not just a figure that patients 
and families strive to achieve in the course of their treatment, but 
also a figure that generates a certain relationship between healthcare 
professionals and patients and their families. Similarly, it is also a 
figure that affects healthcare, with ramifications for quantification, 
measurement, and standardization in medicine.
The focus narrows to the purely individual in Max Liljefors’s 
chapter ‘Knowledge worlds apart: Aesthetic experience as an episte-
mological boundary object’, which details a research project with an 
art exhibition for patients with Parkinson’s disease, organized at an 
art gallery. Within the framework of the project, a new educational 
method was developed that focuses on aesthetic experience and 
bodily self-knowledge. This is in contrast to traditional art education, 
which primarily deals with art history and interpretation. In this 
way, Liljefors combines contemporary findings from the growing 
field of culture and health with older insights derived from aesthetic 
philosophy to argue that aesthetic experiences can constitute an 
essential aspect of the health dimension that is increasingly called 
‘existential’ or ‘spiritual’ health. The chapter ends with an appen-
dix where the current project method is described in detail with 
pedagogical texts and photographs.  
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In the final chapter, Rui Liu and Susanne Lundin re-evaluate 
traditional models of the doctor–patient relationship in ‘Medicines 
in the grey market: A sociocultural analysis of individual agency’. 
They draw on survey data and netnography to chart individuals’ 
experiences buying medicines online. Liu and Lundin argue that 
deregulation of the retail pharmaceutical sector in Sweden opened 
the way to online sales of medicines, and while many sellers are 
legitimate pharmacies, consumers risk purchasing medicine of 
unknown providence from illegal or quasi-illegal sources. They find 
that the doctor–patient dialogue is not a hierarchical one, and that 
people take in multiple forms of knowledge, not only consulting 
their doctor, but also friends and even strangers online, and relying 
on their own experience. In a health system and society with neo-
liberal characteristics like Sweden, the individual is expected to take 
responsibility for self-care, and part of this involves gathering and 
synthesizing information, and making one’s own treatment decisions.
*
Knowledge matters to all disciplines, including the medical humani-
ties. Changes in biomedicine and healthcare require fresh knowledge 
perspectives, along with completely different ways of approaching 
the wider cultural and social context in which healthcare takes 
place. While we believe that the medical humanities have a given 
place in this co-construction of new knowledge, we also argue that 
the field needs to further develop its theories and methodologies. 
Our hope is that this volume will help the medical humanities to 
more fully address the movement of knowledge.
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The co-production of knowledge and values  
in medical research and public debate
Anna Tunlid
‘Your money or your life—A consideration of prenatal diagnosis’ 
ran the headline of an article published in several Swedish news-
papers and magazines in the spring of 1978. It was written by three 
people with connections with the social care sector, and argued that 
prenatal diagnosis had profound social and moral consequences. It 
was now high time to have a wide-ranging debate about the values, 
justifications, and views underpinning its practice (Nordlund et al. 
1978). The article was the prelude to an exhaustive public discus-
sion about the direction, application and consequences of prenatal 
diagnosis. Developments in prenatal diagnosis had hitherto been a 
matter for the research community and the healthcare sector; now 
there was a demand for a broad public debate that could help shape 
national guidelines. This chapter shows how advanced medical 
technology such as prenatal diagnosis was discussed, evaluated, 
and renegotiated when translated from laboratories and clinics 
into the public arena and the debate about policy and regulation.1
The chapter draws on the theory of co-production, which 
describes how the development of scientific knowledge and its 
applications takes place in constant interactions with society’s 
norms, values, and interests (Jasanoff 2004). Neither the produc-
tion of knowledge nor its applications can be understood without 
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considering the social and political contexts that are its precon-
ditions. In this chapter, it is the movement of knowledge from 
research and clinical context out into public debate that is the 
main concern, and above all the question of policy. The focus is 
the notion of prenatal diagnostic practice represented by medical 
experts (medical researchers and doctors) and the views on prenatal 
diagnosis expressed in the media and in policy proposals. I analyse 
how notions of medical technology’s practices and consequences 
were debated and questioned when medical knowledge moved from 
the laboratory and the clinic to the public sphere. When groups 
outside the research community debated prenatal diagnosis, other 
interpretive frameworks, contexts, and values were introduced, 
compared to those which had been central when the technology 
developed in the laboratories and the clinical context. The analysis 
shows there were different views about prenatal diagnosis in the 
public debate and the policy context, which differed somewhat 
from the medical experts’ views. One conclusion of the present 
study is that the application and regulation of complex medical 
technologies require a continuous, unflinching public discussion 
in which both experts and representatives of different sections of 
civil society participate (Jasanoff 2005). Such discussions are the 
prerequisite for democratic decisions about biotechnologies which 
have the potential to influence people’s fundamental ideas about 
life itself (Rose 2007), while at the same time retaining the scientific 
legitimacy of medicine.
The chapter covers a brief historical background and the broad 
outlines of the medical developments in prenatal diagnosis, before 
turning to the public debate and the official inquiry into prenatal 
diagnosis by the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare 
in the early 1980s as part of the formulation of a national policy. 
First, the concept of co-production, and how it can be employed to 
understand what happens when knowledge moves between contexts, 
is discussed. The source material consists of articles in newspapers 
and magazines, particularly for the public debate, and the official 
inquiry proceedings, including the written responses by relevant 
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organizations and government agencies; this material provides a 
broad cross-section of the opinions on prenatal diagnosis found in 
Swedish society in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Several opinions 
had historical resonances, expressing historically-shaped notions 
of health and disease, deviation and normality. The historical per-
spective can therefore help conceptualize how medical knowledge 
has evolved, stabilized and changed, not only in its translation from 
one context to the next, but also between different periods.
The embeddedness of knowledge
There is a well-established notion in the history of science and 
science and technology studies that knowledge is embedded—
that its content cannot be separated from the social, political, and 
cultural contexts in which it is produced and applied. The context 
plays a role, both for the knowledge produced and for how that 
knowledge is perceived, applied, and used. One expression of this 
is Sheila Jasanoff ’s concept of co-production:
the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature 
and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose 
to live in it. Knowledge and its material embodiments are at 
once products of social work and constitutive of forms of social 
life; society cannot function without knowledge any more than 
knowledge can exist without appropriate social support. Scientific 
knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of reality. 
It both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, 
norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions—in 
short, in all building blocks of what we term the social. (Jasanoff 
2004, 2–3)
Our knowledge and our ideas about the world cannot be discon-
nected from the society in which we live. Biomedical knowledge 
produced in a laboratory or any other research environment is 
equally part of its social, meaning-making context. This means 
movement of knowledge
32
that when this knowledge is translated from knowledge-produ-
cing to applied knowledge contexts, it will both influence and be 
influenced by the latter context. Co-production is therefore a useful 
perspective for understanding how social, political, and cultural 
values interact with knowledge in the phases of its construction, 
mobilization, and application, wherever in society it is (see Lindh 
in this volume).
According to Jasanoff, some situations lend themselves to mak-
ing the embedded nature of knowledge visible. One is when new 
technologies are established, questioned, stabilized, and eventually 
regulated in a society. Prenatal diagnosis was just such a technol-
ogy. It was developed in a scientific and medical context moulded 
by certain views and values; when it became the subject of public 
debate, it came up against differing views and values. This was 
particularly true of views on people with disabilities, but also 
opinions on what constitutes human life, reproductive rights, and 
the direction of future medical research. The debate about prenatal 
diagnosis thus not only shows how new technology is discussed 
and questioned when it moves out of the laboratory or clinic, it 
also shows that when a new, complex technology is introduced, a 
variety of social, political, and ethical views are mobilized, which 
will be discussed in this chapter.
The historical roots of prenatal diagnosis
Prenatal diagnosis developed from knowledge in such disciplines 
as medical genetics, clinical chemistry, and obstetrics, of which 
the advances in medical genetics played a significant role, as the 
diagnosis of genetic diseases was a major part of the first prenatal 
diagnoses. One particularly important discovery was made in 1956, 
when the geneticists Albert Levan and Joe Hin Tjio found that 
humans have 46 chromosomes, not 48 as thought (Harper 2006). 
Three years later, the French paediatrician and geneticist Jérôme 
Lejeune and his co-workers suggested that Down’s syndrome was 
caused by an extra chromosome. The same year, 1959, it was found 
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that Turner’s syndrome and Klinefelter’s syndrome are both sex 
chromosome disorders, and the following year further links were 
found between chromosomal abnormalities and specific syndromes 
(Kevles 1995; Lindee 2005; Löwy 2017).
At first this new genetic knowledge was used to diagnose patients 
or confirm diagnoses, and soon it came into use in genetic counsel-
ling, which became established at a handful of hospitals in Sweden 
(Björkman & Tunlid 2017). The background of genetic counselling 
can be found not only in the emerging field of medical genetics, 
but also in the eugenics movement of the early twentieth century, 
with the latter’s aim of controlling the genetic composition of the 
population (Broberg & Tydén 2005).2 An important element in 
Swedish eugenics was the 1934 and 1941 Sterilization Acts, which 
allowed for sterilization of individuals classified as legally incompe-
tent without their consent.3 A group that was specifically targeted 
was the ‘feeble-minded’, who were judged to be genetically inferior 
and a social and economic burden on society, and whose procrea-
tion was assumed to weaken the population’s genetic composition 
(Tydén 2002). Eugenics, however, was a multifaceted movement 
that was not only government-driven; the spread of eugenic ideas 
in Swedish society meant that individuals learnt of the significance 
of their genetic inheritance, and turned to genetic experts for advice 
on reproductive health (Björkman 2015). Often they were afraid 
they might have children with disabilities or serious diseases.
In developing medical genetics and genetic counselling in the 
post-war period, many geneticists emphasized the individual’s right 
to make their own decisions and asserted that counselling was not 
intended to improve the heredity of the population. Most historians 
agree, however, that eugenic ideas and practices did not end with 
the Second World War (Bashford 2010). Exactly which parts of the 
eugenic mindset were abandoned and which were transformed and 
lived on into our own time with its ever more advanced genetic 
and reproductive technologies is much debated. As the historian of 
biology Nathaniel Comfort (2012) suggests, perhaps ‘the eugenic 
impulse’—the urge to eliminate disease, improve health, and reduce 
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suffering by controlling human heredity—has been one of the 
most enduring in this history. It certainly comes with a variety of 
socio cultural values about what constitutes good health, well-being, 
and quality of life, married with the wish to choose certain traits 
and reject abnormalities and diseases when making reproductive 
decisions. As will be seen, it was around these choices that much 
of the debate about prenatal diagnosis revolved.
From statistical risks to information about the foetus 
Before the advent of prenatal diagnosis in the 1970s, the methods 
available to geneticists for genetic counselling were based on sta-
tistical analyses of the risk that parents would pass on a certain 
disease or disability to their children. These estimates were based on 
known inheritance mechanisms and experience-based knowledge 
of how diseases were inherited. Armed with this knowledge and a 
map of the family’s disease patterns, the geneticist calculated the 
risk of a hereditary disease being passed to any future children. 
Those who received genetic counselling were thus told there was 
a risk, expressed as a percentage, of passing a specific disease or 
disability to their children. This figure for risk was what parents 
had to consider when contemplating pregnancy.
The point of genetic counselling, according to the Swedish pae-
diatrician and medical geneticist Karl-Henrik Gustavson, was ‘to 
provide factual information about the hereditary or non-hereditary 
nature of the disease and to communicate how great the risk will be 
for subsequent children’ (Gustavson 1967). According to Gustavson, 
genetic counselling had no eugenic purpose, and existed only to 
help individuals or families with their ‘special problems’. The notion 
that patient autonomy would be respected was often emphasized to 
underline it was the interests of the woman and the family which 
were paramount, not the state. The genetic counsellor’s job was to 
provide the woman with objective, neutral information, and not to 
influence her position on a new pregnancy. However, Gustavson 
and other genetic counsellors knew the risk figures on which they 
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based their advice could be difficult for laypeople to grasp, as there 
were such variations in people’s notions of significant and minor 
risk or the severity of a disease or birth defect. Moreover, parents 
often felt guilt and shame about the risk of passing on hereditary 
diseases or disabilities to their children (Gustavson 1967; Lindsten 
et al. 1975). In practice, genetic counselling was a very complex 
business, open to interpretation and value judgements. Risk calcula-
tions could be presented in different ways, as could information 
about the diseases or disabilities concerned. Medical knowledge thus 
came to be embedded in certain notions of disease, abnormality, 
and normality that were largely characterized by medical expertise.
The circumstances in which women made reproductive decisions 
changed dramatically in the early 1970s with prenatal diagnosis, 
made possible by medical genetics and the invention or improvement 
of several medical technologies. One of these was amniocentesis, a 
procedure in which a small amount of the amniotic fluid is removed 
from the amniotic sac. In the late 1950s it was found that the cells 
in the amniotic fluid could be used for foetal sex determination—
knowledge that was central to the diagnosis of sex-linked hereditary 
diseases. However, it was only in the late 1960s that cells were first 
cultured from the amniotic fluid, which was crucial for analysing 
chromosomes. Another important technology in this context was 
medical ultrasound, which in the early 1970s improved the ability 
to withdraw amniotic fluid (Löwy 2017).
If a woman underwent prenatal diagnosis, the information she 
was given no longer concerned the risk of a particular disease, but 
the specific condition of the foetus she was carrying. Amniocentesis 
made it possible to detect chromosomal abnormalities and deter-
mine the foetal sex. Doctors were also able to diagnose a number 
of unusual but serious metabolic disorders and to establish if there 
was a risk of spina bifida, a neural tube defect. Instead of multiple or 
complex risk figures, a woman who underwent prenatal diagnosis 
and found that the foetus had a disease or condition could decide 
whether to terminate the pregnancy.
The development of prenatal diagnosis occurred in parallel with 
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calls for more liberal abortion laws in Sweden (Lennerhed 2017). 
Under the 1938 Abortion Act, there was the possibility of legal 
abortion, but only in certain circumstances: the woman had to 
apply for an abortion, and it could be granted only with reference 
to certain specific indications.4 One was the ‘eugenic indication’, 
which meant the risk that a parent would transmit ‘insanity, mental 
retardation, or severe physical disease’. In 1963, in the wake of the 
thalidomide tragedy, foetal defects were added as an indication. 
Although the number of abortions on eugenic grounds declined 
in the post-war period (Tydén 2002), abortion due to a suspected 
hereditary disease or condition was a well-established practice in 
the Swedish health service.
In 1974, a new Abortion Act was passed that gave the woman 
the right to elect to have an abortion up to 18 weeks of pregnancy, 
after which an abortion was only permitted in exceptional circum-
stances with the permission of the National Board of Health and 
Welfare.5 Permission could be given until the foetus was considered 
viable, which in practice meant the end of 22 weeks. The majority 
of applications for abortion due to a birth defect were granted by 
the National Board of Health and Welfare, since the test results 
of the prenatal diagnosis were usually not available until after 18 
weeks of pregnancy. Abortions due to diagnosed foetal defects were 
called selective abortions, distinguishing them from the general 
abortions when the pregnancy was unwanted.
The introduction of prenatal diagnosis
Prenatal diagnosis was introduced in the Swedish health service 
in the early 1970s. It was primarily offered to pregnant women 
over a certain age (it had long been known that the risk of Down’s 
syndrome increased with maternal age) and women with disability 
or genetic disease in the family. A third group was women who, 
for other reasons, had strong concerns about having a child with 
a disability or genetic disease.
Prenatal diagnosis was thus targeted at individuals and families 
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in specific situations. It was seen by doctors as helping women in 
the designated risk groups by detecting several serious hereditary 
diseases and disabilities early in pregnancy, and meant that a foetus 
with one of those diseases or a chromosome abnormality could 
be aborted if the woman so wished, while an abortion could be 
avoided if the foetus was healthy. Families who ran a high risk of 
having a child with a disability or genetic disease could thus be 
‘guaranteed that any future child would not have the hereditary 
disease for which they had an increased risk’ according to some 
of the leading doctors in the field (Kjessler et al. 1972, 2362): their 
view was that prenatal diagnosis led to greater numbers of healthy 
children being born, and a reduction in the number of abortions 
of healthy foetuses. The new technology was thus described by the 
doctors as improving women’s opportunities to make informed 
reproductive choices. However, it could also be described as the 
prospect of greatly reducing ‘the number of hereditarily defective 
children’ (Svenska Dagbladet 17 Mar. 1971). In a letter to the Nation-
al Board of Health, three doctors argued that prenatal diagnosis 
should be extended as follows:
Through prenatal diagnosis, parents can be reassured early in 
pregnancy with accurate information. If the expected child is 
healthy, one can thus avoid the abortion of a healthy foetus. If 
the diagnosis of the child is positive, and if the mother wishes to 
terminate the pregnancy, society can be expected to save signi-
ficant sums, which would otherwise be needed for the future 
institutional care of the defective child. If only a small proportion 
of the money so saved is made available for prenatal diagnosis, 
something of benefit to both individual and society could be 
achieved satisfactorily.6
The reproductive choices of women and families were expected to 
fall into line with society’s interest in cutting the costs of healthcare 
and social care for disabled and seriously ill children. The expense 
of expanding prenatal diagnosis and genetic counselling could 
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therefore be justified on socio-economic grounds, compared with 
the costs of health and social care (Lindsten et al. 1976).
The possibility of using prenatal diagnosis to prevent the birth of 
children with disabilities was noted in several contexts. In Sweden’s 
medical journal, Läkartidningen, two paediatricians, Bengt Hagberg 
and Karl-Henrik Gustavson, expressed the hope that prenatal diag-
nosis would progress to the point where a simple blood test early 
in pregnancy would detect if the foetus had Down’s syndrome. It 
was their belief that ‘a preventive approach’ to mental disability was 
justified not only on humanitarian grounds but also on financial 
ones. According to their calculations, the cost to the taxpayer of a 
single ‘severely mentally disturbed child’ in institutional care was 
SEK 1.2 million a decade (Hagberg & Gustavson 1978). It is unclear 
what they meant by humanitarian grounds, but it may have been 
both the family’s situation and the child’s, as doctors often said 
that disabilities and hereditary diseases caused suffering to both 
children and families.
The early discourse of prenatal diagnosis, in which doctors and 
medical experts took the lead, therefore had several elements. It was 
based on medical advances which gave women greater opportuni-
ties to make reproductive choices, but it also plainly involved value 
judgements about serious diseases and disabilities. The individual’s 
right to choose in the question of abortion was combined with a 
belief that there was a public interest in reducing the number of 
people with genetic diseases or disabilities. The discourse also 
spanned such notions as disease, suffering, and normality. Children 
with genetic diseases and disabilities were often described as defec-
tive, and their condition a source of suffering for them and their 
families. Prenatal diagnosis, combined with abortion, was seen as 
a way of preventing this suffering. In this way the new technology 
was placed in a context characterized by certain norms and values.
When medical notions of foetal diagnosis were debated more 
generally, it was primarily in terms of two contemporary dis-
courses: one that stressed women’s rights to make independent, 
well-informed choices about reproductive issues, and one about 
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perceptions of people with disabilities and their place in society. 
Alongside this was a discourse about the right to abortion per se, 
but it hardly featured in the debate under consideration here. There 
was no organized anti-abortion movement in Sweden at this time, 
although there was a belief, especially in Christian contexts, that 
abortion rights should be restricted.7
Public interest in prenatal diagnosis
At first, the debate about prenatal diagnosis was limited to the 
medical context, with a few exceptions (see Gustafson 1980). An 
early attempt to address the wider implications of the technology 
was mounted by the Liberal politician Kerstin Anér in a high-profile 
motion in Parliament in 1972 on the inviolability of the individual, 
in which she stressed that society faced a difficult, complex situation 
because of recent medical and technological advances. One was 
prenatal diagnosis, which according to Anér could soon lead to 
the question of whether it was a right for all pregnant women to 
be informed of any genetic diseases, and whether that right would 
bring with it a duty to abort any foetus with a defect. Anér asked 
whether ‘society would be the child’s advocate and say you have the 
right to live; or you have the right not to live’. The motion resulted 
in a proposal to set up a working group to discuss the social and 
legal consequences of medical developments, and whether there 
were grounds to impose any restrictions on medical research (Anér 
1972). After an extensive consultation process, the parliamentary 
motion was rejected.8
There had been little public discussion, though, by the time 
‘Your money or your life’ was published in the spring of 1978. The 
debate which the article sparked, and the demand for practice 
guidelines for prenatal diagnosis from the medical authorities, led 
the National Board of Health and Welfare to appoint an official 
inquiry in 1980. It brought together doctors and other medical 
experts to clarify and describe the central issues of prenatal diag-
nosis. As the Director General of the National Board of Health and 
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Welfare said, the advances in medical research had determined the 
direction taken, and now it was important to clarify whether society 
should influence future developments (Socialstyrelsen 1982). The 
inquiry’s interim report addressed both the medical and technical 
aspects of prenatal diagnosis and the psychological, ethical, and 
legal ramifications. It also asked several questions about the appli-
cation of prenatal diagnosis. The interim report was circulated for 
public consultation to various public authorities and organizations 
as normal, resulting in the submission of a very large number of 
official consultation responses.
The public debate, like the consultation responses, addressed a 
range of broader issues and problematics. In what follows, three 
central themes in this material have been singled out. First, the 
importance of prenatal diagnosis for views on people with disabilities 
and the socio-economics. Second, foetal rights and the situations in 
which it was right to terminate a pregnancy—a theme that tied in 
with the public debate about abortion per se, and also the question 
of prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion. Third, the implemen-
tation and regulation of prenatal diagnosis, including whether there 
were reasons to change the standing abortion legislation, a theme 
with a bearing on reproductive rights as formulated in the 1974 
Abortion Act. Also considered here is the side theme of the nature 
of medical research, and whether there was reason to redirect or 
limit the research relating to prenatal diagnosis.
Prenatal diagnosis and disability
The article ‘Your Money or Your Life’ dealt pointedly with the 
three points that the authors said had been the key arguments for 
prenatal diagnosis: reducing the suffering of families with children 
with disabilities, reducing the suffering of the child, and reducing 
the cost to society. To the first argument, the authors said that the 
remedies were social measures and changed attitudes. The idea 
that prenatal diagnosis could reduce the suffering of people with 
disabilities was also called into question, because only those with 
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a disability or their immediate relatives could decide what con-
stituted a meaningful life. However, according to the authors, the 
humanitarian arguments were overshadowed by the third argu-
ment concerning economics, and they cautioned that in a society 
driven by profitability, efficiency, and the rational use of resources, 
people with disabilities were dismissed as unprofitable. According 
to them, this was the chief reason for offering prenatal diagnosis 
(Nordlund et al. 1978).
The claim that the impetus behind prenatal diagnosis was 
socio-economic outraged several doctors, who countered that the 
primary reason was to reduce the suffering of children with severe 
congenital diseases, disabilities, or birth defects, and the same went 
for families too. It should be noted here that suffering would be 
alleviated by the abortion of foetuses with those diagnoses—there 
was no possibility of treatment in utero. Furthermore, according 
to the doctors, the possibility of prenatal diagnosis would allay 
the fears of parents worried about future pregnancies. The socio- 
economic arguments were now toned down and the medical and 
humanitarian aims emphasized (Gustavson 1978; Kjessler 1979). 
However, even among doctors there were those who wondered 
whether Down’s syndrome could justify abortion on the basis of 
diminished suffering. Stig Melander, a senior consultant at the 
department of obstetrics and gynaecology in Norrköping, wrote 
that ‘It is a widely accepted fact that the mongoloid as a conscious, 
living person does not suffer to any appreciable extent from his 
condition’ (Melander 1978). Despite this, an increasing number 
of pregnancies were terminated due to Down’s syndrome, and it 
could not be ruled out that this affected people with disabilities:
The hardest thing for many people, as for me, however, is the idea 
of those disabled individuals who have already been born, who are 
aware of their situation. How can the disabled view this state of 
affairs, this reasoning, as anything other than deeply humiliating 
and offensive? If I were on the way now, would you others have 
made sure I never came into the world? I am a deeply unwelcome 
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citizen. Can anyone help convince me that I don’t look at them 
this way? (Melander 1978)
The Swedish disability movement was divided in their view of pre-
natal diagnosis. The reasons for and against were many, and related 
to attitudes towards people with disabilities and the support for them 
and their families. Many parents of children with disabilities found 
there were major deficiencies in social support, and the pressure on 
them to take care of their disabled children themselves was at times 
described as ‘an unreasonable workload’ (Dagens Nyheter 10 June 
1980). From this perspective, the possibility of prenatal diagnosis 
could be felt important for future pregnancies. Yet there was a strong 
concern within the movement that prenatal diagnosis would end in 
quality checks on all foetuses, with people with disabilities thought an 
undesirable group in society. Another concern was that the voluntary 
nature of testing and abortion would be eroded: prenatal diagnosis 
might seem obligatory rather than an option, and abortion the 
self-evident choice if a disease or disability were diagnosed.
At first, however, the disability movement was cautiously positive 
about prenatal diagnosis. In the early 1970s, the Swedish National 
Association for People with Intellectual Disability (FUB), which 
largely organized parents who had children with disabilities, argued 
that genetic counselling should be expanded, because many of its 
members were worried about having another child with the same 
diagnosis. Over the 1970s, though, fears grew that prenatal diag-
nosis would lead to selection and eventually the emergence of an 
elite society. In essence, the disability movement tried to defend 
the rights of people with disabilities while supporting access to 
prenatal diagnosis for individual families. Prenatal diagnosis could 
be justified on an individual basis, whenever the expectant parents 
felt themselves incapable of caring for a child with a disability. ‘We 
couldn’t cope having another mongoloid child’, as one parent put 
it (Wahlström 1974). The debate within the FUB became more 
heated in the late 1970s when the question of human dignity and 
societal issues was raised. Prenatal diagnosis was said to be ‘not 
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primarily a question for experts—but about views on human dig-
nity and what kind of society we really want’ (FUB-kontakt 1978). 
FUB representatives rejected the standard argument that prenatal 
diagnosis could prevent suffering. For example, it was indefensible 
to say that all children with Down’s syndrome suffered, and it was 
virtually impossible to know in advance what life would be like for 
them (Stockholms-Tidningen 22 Nov. 1982).
In its official consultation response to the National Board of 
Health and Welfare’s report, the FUB stated that it represented an 
uncompromising view of humankind: ‘Each person has a unique 
value in themselves. Even a severely disabled person has an infinite 
value, and the right to our respect and love.’9 Any tendency to ques-
tion the right to be born or to live with full human rights, regardless 
of disability, had to be fought, and efforts had to continue to direct 
research and find resources to provide life chances for children 
with disabilities and their families. However, the possibility of 
prenatal diagnosis could not be rejected. According to the FUB, 
Sweden’s abortion legislation and the rules on free abortion were 
incompatible with the prohibition on abortion on the basis of birth 
defects; it stressed, however, that its position had nothing to do 
with the attributes of the foetus, but on the family’s situation, and 
whether the woman judged that the family had the resources for 
a child who required extra care.
Likewise, the Swedish Disability Federation Central Committee 
(HCK), an umbrella body for several disability organizations, was 
initially in favour of prenatal diagnosis, arguing it could prevent 
disability (Gustafson 1980, 66). However, by the time of its official 
consultation response to the National Board of Health and Welfare’s 
report, the HCK, much like the FUB, emphasized the equal right 
to dignity and that society had to provide support so everyone 
would have equal treatment.10 The HCK could not accept prenatal 
diagnosis ‘designed to sift out the people who will not be allowed to 
live’. Nor should the severity of the birth defect determine whether 
an abortion was defensible. For the HCK, the ethical issue was not 
one of degree; the conflict existed in the idea that one could ‘quality 
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assess’ a foetus. Rather, it emphasized the importance of changing 
society so the consequences of disabilities could be compensated 
for or prevented. Many of the HCK’s members were worried that 
tolerance of people with disabilities would wane and that society’s 
resources for the group would stagnate or be cut. That said, it did 
not reject prenatal diagnosis out of hand. What it objected to was 
prenatal diagnosis predicated on the abortion of all foetuses with 
a defect. However, it could support ‘foetal-focused therapy’, or 
prenatal diagnosis focused on the treatment of foetuses.
Segments of the disability movement clearly distanced them-
selves from prenatal diagnosis, however. For example, the Swedish 
Association of the Visually Impaired ‘forcefully’ rejected 
all prenatal diagnosis designed to cull human populations. No 
disability could possibly justify abortion in a democratic society. 
Any other approach can have devastating effects on how people 
with disabilities are viewed. But it can also lead to the founda-
tions of democracy and views on people and people’s worth are 
changing beyond recognition.11 
There may have been several reasons for the disability movement’s 
varied views on prenatal diagnosis. One was that the associations 
of parents of children with disabilities were often more cautiously 
positive than those associations of people with disabilities  (Gustafson 
1984). Being the parent of a disabled person often carried great 
responsibility. Attitudes may also have been affected by the severity 
of the disability. Although several associations objected to rating 
various disabilities and conditions, that did not rule out that parents 
who already had children with very severe disabilities and significant 
care needs were in favour of prenatal diagnosis.
The socio-economic arguments, though, were firmly and unani-
mously rejected by the disability movement. In the early 1980s that 
case was still being made, with talk of cost–benefit analyses and 
calculations of the economic gains to be had from the increased 
diagnosis of birth defects and subsequent abortions and saved care 
45
prenatal diagnosis
costs. ‘However you want to count it, prenatal diagnosis is very 
profitable for society’, as a county council politician put it (Åker-
man 1982; FUB-kontakt 1982). Disgust at this sort of calculation 
went far beyond the disability movement: it opened for ‘general 
hatred of disabilities’, wrote the Social Democratic newspaper 
Stockholms-Tidningen (5 July 1982), which thought the question 
ought to be discussed in terms of society’s general support for 
people with disabilities. Only societies which included them could 
avoid prenatal diagnosis becoming an instrument for selecting and 
removing ‘non-perfect’ people.
Foetal rights
Another theme in the debate about prenatal diagnosis was the rights 
of the foetus and the ability to diagnose and possibly treat foetuses 
with birth defects. As the conservative newspaper Svenska Dagbladet 
(9 Dec. 1979) said, this could reasonably be expected to raise the 
ethical question of whether the foetus is a person with the right to 
life and not part of the woman’s body. The Swedish Medical Society 
reasoned along similar lines in its views on the ethics of prenatal 
diagnosis, stating that the possibility not only of diagnosing but also 
treating foetuses would probably lead to the rights of the foetus as 
an independent individual being respected to a greater extent ‘than 
is now the case’ (Svenska Läkaresällskapets delegation för medicinsk 
etik 1980). Before the new Abortion Act was passed in 1974, the 
Medical Society’s Delegation for Medical Ethics had stated that the 
foetus had its own life, and that as a potential human should be given 
legal protection; however, it was omitted from the new legislation 
(Svenska Läkaresällskapets delegation för medicinsk etik 1979). 
Thus, it was a view that enjoyed a resurgence because of the ability 
to diagnose and possibly treat in utero. The debate about prenatal 
diagnosis therefore evolved to include the question of when the 
human embryo could be regarded as having personhood.
This and many other issues were covered by a special inquiry 
on the medical ethical aspects of prenatal diagnosis appointed by 
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the Swedish national synod in 1979.12 Medical experts as well as 
theologians sat on the inquiry panel.13 As described in their report, 
prenatal diagnosis had three aims: to prevent the abortion of healthy 
foetuses; to develop methods for treating foetuses before any per-
manent damage; and to provide a basis for a decision to possibly 
terminate a pregnancy. These were the three aims doctors had always 
recognized. The synod inquiry was unanimous that the first two aims 
could be accepted without reservation, so it concentrated on the 
third—abortions after prenatal diagnosis. Opinion was divided on 
these so-called selective abortions, but the synod inquiry could agree 
that they were part of ‘the much larger and ultimately fundamental 
problem of abortion’ (Fagerberg 1980, 8). It amounted to the foetus’s 
right to life. Prenatal diagnosis was thus tied to the questions of the 
point at which the fertilized egg or embryo had personhood and at 
what point it merited protection. This went hand in hand with an 
ongoing debate about euthanasia—the circumstances in which it 
was right to actively end a life—and the 1974 Abortion Act, which, 
according to the synod inquiry, had not addressed the rights of the 
foetus. The synod inquiry’s various positions on these questions 
were summarized by the chairman of the Swedish Medical Society’s 
Delegation for Medical Ethics, who hoped that a ‘more thorough and 
nuanced discussion of abortion than the one which preceded the 
1974 decision would now be possible’ (Giertz 1980, 117).
However, according to the synod inquiry, selective abortions 
were, to some extent, special compared to general abortions. The 
pregnancy was initially desired, but the foetus was found to have a 
disease or defect. Further, they were often performed late in preg-
nancy. ‘In these circumstances, no one can ignore the fact that life 
is extinguished because it is not desirable’, said Gustav Giertz, phy-
sician and chairman of the Swedish Medical Society’s Delegation 
for Medical Ethics (Giertz 1980, 119). The synod inquiry could not 
agree on whether such abortions should be considered ethically 
defensible or not. Views ranged from certainty that the Abortion Act 
accurately reflected current norms to calls to safeguard the rights of 
the foetus and a belief that abortion was only ethically acceptable 
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under special conditions such as incurable and fatal birth defects or 
danger to the mother’s physical or mental health. The synod inquiry 
did not believe the Abortion Act should be changed, but did not 
preclude a situation when diseases of the foetus could not only be 
diagnosed but also treated, meaning that the legal status of the foetus 
as an independent individual would have to command far greater 
respect. According to Archbishop Olof Sundby, advances in prenatal 
diagnosis had reinforced an awareness of the respect for the life of 
the foetus (Upsala Nya Tidning 17 June 1980). The inquiry attracted 
considerable attention, placed the foetal rights on the agenda, and 
by extension fuelled the wider debate about prenatal diagnosis and 
abortion (Dagens Nyheter 17 June 1980; Svenska Dagbladet 18 June 
1980). The medical knowledge generated by prenatal diagnosis as it 
moved to other contexts than its original genetic, medical context 
thus prompted new questions—or brought to life old ones—of which 
several concerned conflicting norms and values.
Practice and regulation
When prenatal diagnosis was introduced in the Swedish health 
service, it was with no specific guidelines or regulations. Much 
of the public debate had turned on the question of how prenatal 
diagnosis would be implemented, what would be allowed, and 
whether specific regulations were required besides the 1974 Abor-
tion Act. Many of the voices in the debate were worried about what 
the future held. The liberal newspaper Dagens Nyheter wondered 
whether prenatal diagnosis could become mandatory, and what 
choices parents would be faced with: ‘Will the authorities permit 
diagnosed harmful genes to be reproduced? Will the taxpayer, who 
will foot the bill, tolerate that foetuses suspected to be defective 
become people?’ (Dagens Nyheter 18 June 1980). The eugenicist 
mindset was cited as a warning lesson. The disability movement 
also demanded regulation. According to the HCK’s registrar, Rolf 
Utberg, not every disease was grounds for abortion. As he wrote, 
‘I believe that all kinds of people should be welcome and that we 
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should have very strict rules for how prenatal diagnosis should be 
conducted’ (Dagens Nyheter 27 July 1982).
The question of guidelines or regulations was also raised by the 
National Board of Health and Welfare in its inquiry into prenatal 
diagnosis. Who should be offered prenatal diagnosis? Was there 
cause to change the 1974 Abortion Act? Should a woman have the 
right to choose, even if the reason for an abortion was the foetus’s 
attributes? On the first question, many consultation bodies—except 
those which flatly rejected prenatal diagnosis—accepted the  practice 
developed by the Swedish health service of prenatal diagnosis being 
offered to special risk groups. However, segments of the disability 
movement were critical of the concept of ‘risk groups’, which often 
featured in the debate, and argued vigilance was needed so attitudes 
towards people with disabilities would not gradually worsen.14 In 
medical quarters, meanwhile, the view was that fear and anxiety 
felt by women was as important a reason for prenatal diagnosis, 
and that any rules had to be adaptable to the individual situation.15 
It is interesting to note that in its consultation response to the 
National Board of Health and Welfare’s report, the Swedish Med-
ical Association argued that the final rules for prenatal diagnosis 
and the resources it would attract should be the subject of a broad 
parliamentary inquiry, as ‘the correct democratic approach’.16 This 
was not detailed in the consultation response opinion, but was in 
line with views expressed by individual doctors (Dagens Nyheter 
23 July 1982), perhaps an indication of the need for clinical praxis 
consistent with society’s values and norms.
Thus while the majority of consultation bodies believed that pre-
natal diagnosis should be available to certain groups, many were 
critical of screening, with all pregnant women offered the tests to 
detect serious birth defects.17 Several consultation bodies stressed that 
prenatal diagnosis had to be voluntary, and if it came to screening it 
could impose such pressure on women that in practice it would be 
difficult to say no. Even voluntary testing made some uneasy, not 
least in the disability movement, for whom just the offer of prenatal 
diagnosis was problematic, concerned that in practice women did not 
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have freedom of choice. It could be difficult to refuse. ‘The entirety of 
the technological situation with its (ostensible) accuracy and effec-
tiveness exerts a strong manipulative influence. There is little scope 
for questioning, reflection, and emotional evaluation. It is simplest 
and best to let technology have its way’, wrote the Swedish Heart 
and Lung Association.18 According to the National Association of 
the Disabled, if a foetus was found to have defects abortion was not 
voluntary, as there was a very strong pressure on the woman in this 
situation to abort, something that the National Board of Health and 
Welfare (Socialstyrelsen 1982, 81) also noted in its report.19
The question of altering the right to free abortion was closely 
linked to rapid medical developments, which meant that an increas-
ing number of foetal diseases and abnormalities could be diagnosed 
ever earlier. According to the inquiry, there was an evident risk of 
‘quality checks’ on the foetus and a greater number of abortions 
for less serious abnormalities. The measures considered included 
the possibility of increased surveillance of abortions due to birth 
defects, and partial restrictions on the right to have an abortion 
due to birth defects. Regarding surveillance of abortions due to 
birth defects, the inquiry asked whether a woman who wanted to 
have an abortion between weeks 14 and 18 of pregnancy should 
have to state her reason. Since the results of prenatal diagnosis were 
rarely available before the end of week 18, the majority of abortions 
due to birth defects were decided by the National Board of Health 
and Welfare (though in principle it always gave permission); they 
therefore had a good overview of the reasons given. If more birth 
defects were diagnosed before week 18, the inquiry feared this 
supervisory aspect would be lost ‘unless special steps were taken’. 
At least initially, the proposal that a reason would have to be given 
for an abortion between weeks 14 and 18 was not designed to limit 
a woman’s right to an abortion. However, future changes were not 
ruled out (Socialstyrelsen 1982, 106).
By extension, the inquiry foresaw ‘bigger problems’ arising from 
future medical developments, namely that minor abnormalities 
would increasingly be detectable. Would this justify imposing limits, 
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deciding which birth defects would be considered valid grounds 
for an abortion? The inquiry emphasized that regulation would 
scarcely be possible without overruling women’s autonomy, and it 
therefore asked whether abortion on the grounds of birth defects 
was such a problem it justified tearing up the basic principle of the 
abortion legislation, namely a woman’s right to choose. Was it the 
woman’s right alone to decide to have an abortion, even when the 
reason was the foetus’s traits?
To check the reasons for abortions between weeks 14 and 18 or 
to restrict the woman’s right to choose would require changes to 
free access to abortion. Most consultation bodies strongly opposed 
any such restrictions, and especially the majority of the women’s 
movement, the campaign for the 1974 Abortion Act fresh in their 
minds. This did not prevent many women’s organizations com-
menting on the National Board of Health and Welfare’s report 
that it was an ethically complex issue, which would affect society’s 
views on disability.20 Social Democratic Women in Sweden was one 
organization to emphasize that for decades women had fought for 
the right to abortion, including the right to decide without giving 
a reason. They did not agree that the fundamentals of the 1974 
Abortion Act had changed.
Then as now, we hold that in balancing the foetus’s right to 
 development on the one hand and its right to be born into  human 
dignity, the latter must weigh more heavily. Then as now, we 
contend it is the mother alone who can determine whether the 
conditions of human dignity can be met.21
Even the Fredrika Bremer Association, one of the oldest Swedish 
women’s organizations, stressed the importance of free abortion: 
‘Now, as before, we wish to state our belief that a woman’s right to 
decide about the possible termination of a pregnancy may not be 
limited.’ For them it was ‘obvious that the woman bases her judgement 
about a possible termination of a pregnancy on whether she can, 
whether she dares, assume responsibility for the child … Who better 
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than the woman to judge what she can cope with.’22 The Women’s 
Political Committee of the Left Party Communists also stressed 
women’s ability ‘if supported to take difficult decisions’, and there 
was no reason whatsoever to restrict the 1974 Abortion Act in the 
light of advances in prenatal diagnosis. It could not be construed any 
other way ‘than as a distrust of a woman’s ability to decide for herself 
on what conditions she wants to give birth.’23 The women’s political 
association that most disapproved of prenatal diagnosis was, not 
surprisingly, the Christian Democratic Women’s Association, their 
view being coloured by their general dislike of the 1974 Abortion 
Act. Their precept was the sanctity of life and the equal dignity of 
all, and they believed abortion was a last resort.24
One of the most determined defenders of a woman’s right to 
choose was the Swedish Association for Sexuality Education (RFSU), 
a non-profit organization that had long championed the right to free 
abortion. For the RFSU it was unthinkable that a woman should 
have to request an abortion because of minor abnormalities other 
than in purely exceptional cases, and to change the regulations for 
abortions in weeks 14 to 18, as the inquiry discussed, would be to 
reimpose on the woman ‘a paternalism that after a long struggle 
she had finally rid herself of with the 1974 Abortion Act’. The very 
idea ‘that once again she would be declared not to be trusted to 
decide a thing that so deeply impinges on her life’ was offensive in 
the extreme. Worse, if it were possible to ban abortions for minor 
birth defects, the RFSU feared that it could end in a ban on all 
abortions where there was no birth defect. In other words, it was 
a direct threat to the right to free abortion.25
The doctors too defended the existing abortion legislation and 
a woman’s right to choose, even when the reason was the foetus’s 
condition. This was in line with current rules, and ‘all our other 
legislation in the field of healthcare is predicated on it being the 
adult who has to take decisions.’26
With few exceptions, the right to free abortion thus went unchal-
lenged by the debate about prenatal diagnosis. But many expressed 
restrictive views about access to prenatal diagnosis, and called for 
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vigilance about the technology’s ethical and social consequences, 
and the importance of greater support for people with disabilities 
and their families.
Freedom of research and its consequences
Throughout the debate on prenatal diagnosis, new research findings 
and methods were published. This, combined with medical experts’ 
hopes that in the future even more diseases and conditions could be 
diagnosed and that some treatment in utero would be possible, meant 
that terms such as foetal medicine, foetal therapy, and foetal surgery 
were introduced into the debate, largely to argue that prenatal diagno-
sis was not merely a question of birth defects and abortion. Existing 
fears persisted that such developments might have undesirable effects, 
especially in negative views of disability and the pursuit of ‘perfect 
children’. The issue of research funding and whether it should be 
regulated was therefore part of the debate about prenatal diagnosis. 
The National Board of Health and Welfare’s report acknowledged that 
independent research would lead in directions which, for a variety 
of reasons could have no application in society, and asked whether 
the applications or the research itself should be controlled in any 
way (Socialstyrelsen 1982, ii–iii). This part of the debate reflected 
an awareness that knowledge production in prenatal diagnosis was 
associated with strongly held values and norms.
Medical experts and researchers, naturally enough, opposed 
controls on research: the positive effects of prenatal diagnosis 
outweighed even the ethical problems posed by new knowledge 
and techniques.27 Any attempt to control independent research 
would be unfortunate. Instead, what was needed was prepared-
ness to manage the social and ethical problems that arose.28 The 
disability movement, meanwhile, had a more restrictive stance. It 
was widely felt that resources should be channelled to research on 
the prevention and treatment of birth defects—to foetal therapy, 
in other words. Many also pointed to the importance of research 
and measures that made it possible for people with disabilities to 
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live in the community. Few opposed the idea that research should 
be independent, but many were critical of the lack of reflection and 
democratic discussion about its practical implications. This was the 
view of the Swedish Association of the Visually Impaired, among 
others: ‘We find it horrifying that such important research as lies 
behind prenatal diagnosis can be developed and put to practical 
use before society’s decision-making organs even have the chance 
to evaluate it and decide.’29 Medical knowledge production should 
not be allowed without in-depth, democratic discussions about the 
possible consequences when that knowledge is transferred from the 
laboratory to the clinical setting. As these comments demonstrate, 
what was asked for was a democratic conversation, a form of public 
engagement with science (Irwin et al. 2013; see also Lindh in this 
volume), where knowledge was not only translated between different 
contexts, but also subjected to discussion, criticism, and reflection.
Conclusions
This chapter examines the new interpretations and understandings 
of prenatal diagnosis when it was translated from the medical and 
clinical context to the public sphere. The public debate was influ-
enced by several movements of the day—the disability movement, 
the women’s movement—and also by enduring historical trends 
in views on health and disease, normality and deviation. The ear-
ly medical discourse, which acknowledged the opportunities to 
reject foetuses diagnosed with genetic diseases and chromosomal 
abnormalities, thus reducing suffering and increasing the pro-
portion of healthy children, was challenged by the debate about 
human dignity and everyone’s right to live an equal and dignified 
life. Soon the complexities accelerated as the debate opened up to 
include everything from ethical issues to political problems, and 
ultimately whether there were reasons to limit prenatal diagnosis 
in practice and to impose restrictions on the existing abortion 
legislation, which, after long investigations and discussions, had 
been passed just a decade before.
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That there were deep reservations about a new, far-reaching tech-
nology during its introduction was not in itself strange. According 
to Jasanoff (2004), this stage, when the social order of technology 
has not yet stabilized, is when it is usual for conflicts over its inter-
pretation, values, and standardization. Questions, debate, should 
be thought an essential element in the stabilization of complex 
technologies. For society to think knowledge and technology legiti-
mate, then, neither can be decoupled from the values and norms in 
which they are produced and applied. In terms of co-production, 
the debate about prenatal diagnosis thus was a very necessary stage 
if this technology was to become part of the social order. Various 
actors—experts and representatives of different organizations—
participated in the debate, which ranged over all the arguments 
about prenatal diagnosis, within the framework of key discourses 
that operated in accordance with their own logic and values.
In Sweden the debate about prenatal diagnosis did not lead to 
a change in the right to abortion. That right, like confidence in 
the woman’s right to choose, was firmly rooted in the political 
discourse of the 1974 Abortion Act and in the medical discourse, 
and the practice of prenatal diagnosis was stabilized around these 
discourses. However, because of the official inquiries and dis-
cussions, there was a growing emphasis on the voluntary nature 
of prenatal diagnosis and the importance of women being given 
detailed, factual information, along with information about soci-
etal support to children with disabilities. Medical facts were not 
enough, information about prenatal diagnosis had to include its 
social and psychological aspects (Socialstyrelsen 1986). However, 
the highly charged and normative issues of the right and ability 
to choose foetal traits, would return in the following years as new 
medical knowledge and new technologies developed in genetics 
and reproductive medicine. The debate about prenatal diagnosis 
shows the importance of reflecting on this knowledge and its 
applications at an early stage. The social order it gives rise to will 
influence not only how the application of research is regulated, but 
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The objects of 
global health policy
Turning knowledge into evidence  
at the World Health Organization
Rachel Irwin
In December 2012, I received a box with a picture of a mother 
and baby. It was a ‘Nourishing newborns feeding kit’, which, 
according to the text on the outside, included an ‘easy-to-follow 
guide to breast and bottle feeding, valuable savings on infant 
formula and Similac savings for your baby.’ The box also had the 
slogan, ‘Newborns don’t come with a feeding manual. But Similac® 
StrongMoms® does’. In addition to this box, between July 2011 
and December 2012 Abbott Laboratories, the makers of Similac, 
sent me five direct mailings advertising Similac Infant Formula 
and each including a $5 coupon.
At the time, I was researching the UNICEF/WHO  International 
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes. The Code was adopted 
in 1981 in response to the unethical marketing of infant formula, 
especially in low-income settings. The direct mailings I received 
thirty years later were a violation of the Code, specifically  Article 5 
which prohibits both the direct advertising to mothers and coupons. 
I reported this to the International Baby Food Action Network 
(IBFAN), an international non-governmental organization (NGO). 
IBFAN relies on a grassroots network to supply it with examples 
of Code violations or inappropriate private sector involvement. As 
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part of their work, they run the International Code Documen-
tation Centre in Penang, Malaysia, to which people can report 
violations. The Centre responded, letting me know that they had 
received similar reports from mothers in Canada and the US. 
My complaint, and those of the mothers referenced in the letter, 
eventually fed into IBFAN reports, including updated versions of 
Breaking the Rules, Stretching the Rules, a biannual report produced 
by IBFAN that presents evidence on violations of the Code. IBFAN 
uses the report as an advocacy tool, for example using excerpts in 
flyers to hand out at WHO meetings with the aim of influencing 
policymakers. 
This vignette describes how an object—or a photographic rep-
resentation of it—can be transformed from a promotional tool, 
manufactured at an Abbott factory, into a piece of evidence which 
is then used in advocacy at the WHO in Geneva, Switzerland. 
In a broader sense, public health knowledge and experience are 
embedded in an object which is then used as evidence to inform 
policy.
Empirical and theoretical approaches
The transformation of public health knowledge and experience into 
evidence is fundamental to the work of the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO). As the United Nations’ (UN) specialized agency for 
health, the WHO constitution mandates it to ‘propose conventions, 
agreements and regulations, and make recommendations with 
respect to international health matters’ and to ‘develop, establish 
and promote international standards’ in the health sector. In order 
to fulfil these core functions of ‘setting norms and standards’ in 
public health and ‘articulating ethical and evidence-based policy 
options’ (WHO 2019), the WHO also calls on experts to prepare 
independent and evidence-based reports. However, as a member 
state organization, the process of making recommendations and reg-
ulations also formally involves representatives from 194 countries, 
and often includes other UN bodies, civil society, and the private 
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sector. A key question is how (or if) the WHO produces policies 
that are globally relevant through this process. How are public 
health knowledge, evidence, and experience from 194 member 
states and a wide range of other stakeholders incorporated into 
policies that are meant to be universally applicable?
I examine this question by comparing the production of two 
WHO policies: the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk 
Substitutes (1981) and the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing 
of Foods and Non-alcoholic Beverages to Children (2010). The latter, 
developed in response to concern at increasing rates of childhood 
obesity, sets out ways for member states to ‘reduce the impact on 
children of marketing of foods high in saturated fats, trans/fatty 
acids, free sugars, or salt.’ In drafting both the Set of Recommen-
dations and the Code, the WHO involved member states, experts, 
civil society, and the private sector in the shape of the food and 
pharmaceutical industries. Both documents were formally adopted 
and endorsed by WHO member states at the World Health Assembly 
(WHA), the WHO’s main governing body.
Empirically, my comparison is based on interviews with key 
stakeholders behind both documents, ethnographic fieldwork at 
WHO headquarters in Geneva, archival material, and documen-
tation from WHO governing body meetings. I interviewed 46 
individuals, spanning WHO staff, staff from other relevant UN 
bodies, representatives from member states (including the WHA 
delegations), NGOs, and private industry (including advertising 
and the food and beverage sectors), and researchers involved in 
the case studies as experts. After the Set of Recommendations was 
endorsed by the WHA, the WHO was tasked with producing an 
implementation guide. This document sets out policy options and 
suggestions for incorporating the Set of Recommendations into 
national contexts. I carried out six months of participant obser-
vations at WHO headquarters, working in the team responsible 
for the Set of Recommendations and contributing to the writing 
of the implementation guide, which was finalized in 2012. In the 
course of the fieldwork, I came across information and experience 
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embedded in many physical and digital objects—reports, flyers, 
peer-reviewed articles, systematic reviews, logos, products, and 
brands—which are the subjects of this chapter.
The policy process at the WHO revolves around the transforma-
tion of public health experience and knowledge into evidence. Such 
knowledge and experience often come in the form of systematic 
reviews of peer-reviewed literature, official recommendations by 
expert committees, and data on disease trends and burdens. In the 
case of the Code and the Set of Recommendations, evidence also 
includes documented violations of the Code or other marketing 
techniques considered inappropriate by the various actors in the 
case studies. Formal decisions, or resolutions, taken by the WHA, 
not only cite evidence, they also become evidence in that they can be 
cited in future resolutions. In fact, any object can become evidence 
when it is used to prove a point. In the policy context, evidence 
only exists in relation to a question (Engelke 2008). That is, know-
ledge and experience of the marketing of food or infant formula is 
organized into evidence depending on who is using it and for what 
purpose, and evidence must be for something  (Engelke 2008). In 
other words, the Similac® kit was ‘just’ an object, but became evi-
dence when used by breastfeeding advocates to prove that Abbott 
was violating the Code. In other words, as Åsa Alftberg notes in 
this volume, knowledge is mediated through material objects.
The narratives of these two case studies demonstrate how poli-
cymaking at the WHO is the result of the interaction among public 
health knowledge, evidence, emotion, and a range of situational, 
social, and environmental factors that influence political feasibility 
(Walt 1994, 29–33; Hodžić 2013). We also see that the global health 
community continues to struggle and experiment with ranking and 
using different types of evidence in creating policy. On the one hand, 
the superiority of evidence can be fetishized and used to create the 
illusion that policy stakeholders are morally superior and acting 
impartially according to what the evidence ‘says’. In this way, the 
use of evidence can be a way to assert power. On the other hand, 
evidence is a social product whose truth can be challenged. Indeed, 
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treating evidence as truth can obscure the subjective, ideological, and 
political nature of the production of evidence (Goldenberg 2006). 
For example, criticisms of randomized controlled trials (RCT) and 
evidence-based medicine focus on how these movements and tools 
have inappropriately quantified the social and political processes 
that interact with health, or have ignored them completely (Lambert 
2006; Lambert et al. 2006; Goldenberg 2006; Ecks 2008). In another 
example in this volume, Kristofer Hansson, Gabriella Nilsson, and 
Irén Tiberg look at the challenges of implementing evidence-based 
care practices in real-life settings. Evidence can also be challenged 
on the basis that those who produce it are biased—as in both of 
the cases I mentioned at the start of this chapter.
Beyond this, the policy process at the WHO is characterized by 
both politics and aesthetics. Major policies, such as the Code or 
the Set of Recommendations, must be agreed upon by 194 mem-
ber states. Each of these countries has their own social, cultural, 
and political contexts which influence how they vote or push for 
certain policy choices in Geneva. This also creates a situation in 
which powerful lobbies or advocacy groups at the national level can 
influence member states to make certain decisions at the WHO, and 
pressure other countries to do the same. At the same time, WHO 
documents represent a certain type of genre, and knowledge and 
evidence must be massaged so that it fits the aesthetic constraints 
of international policy documents  (Hodžić 2013; for press releases, 
see Lindh in this volume).
In what follows I look at how public health knowledge and 
experience were transformed into evidence, which in turn was 
used to produce both the Code and the Set of Recommendations. 
In doing so, I consider the use of evidence for agenda-setting and 
as a rationale for action, controversies about evidence, and how the 
‘best available evidence’ promotes or limits certain policy options.
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Evidence as a rationale for action
I begin with breastmilk substitutes: at the 27th WHA in 1974, 
fifteen WHO member states sponsored a draft resolution that was 
adopted as Resolution WHA27.43. Its preamble stated:
Reaffirming that breast-feeding has proved to be the most ap-
propriate and successful nutritional solution for the harmoni-
ous development of the child; … Noting the general decline in 
breast-feeding, related to sociocultural and environmental factors, 
including the mistaken idea caused by misleading sales promo-
tion that breast-feeding is inferior to feeding with manufactured 
breast-milk substitute. (WHO 1974, 1)
This was the first mention in the WHO record of the issue of 
marketing of breastmilk substitutes, and it noted evidence and 
experiences of the decline in breastfeeding.1 Less than ten years 
later, the WHO would adopt the International Code of Marketing 
of Breastmilk Substitutes. Here I will trace the history leading up 
to the adoption of the Code.
The decline of breastfeeding rates and the rise of commercial 
feeding had their origins in the industrial era and shifts in women’s 
roles (Palmer 2009). Broadly, industrialization led to increased 
female employment outside the home in settings that were not 
conducive to breastfeeding. ‘Scientific products’ such as infant 
formula were promoted as ‘modern’ and ‘better’. In the first half of 
the twentieth century, the increasing Westernization of medicine 
continued this trend, so that by the Second World War artificial 
feeding was promoted as the norm in much of the US and Europe 
(Post & Baer 1980; Palmer 2009; Allain 2005, 8). Other reasons 
cited for the decline in the mid twentieth century included a lack 
of education in general, lack of education about breastfeeding, 
family influences, working conditions, and healthcare practices 
(WHO 1981, 7, 14–24).
In the post-war period, companies also began to market their 
products heavily in low- and middle-income countries. According 
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to the WHO, this marketing of breastmilk formula was a factor in 
the decline of breastfeeding:
Another factor is the infant food industry. While it has met cer-
tain needs it has also diffused new and inappropriate ideas on 
infant feeding and has often created an unnecessary demand. 
The advertising and promotion of breast-milk substitutes, par-
ticularly in health facilities, may have contributed to the decline 
in breastfeeding. Promotion of breast-milk substitutes by com-
mercial concerns has been more extensive and pervasive than 
provision of information about the advantages of breast-milk 
and breastfeeding. (WHO 1981, 17)
Companies marketed their products in ways that many NGOs and 
others working in health considered to be unethical. For instance, 
companies gave medical workers misleading literature and free 
samples, and, dressed in white coats, gave starter packs of formula to 
new mothers while still in hospital (Jelliffe 1971; Werner & Saunders 
1997). This was not limited to low- and middle-income countries, 
but health workers and activists were particularly concerned about 
the promotion in poor resource settings.
Specifically, they were concerned by the misuse of infant for-
mula, leading to higher infant mortality. This included mixing 
formula with contaminated water, diluting formula to make it 
last longer, or the use of non-appropriate foods as formula such 
as sweetened condensed milk (Werner & Saunders 1997). The 
difference in mortality between breastfed and formula-fed babies 
was noted as early as 1910 (Davis 1913). In the 1930s, Cecily 
Williams—later the first director of Maternal and Child Health at 
the WHO—warned of unsanitary, diluted breastmilk substitutes 
(Joseph 1981). In the 1950s and 1960s, doctors across Africa were 
‘dismayed by the numbers of younger infants suffering from the 
diarrhoea and malnutrition that came to be called “bottle-baby 
disease”’ (Palmer 2009, 240). The issue here, as in Europe and the 
US at the turn of the century, was that much of the population 
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did not have access to clean drinking water. Also, on account of 
poverty, mothers were diluting the formula to make it last longer, 
further contributing to malnutrition. An additional concern in 
poor resource settings was the high costs of treatment for ill 
babies (Post & Baer 1980).
The concern expressed by healthcare providers gained attention 
in the popular press in the early 1970s. The New Internationalist 
magazine published an interview with two paediatricians who had 
worked in Africa. Then in 1974, the British charity War on Want 
published The Baby Killer, which was infamously translated into 
German as ‘Nestlé kills babies’ (Palmer 2009, 242). Perhaps what 
garnered more attention was not the publication itself, but Nestlé’s 
libel suit against War on Want (Chetley 1988).
By this time, religious groups were also concerned about the 
promotion of infant formula. The World Council of Churches’ 
Christian Medical Commission addressed the issue in several of its 
newsletters (Barrow 1976).2 In the US context, the Interfaith Center 
on Corporate Responsibility, a coalition of national church bodies 
and Roman Catholic orders, investigated the issue and, finding that 
many of its constituent national church bodies and Roman Catholic 
orders held shares in companies that sold infant formula, decided 
to encourage its membership to file shareholder resolutions. At 
first these resolutions were simply requests for information and 
clarification about marketing practice, but as marketing practices 
were documented in ever-greater detail they began to take legal 
action. For example, in 1976 the Sisters of the Precious Blood, 
who held shares in Bristol Myers, filed a lawsuit against them for 
misleading sales promotion. The Infant Formula Action Coalition 
grew out of these grassroots efforts to launch a boycott of Nestlé in 
1977, which attracted a growing number of breastfeeding groups, 
such as Baby Milk Action in the UK.
The result was that the issue entered the political arena, where 
it was picked up by US Senator Edward Kennedy. He pursued it at 
both the national and the international level, even insisting that 
the WHO send a representative to testify to Congress and later 
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requesting that the WHO organize a conference to consider the 
development of an international Code (McCoy 1995).3 Prompt-
ed by Senator Kennedy’s letter along with ‘deep concern felt by 
many people, organizations and governments about the state of 
health and nutrition of the infant and young child’ the WHO and 
UNICEF called a joint meeting in October 1979 (WHO 1981, 10). 
Experts and stakeholders discussed information about energy 
needs, normal weight gain, milk production and composition, 
anti-infective factors in human breastmilk, and mechanisms 
of prevention. They also considered information on trends in 
breastfeeding and its role in birth spacing (WHO 1981). The 
WHO had set up a collaborative study that ran between 1976 and 
1978 to gather evidence on breastfeeding, specifically ‘to define 
the current state of breastfeeding more clearly and to identify the 
factors contributing to change’. In it they studied 23,000 mother 
and child pairs from Chile, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Hungary, India, 
Nigeria, the Philippines, Sweden, and Zaire, countries chosen to 
represent broad regional, cultural, and socioeconomic differences 
across the WHO, with participants selected from a range of rural 
and urban locations and according to their socioeconomic status 
(WHO 1981, 130).
One recommendation to come out of this meeting was that 
‘there should be an international code of marketing of breast-milk 
substitutes’ (WHO 1981, 10). Over the next two years, the WHO 
Secretariat consulted with member states, other UN agencies, 
NGOs and consumer groups, scientists, and the food industry. 
They went through several drafts of the International Code, which 
was revised following further consultation. The final version 
was endorsed by the 34th WHA in May 1981. It was widely seen 
as a success, with only the US voting against it and three other 
countries abstaining.
At the 34th WHA, delegates submitted interventions, citing 
evidence to argue for the Code. The Iranian delegate noted the 
health benefits of breastfeeding, stating that:
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Breastfeeding not only provided the child with a considerable 
amount of maternal antibodies, thus protecting it against com-
municable disease. It also created an emotional and psychological 
interdependence between mother and child which resulted in 
well-balanced physical and mental growth. (WHO 1982a, 11)
The delegates of Turkey and Canada, respectively, made similar 
points on the ‘superiority’ of breastmilk over infant formula, with 
Turkey arguing that ‘no one questioned the superiority of breastmilk’.
Indeed, the biological and psychological benefits of breastfeeding 
were so well established that it would be superfluous to elabo-
rate on them, except perhaps to say that every year added more 
knowledge of breastmilk’s unrivalled anti-infective and nutritive 
properties. (WHO 1982b, 3–4)
Canada said that ‘the superiority of breastmilk—psychological, 
nutritionally, immunologically—was beyond dispute. Hence breast-
feeding must be encouraged and produced as one of the measures 
essential to the vary [sic] survival of many infants and desirable for 
the health development of all the world’s children’ (WHO 1982b, 4).
The Code provides guidance on how companies may ethically 
market products to healthcare providers and to mothers, including, 
but not limited to, the following measures:
All products should include clear labels with the benefits and 
superiority of breastmilk;
Labels should also clearly state the hazards of improper prepa-
ration of breastmilk substitutes;
No advertising of breast milk substitutes to the general public;
No free samples to pregnant women, mothers or members of 
their families;
No promotion in health care facilities, including no free supplies. 
(WHO & UNICEF 1981)
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The WHO Code per se is non-enforceable, but many WHO mem-
ber states have incorporated parts of it into their own national 
laws, which are in line with the Code (Allain 2005; Palmer 2009). 
Companies have subsequently been taken to court in several 
 countries, either for false advertising or for breaking national 
law in member states. For example, in the mid-1990s a consum-
er group in India took Nestlé to court for violating the Infant 
Milk Substitutes, Feeding Bottles and Infant Foods (Regulation 
of Production, Supply and Distribution) Act 1992 (Jindal 1996; 
Bouckley 2012). Primary monitoring of the Code is carried out 
by a global network of breastfeeding groups, under the wider 
umbrella of the International Baby Food Action Network, and 
the reporting on the Code’s implementation is typically discussed 
every other year at the WHA.
In the next section, I turn to the marketing of food and non- 
alcoholic beverages to children. In high-income countries child-
hood overweight and obesity levels began to rise in the 1980s, 
alongside a rise in adult levels. Obesity and overweight are mul-
tifactorial, with a number of causes and suggested reasons for the 
increase. At a micro level, these include levels of physical activity, 
parental eating habits, breastfeeding, and early child nutrition; 
at a macro level, both the academic and popular discourses have 
focused on the nutrition transition, including the role of modern-
ization and industrialization in the food and agriculture sectors, 
the growth of transnational companies, and trade liberalization 
(Zimmet 2000; Hawkes 2007), and specifically the role of fast-food 
companies, agricultural subsidies, high fructose corn syrup, and 
the marketing of unhealthy food (Schlosser 2001; Nestle 2002). 
These dietary changes are not limited to high-income settings 
(Kennedy 2005; WHO 2010). In fact, low- and middle-income 
countries bear the greatest burden of diet-related non-commu-
nicable diseases (NCDs) (WHO 2011).
Philip James of the International Obesity Task Force was one 
of the first researchers to raise concerns about the specific role of 
the marketing of food and non-alcoholic beverages to children as 
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a significant contributor to the rise in childhood obesity. The first 
milestone was his 1997 report to the UK government, Healthy English 
schoolchildren: A new approach to physical activity and food (James 
& McColl 1997), in which he discussed corporate promotion in 
schools. Two subsequent studies were also influential in setting out 
the evidence base, raising awareness of the issue, and contributing 
to national policy: the so-called ‘Hastings Review’, and an Institute 
of Medicine (US) study in 2006. Gerald Hastings and colleagues 
published the first systematic review of the effects of food promotion 
on children for the British Food Standards Authority (Hastings et al. 
2003). Policy recommendations included restrictions on broadcast 
advertising and the sponsorship of products high in fat, salt, or 
sugar during and around programmes with a disproportionately 
high child audience. Three years later, the US Institute of Medicine 
produced the report, Food Marketing to Children and Youth: Threat 
or Opportunity? (IOM 2006).
During the first five decades of the WHO’s existence, the organi-
zation, with a few notable exceptions, neglected non-communicable 
disease, focusing overwhelmingly on infectious disease. Those 
exceptions included a report by the WHO’s Study Group on Diet, 
Nutrition and Prevention of Chronic Disease, published 1990. The 
WHO’s first explicit recognition of the emerging obesity epidemic 
came in 2000 when it published a technical report on obesity, 
subtitled Preventing and Managing the Global Epidemic (WHO 
2000). It was thus in the late 1990s that the WHO’s work on food 
marketing began. ‘Recognising the growing burden of NCDs and 
the fact that up to 80 per cent of heart disease, diabetes and stroke 
and over a third of cancers can be avoided by avoiding risk factors’ 
(WHO 2008), in 2000 the 53rd WHA endorsed the Global Strategy 
for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases. 
The WHO’s mandate for action on marketing food to children is 
ultimately derived from this document.
In a report prepared for the WHO, Marketing Food to Children: 
The Global Regulatory Environment, Corinna Hawkes (2004) 
focused on the processes that were very visible to the consumer, 
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namely advertising and promotion. The report considered food 
marketing and promotion to include (but not to be limited to) 
broadcast advertising (television and radio), in-school marketing, 
corporate sponsorship, product placement, online and digital 
marketing, sales promotions, and packaging, including everything 
from supermarket specials on certain items to product placements 
in television programmes (Hawkes 2004). In the period leading 
up to the Set of Recommendations, the bulk of marketing of food 
and non-alcoholic beverages to children was on television, but the 
Internet, films, music, games, viral marketing, events sponsorship, 
and cross-promotions (such as toys in fast-food meals) were also 
notable sources (Harris et al. 2009).
The 60th WHA saw the passing of Resolution 60.23 on the 
Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Disease: Imple-
mentation of the Global Strategy (WHO 2007), which asked the 
Director-General to use the Global Strategy for the Prevention and 
Control of Noncommunicable diseases as a basis for developing an 
action plan (WHO 2008). As part of Resolution WHA 60.23, the 
Director-General was asked ‘to promote responsible marketing of 
foods and non-alcoholic beverages to children, in order to reduce 
the impact of food high in saturated fats, trans-fatty acids, free 
sugars, or salt, in dialogue with all relevant stakeholders, including 
private-sector partiers, while ensuring avoidance of potential conflict 
of interest.’ It also called upon the WHO Secretariat to develop a 
set of ‘recommendations on marketing of foods and non-alcoholic 
beverages to children’ (WHO 2007).
As part of the process of drafting the Set of Recommendations, 
Hastings and his colleagues were asked to write two reports for the 
WHO on global data. In 2009, the WHO published their study, 
The extent, nature, and effects of food promotion to children, in 
which they reviewed studies from the 1970s up to 2008. Although 
the data was mixed, overall they found that food promotion did 
indeed influence food preferences, preferences for branded over 
unbranded products, and purchase-related behaviour (Cairns 
et al. 2009; Hastings et al. 2003; Livingstone 2005). The WHO 
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Secretariat convened an ad hoc expert group on food marketing 
for a week-long meeting to look at the evidence base for policy 
recommendations, including Hastings and his colleagues’ reports. 
The WHO also consulted with member states and held two sets of 
stakeholder dialogues in Geneva with the private sector and NGOs 
respectively (WHO 2012).
At the 63rd WHA in 2010, the WHO Secretariat presented its 
recommendations on the marketing of food and beverages to child-
ren, as mandated by Resolution 60.23. They were duly passed as 
Resolution 63.14. The recommendations present a range of policy 
options for member states and, although much of the onus falls on 
them to implement the marketing policies—whether as government 
regulations, private sector voluntary pledges, or a combination—the 
WHO can offer assistance in developing policies if wished. One 
form this took was the 2012 implementation guide for the Set of 
Recommendations, a document that provides national and regional 
policymakers with concrete options for implementing the Set of 
Recommendations.
In the foreword to the Set of Recommendations, Dr Ala Alwan, 
then Assistant Director-General for Noncommunicable Disease 
and Mental Health, cites evidence of the global burden of obesity 
and overweight among children and its effects:
Overweight and obesity now ranks as the fifth leading risk for 
death globally. It is estimated that in 2010 more than 42 million 
children under the age of five years are overweight or obese, 
of whom nearly 35 million are living in developing countries. 
Overweight during childhood and adolescence is associated not 
only with an increased risk of adult obesity and NCDs, but also 
with a number of immediate health-related problems, such as 
hypertension and insulin resistance. (WHO 2010, 4)
He then points to the role of marketing in childhood obesity:
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But at the same time, the wide availability and heavy marketing of 
many of these products, and especially those with a high content 
of fat, sugar or salt, challenge efforts to eat healthily and maintain 
a healthy weight, particularly in children. (WHO 2010, 4)
Although he does not cite any specific studies of marketing, this is 
inferred, and he does refer to the overall process, which included 
an analysis of such studies. With his statement that ‘The recom-
mendations were developed with substantial input from Member 
States and other stakeholders and endorsed by the Sixty-Third 
World Health Assembly in May 2010’ (WHO 2010), he implies that 
member states’ and other stakeholders’ experiences were indeed 
incorporated into the final document.
In both case studies it is clear that evidence and experience were 
the precursors to serious international action. The ad hoc expert 
group and academics both noted that ‘evidence was a given’ and 
that the Set of Recommendations ‘couldn’t have happened without 
the evidence—like Gerald Hasting’s work’, pointing to the impor-
tance of research. 
Once a health issue reaches the WHO, evidence provides the 
justification for action and confers on it the necessary ‘moral 
authority’. By invoking evidence, actors give the impression they 
are acting rationally to improve health and well-being. Although 
policymaking at the WHO is situated in wider social, political, 
and economic contexts, the use of evidence in these interventions 
was a key depoliticizing strategy. This is seen in the statements by 
the Turkish, Canadian, and Iranian delegates at the 34th WHA: by 
invoking evidence, it makes diplomats seem as if they are ‘above’ 
politics and acting impartially, even as they gloss over the wider 
context of the situation and the political nature of evidence (Gold-
enberg 2006).
A key difference between the making of the Code and the Set 
of Recommendations was that the Code relied far more on expert 
opinion and stakeholder views, particularly at the 1979 Joint WHO/
UNICEF meeting and in the drafting process. This was highlighted 
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by a report published by the WHO in 1981, based on the paper 
prepared for the 1979 Joint WHO/UNICEF meeting. While not 
meant to be a ‘scientific treatise’, it nevertheless set out to ‘stimul-
ate further thought and discussion’ among ‘national-level health 
workers and planners’ (WHO 1981, 12); it did include such state-
ments as ‘several studies indicate that breastfed infants have fewer 
gastrointestinal infections than those not breastfed’ (WHO 1981, 
109), but provided no references.
Today, greater transparency in the way evidence is collected 
and analysed is expected, and this transition has been seen at the 
WHO. Before 2007, WHO recommendations were based largely 
on expert opinion and did not use ‘systematic evidence-based 
methods’. Public criticism of this process led the WHO to develop 
a Guidelines Review Committee (GRC) to standardize the process 
and assert a level of quality control (Sinclair et al. 2013). In a study 
led by the clinical researcher David Sinclair, eighteen WHO staff 
were interviewed about their experience of the GRC. Overall, the 
interviewees felt that it was essential to the WHO that its guidelines 
met the highest standards; however, some had concerns about the 
way in which the GRC takes a single approach to ranking types 
of evidence, for instance prioritizing randomized controlled trials 
over observational studies. The concern is that this may work very 
well for clinical guidelines, but may be less appropriate for health 
systems or public health guidance.
With the Set of Recommendations, the WHO spelt out very 
clearly how its systematic reviews were conducted, and gave ref-
erences and summaries for all the studies reviewed, which are 
publicly available (Cairns et al. 2009). These reviews are also cited 
in the final Set of Recommendations. Overall, in line with the move 
towards evidence-based medicine, the WHO has increasingly taken 
a more systematic, evidence-based approach to policymaking. In 
this case, however, the evidence linking childhood obesity to food 
marketing is not conclusive. This has proved to be fertile ground 
for controversy.
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Controversies about evidence
It is difficult to link the marketing of food directly to childhood 
obesity. In the systematic reviews commissioned by the WHO, 115 
studies met the criteria for inclusion, of which only 46 were  ‘capable 
of demonstrating a potential causal relationship between food pro-
motion and children’s food knowledge, preference and behavior’ 
(Cairns et al. 2009, 10). The remaining studies were content analyses 
of advertisements or other type of promotions, or they were surveys 
of food consumption or purchasing behaviour, or rather children’s 
purchase requests to their parents. There are natural experiments as 
marketing aimed at children has been highly restricted in Norway, 
Sweden, and Quebec since the 1980s, but the evidence as to the 
usefulness of such bans is mixed (Kent et al. 2011). Still, marketing 
remains an ‘easy’ policy choice in that it is ‘legislable’.
In interviews with private sector informants, representatives from 
the food industry discussed the mixed nature of the evidence. For 
instance, one stated that
I would say in general, that there is no sure cause-effect relation 
between advertising and obesity … obesity is definitely a multi-
factorial phenomenon. For example, most families have two cars 
… causes range from transport to health to culture. Yes, adver-
tising is a part. But a part. 
Another complained about ‘academic activists’ publishing head-
line-grabbing studies that are based on ‘bogus’ evidence—or at 
the very least, evidence that had been manipulated or presented 
in what they saw as an anti-industry way. The same informant also 
felt that that NGOs have greater influence at the WHO. Speci-
fically, he suggested that many academics have a political bias 
which ‘taints’ their work, yet because many of them work closely 
with the WHO—in expert groups, collaborating centres, and as 
consultants—their academic work is affected by their politics. He 
went on to explain the main obstacle to the food industry producing 
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evidence, namely that it is virtually impossible to publish any 
industry-funded research in academic journals, although he felt 
like this was beginning to change.
Almost all civil society informants, meanwhile, compared the 
food industry to the tobacco industry, citing the way that private 
sector actors ‘deny, deflect or diffuse’ public health evidence. One, 
who had worked closely with the WHO, discussed ‘dismissal, denial, 
acceptance and pre-emption’. These strategies range from industry 
representatives who dismiss the quality of evidence to companies 
which, accepting the ‘unhealthiness’ of their food, introduce new 
‘healthy’ ranges of popular products. It also includes companies that 
focus on multiple causes of obesity or on lack of physical activity 
as a cause (rather than diet). 
Broadly speaking, the evidence as collected, analysed, and pre-
sented by academics working for the WHO is mixed. Many private 
sector actors use this to shift the focus away from their unhealthy 
products—a tactic that is part of the wider quest for legitimacy. 
By creating doubt, the private sector delegitimizes its critics; when 
the evidence is stronger, the private sector must participate in 
partnerships with government or other regulatory processes if it 
is to maintain its legitimacy (Benson & Kirsch 2010). 
The controversies and dilution of the evidence about breastfeed-
ing are similar. A representative from an infant formula company 
pointed out that the decline in breastfeeding was multifactorial, 
citing issues with maternity leave and ease of pumping that have 
nothing to do with her company’s production of food. Indeed, 
although delegates at the WHA in 1981 asserted that the ‘superiority 
of breastmilk was beyond dispute’, the reality is that there were—and 
remain—conflicts about evidence. For example, in September 1981 
the editor-in-chief of Pediatrics wrote:
Picture yourself, a doctor living in a Third World country frust-
rated by the failure of your efforts to change poverty, malnutri-
tion, and poor sanitation. Little wonder that you would choose 
to attack rich foreign companies if you thought they contributed 
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to your problems. You would also feel great if the whole world 
joined you in condemning such companies. When the turmoil 
had settled, however, and you realized that you may have been 
wrong, or at least lacked proper evidence, you might not feel so 
self-righteous. (Lucey 1981, 431)
The evidence to limit the marketing of breastmilk substitutes 
was not strong in the way we expect evidence to be strong today. 
Much of the evidence for the Code was based on the experiences 
of health professionals working in low-income countries. If the 
Code were written today the evidence for it would be expected 
to come from systematic reviews and quantitative, replicable 
studies. And yet, despite all the research in the nearly forty years 
since the Code, the issue has not been settled. In the 1980s and 
1990s, evidence on breastfeeding was called into question because 
of concerns about HIV transmission between mother and child 
(Newell 2001). Other researchers have questioned the WHO/
UNICEF recommendations of exclusive breastfeeding for six 
months (rather than four months), suggesting that new system-
atic reviews were needed. This was in part due to concerns about 
the higher incidence of food allergies and risk of coeliac disease 
among breastfed children (Fewtrell 2011).
There is a performative aspect to evidence (Ecks 2008, S85). 
This means that an individual, say a clinician, may use the same 
study or statistic differently depending on the audience, patient, 
colleague, or academic journal. When scaled up to a global level, 
we see that policymaking at the WHO involves people who use the 
same body of evidence to forward the agendas of their country or 
organization. While the underlying knowledge and experiences 
may be the same, they are used to created different sets of evidence 
depending on the situation.
This is particularly the case with both the Code and the Set of 
Recommendations, in which the evidence base is mixed. Most global 
health actors would suggest that the move towards standardization 
and evidence-based policymaking is a positive step. There is also 
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the suggestion that it lends greater legitimacy and authority to 
guidelines, as in the case of the Sinclair et al. study (2013). How-
ever, it also raises the question of what policymakers should do 
when the evidence is not clear, as is often the case in situations of 
international concern. I discuss this in the next section.
Evidence and policy options
The way evidence is used both constricts and expands the possible 
policy options. With the Set of Recommendations, the WHO con-
vened an ad hoc expert group who were asked to ‘Provide technical 
advice in three areas’:
Policy objectives: What should be the objectives of Member 
States policies on marketing of food and non-alcoholic bever-
ages to children;
Policy options: What are the evidence-based or currently applied 
policy options available on marketing of foods and nonalcoholic 
beverages to children;
Monitoring and evaluation: What are the feasibility and mech-
anisms required to monitor and evaluate recommended policy 
options. (WHO 2012, 1)
The groups focused on the responsibilities of the various stakehold-
ers, the range of policy recommendations and options (statutory 
versus non-statutory), the age ranges of the children, and where 
protection from marketing pressure was needed.
A 2012 special issue of The Economist argued that food companies 
influenced the Set of Recommendations, which led to watered-
down, general recommendations:
Food companies are among those that present their view to 
the WHO … through the WHO’s ‘public dialogue’ process. For 
example, companies encouraged the WHO to present a menu 
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of possible policies on food marketing, rather than a single pre-
scription. (The Economist 2012)
Another point of contention has been the role of voluntary measures, 
including self-regulation (Sharma et al. 2010). Since 2006, individual 
companies and industry-wide bodies have made a series of voluntary 
promises to restrict the types of foods marketed and the venues and 
modes of advertising. For example, this might include ceasing to 
use cartoon characters to promote foods, or not promoting foods 
with an ‘unhealthy’ nutritional profile to children. Critics argue 
that voluntary self-regulation is ineffective, in part because the 
ways in which companies define foods as healthy or not healthy 
is not transparent or uniform across countries or regions. Also, 
there are virtually no examples of self-regulation being effective 
(Moodie et al. 2013). The Set of Recommendations leave open the 
possibility of self-regulation, in part because at the time there was 
not the evidence to rule it out completely. Research has since been 
published indicating that self-regulation pledges are too limited 
and inconsistent to be effective, and that the private sector has not 
followed through on wider promises to self-regulate (Hawkes & 
Harris 2011; Kraak et al. 2016).
I find the criticisms that industry influenced the Set of Recom-
mendations somewhat misleading. One problem is the lack of 
direct evidence. According to an informant from the expert group, 
they ‘thought critically of the evidence and their duty and respon-
sibility’ to be independent. This same informant said that ‘there 
was no evidence for the interventions, which is part of the reason 
we couldn’t make concrete recommendations’. A second member 
of the expert group also noted that they ‘knew the evidence base 
wasn’t there to fully rule out self-regulation.’ I also specifically 
asked informants from the ad hoc expert group whether the pri-
vate sector had influenced the Set of Recommendations, to which 
one responded that ‘I would not use the word influence, but there 
was the recognition that we needed to provide a range of options 
and recognize reality.’ Similarly, another said there was ‘indirect 
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influence because we knew the political reality, attitudes […] 
and this shaped the direction and frame of recommendations.’ 
The same informant pointed out that they had consulted the 
reports from the private sector and civil society dialogues, and in 
that sense they were aware of the range of possibilities that were 
politically feasible. Another believed that the WHO Secretariat 
had suggested Corinna Hawkes as the chair of the ad hoc expert 
group because she ‘knew the political possibilities.’ Companies 
and the way they interact with governments and public health 
actors—through various types of partnerships and platforms—help 
determine the policymaking environment, and thus the options 
open to policymakers.
A concept that was often discussed during my participant 
observation at the WHO was the precautionary principle. Known 
from other civil society and member state fora, this is the idea 
that ‘the introduction of a new product or process whose ultimate 
effects are disputed or unknown should be resisted’ (OED 2013). 
Applied to food marketing, the precautionary principle would 
suggest that policymakers should restrict the marketing of foods 
high in fats, salt, and sugar to children unless food companies can 
prove it has no ill effect on child health. The food policy expert 
Amandine Garde, who has worked as a consultant to the WHO, 
writes that:
while there is at present no conclusive scientific evidence that 
controls on food advertising directed at children alone are likely 
to lead to direct reductions in either consumption or harm, there 
is evidence that the promotion of food impacts on cultural atti-
tudes and patterns of eating. An absence of conclusive evidence 
should not be interpreted as evidence of an absence of any adverse 
effect. (Garde 2006, 15)
The point here is that sometimes there is a justification—perhaps 
a moral justification—for making policy in the lack of direct and 
conclusive evidence.
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Another challenge which impacted on the final Set of Recommen-
dations was the reliance on studies from high-income countries. The 
WHO ad hoc expert group considered two systematic reviews of 
The extent, nature, and effects of food promotion to children (Cairns 
et al. 2009, Hastings et al. 2007), the more recent (led by Georgina 
Cairns) being an update of the first. A total of 115 studies met 
the inclusion criteria, of which only 10 studies had a component 
on countries outside Europe, the US,  Canada, Australia, or New 
Zealand, 6 focused on a middle-income country, and only 2 were 
carried out in a low-income country (Nepal and Solomon Islands). 
This lack of input from low- and middle-income countries was 
also found in the countries and organizations represented in the 
stakeholder dialogues, few of whom had experience of low- or 
middle-income countries. The authors of the studies were well 
aware of the limitations and tried to mitigate them: in the first 
review, researchers conducted supplemental desk research using 
the business and marketing press, journals and responses from 
NGOs to map the marketing environment in low- and middle-in-
come countries (Cairns et al. 2009,18); in the later review, there 
is an entire section devoted to ‘food promotion and marketing in 
developing and middle-income countries’ which teases out more 
detailed data from the 10 applicable studies. Additionally, there 
was geographic diversity in the ad hoc expert group. 
While global representation is a goal at the WHO, there are few 
health issues that are evenly distributed across the globe. Georgina 
Cairns and colleagues found that food companies in middle-income 
countries used marketing techniques similar to those in high-income 
countries at the time, but had very little data on low-income settings. 
This meant that in the final version of the Set of Recommendations 
there was greater focus on television and online advertising and 
less on advertising methods in low-income countries at the time, 
such as billboard, print, and point-of-sale.
One informant, an academic who had worked closely with the 
WHO, discussed the difference between evidence-based and evi-
dence-informed policy, suggesting that ‘good policy should not 
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be solely evidence-driven’—that is, sometimes the evidence is 
non-existent, not strong enough, or not in the right form to justify 
policy action, but that due consideration of the evidence which does 
exist and some common sense can justify policy action. Generally 
speaking, the quality or type of evidence can either constrict or 
expand policy options. A lack of clear evidence also decides the 
policy options. If the Code were developed today, it would need 
to be supported by more developed evidence than was available at 
the time. Evidence, however, interacts with emotion and political 
feasibility, which means that decisions can be pushed forward in 
the absence of evidence.
Where knowledge and experience become evidence
Both the Code and the Set of Recommendations embody a narrat-
ive of how groupings of actors—diplomats, WHO staff, academic 
experts, civil society and private sector actors—brought a range 
of ideas, beliefs, values, and experiences to the drafting process. 
In both cases, civil society actors and health professionals used 
their knowledge and experience, mediated through objects, to put 
inappropriate marketing on the WHO’s agenda; they continue to 
work to keep it there, for example by collecting data on violations 
of the Code nearly 40 years later. The WHO’s role in all this is to 
gather and then turn public health knowledge and experience into 
evidence, which, in turn, is used to determine policy. This often 
means assembling expert groups and commissioning systematic 
reviews. Stakeholders use evidence and moral arguments to justify 
to donors and other policymakers why action should be taken to 
address the underlying causes of various health problems. Address-
ing global inequities in health is a justification for global health 
action (Rosskam & Kickbusch 2012, 4).
Delegates to the WHA use persuasive language and descriptions 
of the health burdens in their countries. Words like ‘urge’ are used 
to propose action. Evidence is also used as a tool to assert moral 
legitimacy and as a depoliticizing strategy. If actors ‘have the 
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evidence on their side’ they can push for certain policy options 
over others. Yet some views are simply not taken into account. 
This is a source of contention for anthropologists such as Judith 
Justice, who have focused on the applicability of global norms 
to communities (Justice 1987). The national-level civil servants 
who sign up to agreements in Geneva are not the same people 
who survey supermarkets for inappropriate marketing practices. 
Although the Code and Set of Recommendations are ostensibly 
global documents, the impetus for the Code originated in the 
marketing situation faced by low- and middle-income countries, 
while the Set of Recommendations grew out of the situation in 
high- and upper-middle-income countries.
There have always been disagreements over the quality and 
interpretation of evidence. One change, however, is that in com-
paring the Code to the Set of Recommendations the global health 
community expects more methodologically robust evidence today. 
It also expects greater transparency about what kind of knowl-
edge and experience is used as evidence in decision-making. The 
negotiation and scope of solutions are now more dependent on 
the robustness of the evidence than they were in the 1970s and 
1980s. On the one hand, this is democratizing, for when evidence 
and decision-making is more transparent, a wider range of actors 
is informed about and can participate in the policy process. On 
the other hand, if the evidence is inconclusive and if actors are 
averse to the precautionary principle, then the interests of con-
sumer industries may prevail and public health action may be 
constrained.
Writing of co-production, Sheila Jasanoff notes that ‘what we 
know about the world is intimately linked to our sense of what we 
can do about it, as well as to the felt legitimacy of specific actors, 
instruments and course of action’ (2004, 14). The case studies con-
sidered here highlight the wider context of policy-making and 
constraints on action, and the ways in which power is embedded 
in the sense of reality. For instance, in the case of the Set of Recom-
mendations the expert committee took into account the ‘reality’ of 
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a global society in which transnational companies wield significant 
influence over regulators. There is also an aesthetic element to the 
process: knowledge and experience must be presented in certain 
ways to become evidence. Similarly, actors are expected to behave 
according to culture scripts in order to be ‘successful’ in legitimiz-
ing their experience and knowledge as evidence, and actors can 
be criticized for deviating from the script, for example by acting 
emotionally. These case studies challenge any notion that evidence 
is apolitical, demonstrating instead the flexible arrangements found 
in the transformation of experience and knowledge into evidence 
for policy-making.
Notes
 1 Starting in the late 1960s, the UN Protein Advisory Group, which included the WHO, 
began to discuss concerns about bottle feeding.
 2 The Christian Medical Commission was disbanded in the 1990s, but the World 
Council of Churches remains an active NGO in official relations with the WHO 
(Litsios 2004, 1892).
 3 WHO Archives, Edward Kennedy to Halfdan Mahler, 20 July 1978.
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Neuroscience and the circulation  
of medical knowledge
Åsa Alftberg
Knowledge has long been studied in the social sciences and the 
humanities with focus on its production and construction. For 
example, Science and technology studies (STS) has explored and 
revealed the making of scientific knowledge in particular contexts, 
often the lab, and the ordering of science and knowledge has been 
linked to the ordering of society (Jasanoff 2004). As Sheila Jasanoff 
(2004) has stated, doing science is related to power and merges into 
doing politics. The making of science is a history of knowledge 
dependent on power and culture. In Jasanoff ’s words, science and 
society are co-produced, each underwriting the other’s existence.
A complementary but different approach which has gained 
traction recently is the circulation of knowledge. The concept 
directs attention towards ‘how knowledge moves, and how it is 
continuously moulded in the process’ (Östling et al. 2018, 17). For 
Johan Östling and his colleagues, inspired by work by the likes of 
Philipp Sarasin and Andreas Kilcher, the circulation of knowledge 
is characterized by the mediality and materiality of knowledge (18). 
Knowledge is embedded in social contexts and for the most part 
mediated through material objects. It is always formed by power 
relations and cultural processes, which implies that the accessibility 
of knowledge is dependent on its specific position, time, and place, 
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and differs between societies. As it circulates, knowledge—like 
notions, things, people—often transforms (Markovits et al. 2006). 
The circulation of knowledge is profoundly affected by digitalization, 
as communication—infrastructure and content, production and 
circulation—has changed. The changed conditions for the circulation 
of knowledge have an impact on the forms and exercise of power 
(Couldry 2012). Digitalization can strengthen some forms of power 
and weaken others, just as it strengthens some forms of knowledge 
(legitimizing them so they are taken as given) and lessens others.
In this chapter, medical knowledge and its circulation is explored 
using an example from neuroscientific research, where neurosci-
entists in focus-group interviews talk about sharing knowledge in 
different contexts. Sharing knowledge is here identified as a form 
of knowledge circulation. Sharing knowledge is about spreading 
information, moving it from one context to another, and the process 
is permeated with different layers of intentions, interpretations, and 
meaning-making. As part of a wider circulation, sharing knowledge 
as a concept highlights the intentional and interactive aspects of 
the process. I will describe different aspects of sharing knowledge, 
as they are discussed by researchers in the field of medical know-
ledge. The medical knowledge in question is the specialized field 
of neuroscience that is engaged in the search for potential cures 
for neurodegenerative diseases, so in other words part of a larger 
paradigm of the medical knowledge frequently examined by the 
medical humanities.
By exploring views on medical knowledge and its circulation 
from the perspective of a privileged group—the scientists who are 
the main actors in producing medical knowledge—the complexity 
of knowledge circulation can be emphasized. Following James 
Secord (2004), I consider how and why knowledge circulates, and 
what happens when it ceases to be the exclusive property of a single 
individual or group and becomes part of the tacit knowledge held 
by much wider groups of people.
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Interviews as sharing knowledge
The empirical material of this chapter consists of qualitative focus-
group interviews with neuroscientists at a university in southern 
Sweden. The interviews were carried out in a research project about 
the various framings of the human brain that influence neuroscien-
tific work, and the connection to wider cultural interpretations of 
the brain.1 In the focus-group interviews, participants were asked 
to describe their work and laboratory procedures. The focus was on 
their perceptions, opinions, beliefs, and attitudes concerning their 
work, and sharing knowledge was an aspect that came up in the 
interviews. The participants were members of two research groups 
that work with neurons in a laboratory environment, looking for 
treatments for neurodegenerative diseases. Four focus-group inter-
views of one to one and a half hours’ duration with 3–5 participants 
apiece were conducted between November 2015 and May 2016. 
The interviews were transcribed verbatim, but material is presented 
here with anonymized names and research projects.
Focus-group interviews can themselves be regarded as a form of 
knowledge-sharing, as they are conversations that produce, share, 
and circulate knowledge between participants, not just between 
participants and interviewer. This process is of course influenced 
by the questions raised and the nature of the interaction between 
the participants, as there is always the possibility that the partici-
pants will direct their attention towards agreement rather than 
acknowledging differences (Gray 2003). In the present case this 
will probably have been lessened by the fact that the participants 
were colleagues who knew one another well.
Another important aspect is that interviews, by dint of being tran-
scribed, become texts. The shared knowledge from the interviews 
is interpreted, reread, and sorted into patterns by the researcher. A 
written text can be scrutinized in a way that a verbal conversation 
cannot. It also vests in the researcher—the interpreter—the power 
and prerogative of its content (Gunnemark 2011).
movement of knowledge
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Knowledge circulation and neuroscience
The concept of circulation can be used as a theoretical perspec-
tive. According to Katja Valaskivi and Johanna Sumiala, it is the 
dynamic structures of circulation that are of interest, and how they 
connect to power:
The simplest way of thinking about circulation is to say that it is 
about ‘going around’ and/or ‘passing on’ something—whether it 
is material or immaterial items, goods, artefacts, ideas or beliefs 
that are being distributed and disseminated. … In this circulatory 
process, certain ideas, items and actors become more powerful, 
while others may fade away or change their shape or consisten-
cy, thus taking other directions and creating new processes in 
circulation. (Valaskivi & Sumiala 2014, 231)
Valaskivi and Sumiala continue by describing three approaches to 
the topic of circulation. The first is to acknowledge circulation as a 
non-static, non-linear concept. They underline flexibility in the sense 
of the direction and tempo of movement. The second approach is 
to stress circulation as ‘an open-ended process, a movement that 
brings ideas, items and people together’ (233). This relates to action, 
and is explained as ‘typically shaped by tensions, contradictions 
and ambiguities that are represented, reproduced and sustained in 
the circulation process’ (233). Here, power relations shape circula-
tion, but may simultaneously be contested. The third approach is 
that the materiality of circulation constitutes an essential aspect: 
circulation involves material objects, which are embedded in ideas, 
beliefs, ideologies, and emotions.
When such theories of circulation are applied to the circula-
tion of medical knowledge it is easy to see how knowledge moves 
through academia and societies in a non-linear way (see Latour 
1999; Raj 2007). The circulation of knowledge is driven by tensions, 
contradictions, and ambiguities, where power and resources give 
some actors better access—and greater credibility—than others. 
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The materiality of knowledge circulation is always present, for 
circulation relies on material objects (from research instruments 
and printed publications to online publications and information, 
such as lectures easily accessible through computers and mobile 
phones), which in turn affect the circulation process.
Another important aspect of medical knowledge circulation is 
that it is often scientific property. The knowledge is owned. And that 
ownership has consequences for the circulation process. Stephen 
Hilgartner (2004) explains that property is not simply things that 
are owned, but a bundle of rights connected to these entities, with 
specified limits. To possess property is to be embedded in a fabric 
of rights and obligations. Property may not always be explicitly 
recognized by the legal system, as in the example of scientific prop-
erty, because the relevant property in scientific exchange includes 
not only formally recognized intellectual property (such as patents, 
copyrights, and trade secrets), but also what Hilgartner calls ‘infor-
mal’ types of scientific property, such as rights and obligations of 
the parties to a research collaboration or the authors of a scientific 
paper. Therefore, property as a concept, legally and morally, is linked 
to power relations. It is also deeply involved in scientific practices, 
and, as I discuss in this chapter, in medical knowledge circulation.
Neuroscience is a useful illustration of medical knowledge 
circulation. Current developments in brain research, with new 
technological and therapeutic possibilities, have transformed 
how we understand, manage, and treat people, amounting to an 
emerging neuro-ontology (Rose & Abi-Rached 2013; Hansson 
& Idvall 2017). The human condition is primarily understood 
as a self consisting of brainhood rather than personhood (Vidal 
2009): people are cerebral subjects. As such, we have access to 
neuro scientific vocabulary and techniques, especially the colour-
ful images of brain scans, as well as the common-sense notion 
that being human is exclusively physical and reliant on the brain 
(Zivkovic 2015). Knowledge of the brain circulates between neu-
roscience and the public, the media, and politics. It permeates 
popular culture: media products such as sci-fi series and films 
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draw on neuroscience to build imagined, but still vaguely realis-
tic, depictions of what new technology can do to the brain and, 
by extension, to people. Knowledge circulates back to academia, 
where neuroscientists are confronted with these (often distorted) 
representations when meeting patients, watching television, or 
describing their work to friends or the general public (see  Hansson 
2017a). The upshot is that the supposed distinction between science 
and popular culture is constantly challenged by the circulation 
of knowledge (Alftberg & Bengtsen 2018).
In the following, I will explore the circulation of medical know-
ledge and its power dimensions using empirical examples from a 
neuroscientific setting. I examine the concept of knowledge-sharing 
in the light of competition, collaboration, and problematic shar-
ing—the themes which emerge when scrutinizing the empirical 
material for patterns and relevant thematics.
Competition
When the participating neuroscientists discuss their work in the 
interviews, it is clear that the aim of each of their research projects 
is to gain new knowledge. Research is described as a competitive 
game with projects that need to be innovative but not too risky. 
According to the participants, any research project has risks—for 
instance, will it be possible to develop new knowledge or not? If 
the risks are too great the project risks coming to a dead-end (see 
Hansson 2017b; Hammarfelt et al. 2016). A project that does not 
reach any new conclusions is considered a failure. Consequently, 
risk features in every project, but is connected to power factors 
such as influence and funding (which projects receive resources, 
who the influential researchers are, and so on). Academic careers 
are built on competition—competition for funding, for leadership, 
for impact, for international reputation (Müller 2014)—which also 
means there is always a risk of failure.
Medical knowledge, as we have seen, is looked on as property, 
belonging to one or several researchers, and this too fuels and is 
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fuelled by the competitive nature of academia. Competition gen-
erates the risk of ‘being scooped’, when other researchers publish 
similar findings before you do, or of your idea being stolen. This 
is described by Daniel and Karen:
Daniel: On the X-project I think it was very clear when we stated 
that this was a low-risk project based on the techniques, because 
we had everything set up and available. But it was clearly a high-
risk project based on the competition, so we knew very well that 
it had to be done quickly. The high risk was that we knew that 
other researchers were about to do the same thing.
Karen: Yes, the risk of being scooped.
Working on a research project and generating new results is a 
competition against time and other scientists, and there is always 
the risk that ‘your’ findings will be pre-empted by someone else. 
Knowledge is viewed as property that needs to be guarded and kept 
safe, an approach that hinders the circulation of medical knowledge. 
It is only once research findings are published that they are free to 
circulate and be shared. In other words, once medical knowledge is 
validated and has a clear ownership, sharing is possible. Nevertheless, 
as the participants explain, the reality is that ideas and knowledge 
sometimes are scooped, to be used and further developed by other 
researchers. Circulated, in other words.
The participants see a moral dilemma in doing an experiment 
that they know others are doing too. They note that, quite apart 
from the idea of knowledge as property (and property should be 
respected), on a societal level it could be regarded as a waste of 
taxpayers’ money and, in the long run, reduced public confidence 
in science. On the other hand, there can be good reasons to do the 
same experiments, as Karen and Thomas discuss:
Karen: But I think sometimes it’s also a problem that people 
don’t want to do the same as other people did because it’s already 
published, and then you, you lack the validation and there’s lots 
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and lots of data out there that hasn’t been validated. And that’s 
a big problem.
Thomas: It depends also on how clever one group versus the 
other puts that testing. And sometimes one group can be the 
first, but the other one makes it in a much cleverer way, and in a 
much more robust way.
Validating knowledge, and doing ‘robust’ tests to produce it, is a 
typical description of what is called evidence-based knowledge. 
Evidence-based knowledge is the process of systematically finding, 
appraising, and using contemporaneous research findings as the 
basis for rational decisions (Rosenberg & Donald 1995; Persson et 
al. 2017). Originating in medical science, evidence-based knowledge 
and practice have spread, for instance to social work, and today is 
the kind of scientific knowledge that commands particularly high 
confidence in academia and society (see Hansson, Nilsson & Tiberg 
and Irwin in this volume). It is considered first-rate knowledge 
with apparently objective verifications of what reality looks like.2 
As such, this is the kind of medical knowledge that the participants 
value, and, considering its high status, knowledge that ought to be 
circulated and shared.
Collaboration
While competition in science is discussed by participants, they 
dwell even more on the question of collaboration. Collaboration 
is associated with sharing knowledge. The participants reflect on 
how technological advances have opened the possibility of sharing:
Thomas: In science I consider competition not so useful as col-
laboration I’d say.
Karen: I guess people share more too.
Emma: Yeah, they share and it’s more international.
Anna: It’s possible to share. […] There’s access to information 
and there are possibilities… technical possibilities for sharing.
99
sharing knowledge
Karen: Yeah, it’s possible, it’s part of technology. But it’s also that, 
it becomes more common that the big labs, when they have a new 
technique they can… the more software and things… they just 
put it open source on the Internet, and people are free to use it. 
Instead of charging money for it or keeping it secret. I mean that’s 
why the CRISPR, for instance this CRISPR technology of editing 
the human genes, one reason it’s become so popular is because 
the people who developed it they put out software online or on 
their webpage, which makes it easy for other people to do the 
same.3 To use the technique. So they shared that with everyone. 
So, I think it’s a way of spreading your research to others.
Emma: It feels like in the last ten years that there is much, it gets 
much better every year. Like, from my point of view for the last 
ten years that view has changed a lot, you share much more and 
you’ve more commercially available tools for your research now 
than there were eight years ago or ten years ago.
It is not a new insight that technology and digitalization have 
changed the circulation of knowledge, but it is interesting to see 
how the participants reflect on the changes that have happened 
only in the last decade. It has altered their working conditions, 
but also their view on medical knowledge, and sharing is now 
‘natural’. Digitalization and the accompanying quantitative, met-
ric-based measurability and the changes it has effected in working 
conditions in academia have been explored by Ruth Müller (2014), 
who highlights the experience of being in a highly competitive 
race that requires a continuously accelerating working pace as well 
as a strong focus on individual achievement. This relates to the 
concept of the ‘entrepreneurial self ’ (Bröckling 2005), suggesting 
continuous self-improvement and flexibility, adapting to market 
needs (Müller 2014). On the other hand, as the quotes illustrate, 
digitalization and online availability can also lead to increased 
transparency and collaboration.
Technology and digitalization are not abstract phenomena, but 
are dependent on material objects. The materiality of knowledge 
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circulation—the physical objects needed to produce and share 
it—affects the circulation (how, when, and how fast), and partially 
erodes the view of knowledge as property. In current research, 
sharing and collaboration could be more relevant than competition 
and keeping things to yourself (Laudel 2001; Müller 2012). Still, 
the reason for sharing should not be perceived as merely altruistic; 
sharing knowledge is a strategy for a successful career:
Karen: I think today it [sharing] is viewed as a strategy for success. 
Whereas maybe previously it’s been more like keeping secret. But 
today it’s viewed as a route to success of actually sharing because 
that means that more people will cite your work and… […] It 
increases their impact.
Anna: Because now it is possible to monitor the number of times 
that published works are cited…
The materiality of knowledge circulation has changed the conditions 
of scientific publication and publication rates. This in turn seemingly 
influences the way success is being defined: it is to be published 
and, even more importantly, to be cited (Hammarfelt 2017). Shar-
ing may promote collaboration, but paradoxically, because of its 
connection to a successful career, it also promotes competition (see 
Müller 2014). According to the participants, the greater circulation 
of medical knowledge is a desired process. Nevertheless, there is 
also the underlying notion of ‘the entrepreneurial self ’ (Bröckling 
2005), where sharing knowledge in publications and the number 
of citations is a career strategy.
Problematic sharing
The participants also discussed how knowledge is shared between 
patients. For instance, patients may share (often positive) expe-
riences of treatments and information they have acquired. This 
information is part of a medical circulation of knowledge outside 
academia, often using social media. Online social networking has 
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changed how people communicate with one another, and how they 
identify relevant information and share it (Eysenbach 2008). One 
example is communication between people based on their medical 
diagnoses, creating patient forums where they can express and 
compare their experiences (see Hagen 2012). In the social media, 
patients’ experiences may become ostensibly medical knowledge:
Anna: Of course there’s always people who feel that they are 
helped by this, then they do… advertise you know that ‘I went 
there and it was great or I did that’, on Facebook, which is a new 
way of communicating all sorts of things.
Karen: It’s easier to read Facebook than a scientific article.
Anna: Yeah. And people hear what they want to hear. So if they 
want to feel better, they hear someone who felt better and they 
want to do the same thing. They don’t want to hear the arguments 
why it wouldn’t feel better.
Thomas: And some of them actually cite scientific papers.
Karen: Oh yes, really bad examples.
Thomas: Twisted! They select a particular phrase and then they 
go bananas and just claim that… […] and there’s no relationship.
This form of knowledge-sharing is regarded as problematic by the 
participants, since, according to them, the patients risk getting the 
information wrong or the wrong kind of medical knowledge. Even 
though there could be so-called expert patients with considerable 
knowledge about their diseases and new treatments, the participants 
feel that this only can instil false hopes of treatments or cures (for 
patient involvement, see Idvall in this volume).4
There is a global circulation of medical knowledge, which the 
sociologist and medical anthropologist Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good 
(2010) calls the medical imaginary. The medical imaginary—the 
affective and imaginative dimensions of biomedicine and biotechno-
logy that embrace clinics, patients, and publics—circulates through 
professional and popular culture. Alternative stories, misuses, and 
failures of medicine’s power and possibilities are also part of the 
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medical imaginary (failures, fraud, discouragement, and greed); yet, 
broadly speaking it is an optimistic story of hope and the possibil-
ities of medical science (Brown & Michael 2003). When patients 
share, access, and use this medical knowledge, it may be perceived 
as problematic though. According to the participants, the patients’ 
sharing of information has its ethical risks and misunderstandings 
of what medical science can and cannot do. But there also seems to 
be an element of losing control. The scientists do not have control 
over the information that circulates in the social media. Again, 
referring to the idea of knowledge as a property, the implicit view 
is that medical knowledge belongs to science and the scientists, not 
the patients. Digitalization, such as social media, makes it more 
difficult to hold on to this distinction. However, the solution to 
the perceived lack of control is not to hinder information; rather 
it is to increase the distribution of correct medical knowledge (for 
example, by using social media), and to do so through being more 
active and engaged as a researcher. As one explains:
Anna: What you can do is things like you can be active and pres-
ent your research to the community. If you show alternatives, if 
you try to reach as many people as possible and you try to show 
that we are making progress at the universities, at the established 
research institutes, and then try to inform… Because I think that 
often they feel that nothing is going to happen at the universities 
for ten years, so I can’t sit around and wait for that, I’ll go else-
where. If you try to describe the progress and things better…
Were people and patients to understand the ongoing knowledge 
production and progress in established research, they would not be 
tempted to ‘go elsewhere’ as Anna put it. According to the partici-
pants, patients desperate for new treatments are open to exploitation 
by commercial interests. Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2003) explains 
how advanced medical procedures and biotechnologies are now 
becoming part of new markets. The field of organ transplant is the 
most distinctive outcome of the combination of capital and medical 
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technology in a transnational space, but there are also treatments 
that involve other body parts: tissues, cells, and reproductive and 
genetic material of others (Lundin 2012, 2015). When the parti-
c ipants discuss treatment ‘elsewhere’, they highlight how private 
clinics may offer medical treatments that are not tested and not 
safe for humans:
Karen: There’s a very big clinic in Ukraine, which is probably 
one of the biggest.
Emma: Yeah, it was on the news today that they had transplanted a 
retina. That was not supposed to be in experiments, in pre-clinical 
research. But they had transplanted them into patients.
Another example is the use of stem cell transplants, where the 
participants draw a distinct line between their own research and 
clinical trials, and false treatments that are considered experiments 
with no scientific (for which read evidence-based) basis:
Andrew: I think it’s crazy that those places where you can do 
those stem cell transplants, that they even exist and that they’re 
allowed to exist… fooling patients into believing they can be 
cured. That’s really doing experiments on humans.
Karen: There’s no scientific background.
Thomas: They will not say cure but will help this and that, and 
that’s been going on in Europe and in the States because there 
is no regulation for that. You don’t have to prove anything. You 
just have to… I think, I only think you need to show that, don’t 
die from it, that’s it. Otherwise, if it makes an improvement, no 
one cares.
Treatments that are not evidence-based or tested in clinical trials, 
with no requirement of proof, are not regarded as proper science. 
For the participants, going straight from findings in the lab to treat-
ment, leaving out the trial stage, poses great risks to patients, and 
distinguishes this as a highly unethical and non-scientific procedure. 
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The circulation of medical knowledge is perceived as a misuse in 
cases like this. Also, commercial interests are contrasted to what 
science is and should be by definition, which becomes clear when 
Anna comments that the clinics’ intention is not to cure people 
but to make money:
Anna: It’s just charging people money. It’s not for advancing 
science, it’s for making money… Because if they collected data 
from it, it would perhaps be somewhat helpful.
According to Anna, these experimental treatments might be useful 
if they were to collect the data involved, as the clinics would thus 
share their knowledge and contribute to the knowledge circulating 
about stem cell research. This contradicts the idea that there is no 
scientific basis to this; rather, if the clinics were to follow correct 
scientific procedure and produce evidence-based knowledge they 
could contribute. This ambivalence recurs in the discussion of these 
kinds of clinics. Participants agree, for example, that staff at these 
clinics are ‘technically’ researchers, because they have doctorates. 
As Anna says, ‘Well I’m sure that they employ people with PhDs 
and MDs. And then they’re technically researchers.’ As such, they 
may even be encountered at scientific conferences:
Karen: I met one of them [at a conference]. She came up to me 
and said how do you do that transplantation, do you just inject 
the cells in the blood? After talking to her it was really, really 
clear that they have… they don’t know anything, they have no 
clue. They have no clue what they’re doing.
Commercial clinic staff are not regarded as proper scientists and 
therefore sharing knowledge with them is impossible. Even though 
the clinic may have legal permission to obtain human embryos and 
have consent from the patients, the ethical aspects are too prob-
lematic. Karen says that she spoke her mind to the woman: they 
should not be doing anything like this at the clinic, and it could be a 
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huge danger to the patients. Discussing the topic further, it appears 
that the physical risk to patients may not always be severe (even 
though it is never completely risk-free). It depends, for example, 
on whether the treatment involves injections of stem cells into the 
blood (injecting systemically) or into the brain:
Anna: It’s a lot cheaper to inject systemically than into the brain, 
it’s a lot easier so… The risk is much lower than if you were to 
inject into the brain.
Karen: Yeah. The most likely scenario is nothing will happen.
Accordingly, the physical risks to patients are often low (the patients’ 
emotional turmoil, cast between despair and hope, and their finan-
cial investment in the treatment are other risks). Still, sharing 
knowledge in the situation described above is unimaginable, how-
ever low the risk to patients. Medical knowledge circulation has 
its limits, and the actors who produce knowledge can try to make 
it inaccessible for ethical and professional reasons.
The frictions of sharing knowledge
This chapter has explored the circulation of medical knowledge in 
a neuroscientific setting. It has illustrated situations where know-
ledge-sharing is considered by the participants to be useful and 
valuable, and situations when it is regarded as disadvantageous or 
highly problematic for ethical reasons.
The participants connect sharing medical knowledge to both 
competition and collaboration as well as a career strategy. There is 
an underlying aspect of power and influence: whose findings are 
spread and accepted, and how fast can it be done (in order not to 
get scooped)? The circulation of knowledge is affected by digitali-
zation, which has changed the conditions of scientific publication 
and publication rates, and, by extension, success. It also creates 
tensions and contradictions. Sharing is both natural and expected, 
but you simultaneously risk ‘your’ knowledge being poached by 
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someone else. Parallel to that, medical knowledge has to warrant 
the label of evidence-based if both academia and society are to 
hold it in high confidence.
Permeating the empirical examples is the idea that medical 
knowledge has ownership. It can be shared but it is always owned 
by someone, or by some more than others, and is part of power 
relations. The idea of property can be linked to the commodifi-
cation of knowledge.5 Medical knowledge as a commodity means 
that it should be valued by, and of service to, the market. It ought 
to be measured and controlled, just like any other resource. But, 
since the circulation of knowledge is non-static, non-linear, and 
flexible in its sense of direction and speed of movement, it defies 
control and produces what I have called problematic sharing. 
When sharing knowledge, it can rarely stay the exclusive property 
of a single individual or group. Rather, it becomes part of the 
accepted understanding of much wider groups of people, which 
may lead to criticism and disapproval from the group who see it 
as their property. Power relations are contested, as seen here in 
the use of digital media. According to the empirical examples, 
one strategy when knowledge (the property) is circulated and 
used in problematic, misinformed ways (as by patients) is to share 
information increasingly, and make sure it is the correct kind 
of medical knowledge that circulates (evidence-based). As one 
of the participants said, contributing accurate knowledge could 
bring patients to realize that treatments at commercial clinics are 
not an alternative. Another strategy is not to share knowledge 
at all, as in the example of encountering representatives of the 
commercial clinics at a scientific conference. The ethical risks 
involved for patients who are exploited by commercial clinics 
that offer non-evidence-based treatments are of course real, and 
should not be overlooked or downplayed. Nonetheless, ethical 
risks may well be used as arguments in order to guard and pre-
serve the ownership of scientific knowledge, withholding power 
and privileged status.
To conclude, sharing medical knowledge is a process of intention 
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and interaction, competition and collaboration. The concept of 
knowledge-sharing helps highlight how knowledge circulation is 
affected by digitalization, which changes scientific working con-
ditions and sometimes makes sharing problematic. It reveals the 
underlying idea that knowledge is exclusive property, and the 
frictions that occur when this idea is challenged.
Notes
 1 The project was financed by the Basal Ganglia Disorders Linnaeus Consortium 
and named ‘What makes us human? Cultural perspectives on framings of the brain 
in neurological research’. The focus-group interviews were conducted by Kristofer 
Hansson, Markus Idvall, and Ellen Suneson.
 2 At the same time, evidence-based knowledge is under fire from scientific disciplines 
founded on other epistemological grounds. The philosopher Maya Goldenberg (2006) 
points out that the seemingly unproblematic nature of evidence-based knowledge 
may be contested by emphasizing science as a social system of knowledge produc-
tion. Evidence-based knowledge does not increase objectivity; rather it obscures the 
subjective elements that inevitably are part of all forms of human inquiry.
 3 CRISPR is a family of DNA sequences in bacteria and archaea. It is a kind of molecular 
machinery designed to destroy intrusive DNA sequences, for example from viruses. 
It is used as a technology to affect DNA segments in the cell nucleus.
 4 The expert patient (spetspatient in Swedish) is a patient who uses the Internet as 
an important source of disease-specific knowledge, and joins forces with fellow 
patients in patient organisations and similar. Riggare et al. 2017 describes this as an 
ongoing change for chronic conditions in healthcare: a shift from a model where 
healthcare professionals are experts and the patients are passive recipients of care to 
a model where patients are active participants who have the possibility to be experts 
in managing their own disease and situation. This indicates a reliance on patients’ 
self-management and patient education, which can be problematized with the 
concept of self-care (see, for example, Hansson elsewhere in this volume; Alftberg 
& Hansson 2012).
 5 This has long been a subject of discussion, for example Gibbons & Wittrock 1985; 
Gibbons et al. 1994; McKelvey & Holmén 2009; Benner & Widmalm 2011.
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Press releases  
as medical knowledge
Making news and identification  
in medical research communication
Karolina Lindh
Medical knowledge about the brain is not confined to labs, clinics, 
or the neuroscientific community. Neuroscientific research about 
the brain has gained explanatory value for many challenges that 
confront contemporary society and humans today. The increased 
public interest in this medical knowledge is noticeable in the pub-
lication of popular science books about neuroscience in recent 
years (for example, Aamodt & Wang 2008; Damasio 1994; Seth 
& Frith 2014). Another way in which medical knowledge about 
neuroscience circulates to reach wider audiences is in the shape 
of press releases. These briefly describe the results of studies, and 
commonly they also address what consequences the particular study 
may have for future treatments. In a scholarly setting, the publication 
of a paper implies that findings are made public (Borgman 2007, 
48). This way in which findings are made public does however 
not necessarily mean they are easily accessible or comprehensible 
by people with no medical training. The writing of press releases, 
published in a variety of ways and actively promoted by university 
public relations officers, is designed to make findings available to 
the general public. The distribution of a press release may lead to 
a number of events, and publicity for the university or individual 
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researchers if it catches the attention of news media. Although 
scholarly journal articles and scientific press releases may report 
findings from the same study, the ways in which this is done in 
these two genres is very different.
The business of translating the content of peer-reviewed journal 
articles into press releases intended for wider audiences than the 
scientific community often involves communication professionals. 
This group of professionals has grown in size at universities and 
academic institutions in recent decades, and has come to play an 
important role in representing their universities and the research 
done there to external audiences (for example, Hansson 2005). 
This work may involve a variety of activities and forms of science 
communication, among which the writing and distribution of 
press releases is one. It is not uncommon for press releases to be 
published in the news media exactly as they are written by uni-
versity communication professionals, without any additional work 
or contextualization (Autzen 2014)—that is, the text read by the 
public is often the press release written by university communica-
tion professionals (Hansson 2017). 
The aim of this chapter is thus to discuss how medical knowledge 
is adapted in the making of press releases, inspired by a particular 
field in the discipline of information studies concerned with what 
information artefacts such as books, articles, records, and other 
kinds of media do when they are embedded in sociocultural con-
texts and activities, and what people do with such information 
artefacts (Buckland 2012). Press releases can be seen as one kind 
of information artefact, which in addition to conveying a particular 
content also shapes activities and interaction between the parties 
involved in the writing and reading of these texts.
Method and material
The study is based on material gathered through semi-structured 
interviews with seven communication professionals and four neuro-
science researchers working at medical faculties at two Swedish 
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universities. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes and an hour. 
Some of the interviews were done by phone due to geographical 
distance between the author and the interviewee. The interviews 
concerned outreach activities and science communication in gen-
eral. Press work and press releases were one theme included in 
the interview guide. Commonly, interviewees brought up this 
themselves before being asked about it. Press releases turned out 
to be something that all but one informant had some experience 
of or thoughts about. The press releases that were discussed by 
interviewees all reported medical scientific findings, and were 
written by communication professionals employed at medical 
departments or faculties at the two Swedish universities where 
the informants worked. These press releases have a characteristic 
form. The introductory sentences commonly state the name of 
the journal in which the reported findings have been published 
and the author’s affiliation. They also include a link to the original 
journal article where the findings have been published, and the 
researchers’ contact information. The findings and their impli-
cations are described briefly, and it is common to include quotes 
from interviews with the author of the journal article, and often 
a portrait image of the author, or, in cases when neuroscientific 
findings are reported, images of cells or brains.
The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded. The first 
round of coding identified the occurrence of broader,  reoccurring, 
empirical themes. For this study, the press release theme was 
singled out and coded in further detail. Reoccurring themes iden-
tified were (i) how interviewees talked about findings in terms of 
breakthroughs; (ii) news; (iii) the importance of not promising 
too much; and (iv) the importance of encouraging the audience to 
identify with what is being reported. These themes will structure 
the empirical part of this chapter, exemplified by quotes from 
eight of the interviewees, duly anonymized—four communication 
professionals (Anna, Mary, Tom, and Sara) and four neuroscience 
scholars (Linda, Peter, Patricia, and Ivan). It should be noted that 
the focus is the communication professionals’ and researchers’ 
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thoughts about press releases and their experiences, and the chapter 
does not aspire to gauge the audience’s thoughts about or under-
standing of the press releases.
Genres as social action
Genre theory offers a useful approach for teasing out the dispari-
ties and similarities between various kinds of texts and what they 
are intended to achieve. The notion of genre can be understood in 
different ways, as referring to literary genres or more broadly to 
communicative activities (Andersen 2008, 2015; Kjellberg 2009). 
The latter notion, which is how genre will be used here, encompasses 
an understanding of genres as social action. Medical knowledge is 
communicated in many different ways, such as peer-reviewed journal 
articles, popular science books, blog posts, newspaper articles, and 
many more. These genres may be intended for different audiences 
and have different aims. Thinking of genres as communicative 
activities sheds light on how genres, in addition to facilitating the 
writing of texts, also enable their interpretation, setting out the 
connection between acts of writing, reading, and interpretation and 
other activities (Andersen 2015; Miller 1984). The conventions of 
a particular genre are not only applied when texts are written, but 
also when texts are read and made sense of. Understanding a text 
is not merely a matter of understanding the words; understanding 
also requires readers to grasp the conditions and situation in which a 
particular text was created. Through a shared understanding of how a 
genre is used and interpreted communicative activities are achieved. 
Hence, this understanding of genre implies that it is not only a way 
of representing content, but also a facilitator of social action. Genre 
is connected to particular communicative activities in which both 
writers and readers take part (Andersen 2015, 4). Genre theory draws 
attention to how content is mediated and the situations in which it is 
mediated, in addition to the form of the content. Sara Kjellberg’s genre 
theoretical framework (2009) differentiates between four aspects of 
genre: aim, form, content, and context. Although they occasionally 
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overlap, they are useful when identifying differences between types 
of texts. Aim refers to the purpose of the communicative act, that 
is, the intended purpose of the communication. Form refers to the 
ways the text is structured in such a way as to achieve the senders’ 
intentions and the way in which the aim is conveyed. Content refers 
to what the text is about. Context concerns whom the communicator 
engages with and where communication occurs (Kjellberg 2009). 
This also involves communication in the contexts where particular 
texts are made. How the aspects of genre are manifested may vary 
over time, changing relative to transformations of the practices in 
which it is used. In this chapter, the insights of genre theory will be 
used to illuminate the differences and similarities between the genre 
of press releases and other related genres such as scholarly articles 
and news reports, as well as notions of what kind of communicative 
activities press releases are associated with. The context in question 
is the university, since this is where the communication professionals 
and researchers interviewed work.
Peer-reviewed journal articles and popular science
Though press releases can report any number of things, the ones 
discussed here concern medical scientific findings. Scholarly pub-
lications and popular science figure in many forms of publication, 
but are genres that in different ways are connected and related to 
press releases. The main features and differences between them 
will be identified in the light of previous research.
Scholarly communication is an established research field in 
information studies which encompasses the study of the writing, 
distribution, use, and citation patterns of scholarly publications 
(Borgman 2007; Cronin 2005). Though this research area may 
include both the formal and informal communication of research, 
the emphasis has primarily been on the exchange of ideas between 
scholars, although science in a number of formats is increasingly 
available to larger audiences, partly due to digital technologies 
(Borgman 2007, 48–9). Insights from this field of research provide 
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a useful baseline for the aim, form, content and context of peer- 
reviewed journal articles. Scholarly publications may have different 
forms depending on the researcher’s field, and the importance 
of different kinds of publications and genres vary between disci-
plines (Cronin 2005). In medicine, the discipline in focus in this 
chapter, the peer-reviewed journal article is the most important 
of all publications. The language of these publications is technical, 
and the intended readers are other medical scholars in the same 
research field. Whatever they publish, it must have the correct critical 
apparatus that connects it with previous publications in the field 
(Latour 1987), and new findings must similarly be presented in a 
way that connects with the established knowledge in the discipline 
(Borgman 2007, 47). The context in which articles are written and 
read is primarily an academic one. Bernd Frohmann (2004) has 
suggested that peer-reviewed journal articles are not only carriers of 
epistemic content, they also stabilize scientific fields and practices.
Previous studies of popular science writing, science journal-
ism, and press releases have highlighted how scientific findings in 
these styles of writing differ from the conventions of writing for 
peer-reviewed journals.1 These studies offer plenty of insights into 
aspects of popular science genres, although they have not applied 
genre theory. Many describe the form and content of popular 
science writing as featuring a sensationalist language not used in 
scientific journals (Fahnestock 1998; Johnson & Littlefield 2011; 
Nelkin 1996; Sismondo 2010). Sensationalist language may for 
example entail the use of superlatives such as the fastest, newest, 
and biggest, which was a recurring feature of science journalism 
throughout the twentieth century (Nelkin 1996). It is distinctive 
of popular science that writers adapt their message or information 
in such a way that it relates to values already held by non-expert 
audiences (Fahnestock 1998). This encompasses the identification 
of aspects that make findings attractive to readers who are not 
specialists in the particular area by appealing to wonder and how 
the findings can be applied. Jeanne Fahnestock (1998) suggests that 
popular science writing is about foregrounding certain aspects of 
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the findings, and not about replacing technical terminology with 
words that are easier to comprehend. One technique is to frame 
findings in terms of breakthroughs (Fahnestock 1998). Such studies 
centre specifically on the language used in popular science, on the 
text itself, and not on the practices or the people or professionals 
involved in the writing. Narratives about science for public channels 
are not only a matter of conveying the results of particular studies, 
however, because they connect to larger issues and contribute to a 
sense that research and science can offer solutions to societal prob-
lems (Felt & Fochler 2012). Although written for readers who are 
not experts in the subject area, public accounts of science not only 
have consequences for the public’s expectations of researchers, they 
also have consequences for how younger generations of specialists 
think of their role as researchers and what they see as important 
(Felt & Fochler 2012). Ulrike Felt and Maximilian Fochler (2012) 
suggest that the various kinds of activities that constitute science 
communication should be understood to be about creating and 
maintaining good relations between society and science.
Press releases
I discuss the aim, form, content, and context of the press releases 
based on four recurring themes identified in excerpts from inter-
views with public relations officers and senior researchers in the 
area of neuroscience. The first and second concern how findings are 
described in terms of news and breakthroughs; the third, making 
findings appear interesting to non-experts without instilling too 
much hope among patient groups; and the fourth, the significance 
of facilitating the reader’s identification with the contents of the 
press release. Although overlapping, these themes are useful when 





Medical press releases may be intentionally addressed to particular 
audiences such as the media for medical professionals or other 
groups in healthcare settings. Most, however, are intended for media 
with broader audiences, and it was common for communication 
professionals to talk about the content of press releases as news.
Anna: Research is like ready-made news, we don’t have to make 
up strange investigations like other organizations may do. We have 
real news. That is something we see as a strength, then [our job] 
is about relating science and giving journalists support in writing 
about our researchers and what our researchers do.
Whether scientific findings really are news, how science and news 
relate to each other, and the similarities of ‘science news’ to other 
kinds of news can be discussed. Nik Brown (2003, 15) has stressed 
that science reports in the media differ from the common run of 
news. For something to qualify as a news story, it must report 
something that is both recent and has not been heard of before. 
What is reported in scientific publications, though, must connect 
to what is already known in the academic field in question (15). 
Brown writes that ‘It is in fact extremely rare for something com-
pletely new to find its way into Nature or Science. Scientific news 
is more usually old news’ (15).
The contexts of science and news reporting differ from each other. 
Rather than being out there, happening or being found, science news 
is constructed as such by journalists (Ideland 2002). Yet science 
news differs from other kinds of news such as reports on political 
events or decisions, for while that kind of news has a limited time 
frame, science news does not (44). With news only being news for 
a limited period of time, the implication is that journalists must 
work fast (Ideland 2002). The work that public relations officers 
do on press releases matches the pace of science journalism: they 
work fast and try to introduce findings in a concise manner that 
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appeals to the media or the public. The interviewees emphasize the 
importance of fitting the science they report to these outlines. One 
of the communication professionals described the work involved 
in the distribution of press releases in the following way:
Mary: —and then we discuss, how do we distribute this? This is 
really interesting, we should try to get it into [one of the larger 
news programmes on Swedish Television], this has potential…
then you call [the news programme], one of the reporters, and 
say that we have this research, is that something [of interest], and 
you explain in a simple and fast manner what it is about. Yes, we 
are [they say], and then I send them the documentation, and at 
the same time I send it out widely and publish it on [the univer-
sity’s] website so when people hear about it on the news… they 
can always access the source. Because it can become distorted 
along the way. Irrespective of which channel, if we distribute [the 
press release] widely or do it more narrowly we always make sure 
that it is published on [the university website] at the same time, 
a text we can vouch for.
One of the points of a press release and the work surrounding it is 
to communicate science to audiences outside academia. Mary, a 
public relations officer, also touches on possible misrepresentations 
when it is picked up as ‘news’ by television, radio, or other news 
media. The same findings may be shaped to suit a different genre 
in a news context where texts adjust to other conventions of form 
and content. Something ‘very exciting’ may be misinterpreted, 
becoming something the academic institution may not want to 
be associated with. To maintain the connection to the academic 
context, this particular university makes sure that the original text 
is readily accessible on its website at the same time as the research 
features in the news. It is important to communication professionals 
and researchers alike to reduce the risk of misrepresentation, yet 
the composition of press releases requires the findings to be framed 




Previous studies of the popularization of science have discussed 
how findings are conceptualized in terms of breakthroughs, or the 
possibility of describing findings in terms of a breakthrough (for 
example, Fahnestock 1998; Nelkin 1996). Attention is recognized by 
many interviewees in this study as an important factor in the press 
release genre, and by researchers as a reason why some findings 
gain publicity and others do not. Linda, a researcher, accepts this 
about press releases, and thus adjusts her involvement in making 
press releases, shaping their form and content, in accordance with 
what she finds appropriate. Not every study qualifies for the label 
of breakthrough, but in the writing of a press release acquires it 
en route, as if an unavoidable element of the genre. She therefore 
chooses her moment to go public with care.
Linda: Sometimes you see press releases [about a colleague’s 
work], studies that are actually quite uninteresting, about mini-
mal progress, but that are emphasized in press releases as super 
interesting, and then the media take that as a starting point and 
write about it while you yourself know that this isn’t really a 
breakthrough. In the media everything is a breakthrough, but 
in reality research doesn’t work like that; not all studies lead to 
breakthroughs.
She touches on the tension between the way research is done and how 
the news media operate. There is something to process that means 
that breakthroughs figure more prominently in the press releases 
than they do in the research. Although Linda does not necessarily 
agree with this way of handling research findings, she is aware it is 
a feature of press releases that will contribute to its impact in the 
media. She knows what sort of communicative activity is intended, 
and what adaptions to the findings it requires. When Tom, who 
is a communications professional, describes which publications 
and findings are selected for press releases, he explains that the 
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scientific community’s evaluation is one important aspect, but not 
the only one taken into consideration. He talks explicitly about the 
importance of the findings being a breakthrough as a ‘news hook’ 
to catch the interest of readers. Indeed, his description highlights 
how important it is to know how press releases are both written 
and read in order to achieve their intended communicative activity.
Tom: …and then I also have to see that there is a news hook, 
that there is a hook as it’s called, something to attach the mes-
sage to. And most commonly, the easiest way, is something like 
a breakthrough that is as close to the clinic or to a new treatment 
or therapy as possible.
The way Tom talks about news hooks echoes the features of popu lar 
science identified by Fahnestock (1998): it is not merely a matter of 
describing the findings in a non-technical manner, but of identify-
ing the points that will give the message the greatest appeal to the 
intended audience. That the findings are considered a significant 
contribution to the field is one thing, but it is not the same thing 
as a news hook. One way to catch people’s attention can be to 
emphasize closeness to a clinical application. An important feature 
of press releases is that in addition to announcing findings in a way 
that make them easy to comprehend, they also seek to generate 
exposure for the university (see Hansson 2005). Being very short, 
press releases are not the place for elaborate explanations of the 
findings, and certainly not in the detail one would expect to find 
in a research report.
Sara: You can always tweak a little, and you always tweak a bit 
when you do a news angle because the headline must raise in-
terest otherwise nobody will read [the press release]. You can’t 
give the title of a dissertation as a headline but there must be 
some limits, not least when it concerns medicine, health, people’s 




Like the other communication professionals interviewed in this 
study, Sara is cautious not to raise unrealistic expectations in patients 
(see Alftberg in this volume). Yet the rewriting of medical scientific 
findings as a press release necessarily involves some manipulation, 
some shifts in focus compared to the original publication. The job of 
the press release is to reach out and be read by non-experts, meaning 
that the structure and content of the two genres are very different.
The writing of press releases is accordingly one of adapting 
established medical knowledge in an academic field to the conven-
tions of news reporting. There are recognized limits on how much 
recasting is acceptable, as noted by several of the communication 
professionals who were interviewed. These boundaries are handled 
by balancing the appeal to readers with avoiding high expectations 
among readers and patient groups.
Striking a balance
Choosing words and metaphors is a delicate issue when it comes 
to writing about medical advances. If a press release exaggerates or 
uses sensationalist language it may carry over into any news reports 
(Sumner et al. 2014). Much of the content and form of the popular 
science genres identifiable in previous studies does coincide with 
that highlighted by interviewees in this study. Excessive claims 
about the consequences of findings can be particularly problematic 
when press releases concern medical research, as the result can 
be hyped expectations among patient organizations and relatives 
that may not be met (Brown 2003). Audiences can perceive the 
same press release in differing ways: researchers, press officers, 
and patients’ relatives may have very different understandings 
of what constitutes hype in a press release that reports medical 
science (Samuel et al. 2017). The communication professionals in 
this study acknowledge that the way knowledge is represented in 
press releases differs from the way the same findings are presented 
in journal articles. However, they are not indifferent to what this 
may entail, and particularly how the findings they describe might 
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be interpreted and understood by patients. Striking a balance 
between giving findings general appeal and not instilling expecta-
tions that are too high is important. Much neuroscientific research 
is experimental and difficult for non-experts to grasp. Tom says 
that such research requires him to find a good angle—a suitable 
metaphor when describing the findings. Commonly, this angle will 
be the research’s closeness to some new clinical application, but ‘it 
is also very much about not creating too much expectation among 
patients. That is a key issue, to strike a balance each time, and that’s 
something that you learn to calibrate, to stick to the right side of 
that line’ (Tom). Communication professional Mary admits that 
mistakes are made, and gives a few examples of a lack of balance 
when writing press releases.
Mary: We have made occasional faux pas, you make mistakes 
sometimes when you promise too much […] we may create 
enormous expectations among a group that suffers from severe 
illnesses and we shouldn’t do that. We try to work [on that] and 
that is an act of balance, on one side trying to write something 
that carries a news value, and on the other make it interesting, 
and you are supposed to do that on an A4-sized page and simul-
taneously not instil expectations that are not realistic.
Writing a press release includes weighing up possible news  values—
what the public might find interesting—against the risk of raising 
expectations among patients and relatives that cannot be met, and 
doing all that in a very limited space.
Linda was one of those who made the point that reaching out to 
audiences outside academia requires a way of talking about research 
that is nothing like the conventions of scholarly publications. Like-
wise, Peter, another researcher, is aware of this, but chafes at the 
fact that this feature of press releases precludes an accurate account 
of research practice and the production of medical knowledge:
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Peter: If you were to search for Parkinson’s disease on [the uni-
versity’s] website you would find that Parkinson’s enigma has 
been solved like 50 times here…
Author: You mean it has been written in that way? 
Peter: Exactly, [inaudible] that’s because that’s the only way to 
reach out with your research and make someone interested in 
it. No one cares that we’ve taken a small step in Parkinson’s re-
search that will eventually, like in 50 years, contribute to solving 
the Parkinson’s puzzle.
According to Peter, striving for visibility may lead to public pro-
nouncements in which levels of certainty and research outcomes 
no longer correspond with what has actually been achieved. If 
this is the case, the writing and distribution of press releases is 
not primarily about accounting for findings, but a means for the 
university and researchers to gain visibility (for example,  Samuel 
et al. 2017). In the science setting the findings may be a step for-
ward, an advance on what is already known, but this may not be 
sufficient to garner public interest. Public attention, according to 
Peter, requires the exaggeration of both the issue investigated and 
the resultant findings. For one researcher, Patricia, who works 
in a lab far from the clinic and its patients, it may take time for 
findings to result in actual treatments and applications, yet she 
has a great deal of contact with patients, particularly following 
press releases.
Patricia: We had a publication in 2014 and a press release was made 
based on it. People still write and call to find out if they can test a 
new treatment and to find out what we are going to do now. I try 
to answer everything but sometimes I forget. In the beginning, I 
found this to be difficult. I thought, what are we supposed to say 
now? What if they interpret this in the wrong way? What if their 
expectations are exaggerated? Now I’m completely calm in this 
role, no severe consequences have resulted from my statements.
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Patricia’s reflections suggest that some experience is required in 
order to fully comprehend and handle the different communicative 
activities that the various genres generate. The literature describes 
press releases as partly responsible for raising unrealistic expec-
tations among patients (for example, Brown 2003). That aspect to 
press releases does appear to be something that both communication 
professionals and researchers do their best to avoid, because they 
know what consequences it may have for patients. However, it might 
be impossible to completely avoid raising patients’ hopes when 
doing research on human diseases (see Alftberg in this volume). 
That might not even be desirable. For patients and their relatives, 
hope may be a way of imagining a future (Nilsson & Hansson 
2016). The quote from the interview with Patricia illustrates how 
press releases can also trigger or facilitate a dialogue between 
researchers and patients.
Identification
Which findings researchers may find interesting and which appeal 
to the news media and the public may differ. Responses from media 
may be wholly absent—or overwhelming. One of the interviewees, 
Ivan, expected as a researcher that a press release about a study he 
was involved in about the onset of Huntington’s disease would gain 
far more public attention than it did.
Ivan: …[we thought that] this will be really exciting, we could 
say that now we know why the onset of Huntington’s disease 
occurs early or late [in a patient’s life]. No, [a Swedish medical 
journal] wrote about it, that was that. Nobody else was interest-
ed, and then we thought is this too complicated? Is it too nerdy? 
Is Huntington’s disease too unusual? Had it been Alzheimer’s, 
would we have received more attention?
While the research group on this occasion considered their findings 
to be a major breakthrough, a considerable advance on what was 
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known about Huntington’s disease, the interest from the media 
was very low. Ivan wonders if the lack of interest is explained by 
Huntington’s disease being rare; had their findings concerned the 
onset of a more common disease the response might have been 
different. Although by his account their findings did have what can 
be described as the makings of a breakthrough, the findings lacked 
relevance for a larger public. Being a breakthrough may thus not 
be sufficient for a finding to make a successful news story. Iden-
tification is an important feature in both science journalism and 
marketing, which may be achieved by evoking culturally established 
values. Popularized accounts or potentially controversial research 
seek to gain the approval of both the public and research funders 
(for example, Hansson 2005, 2006). Identification also appears to 
be central to the press release genre in terms of content. When 
reasoning about which press releases attract the media and public 
attention and which do not, the factor mentioned by both public 
relations officers and researchers was the bearing the findings in 
question had on something familiar to the public. The research-
ers’ understanding of what deserves public attention does not 
necessarily coincide with what the general public can relate to or 
identify with. In Ivan’s example, Huntington’s disease may have 
been too rare for the press release to attract any wider publicity 
outside the medical professional community. On other occasions 
the media and public response can come as a surprise. Peter did 
not think the findings announced in his most recent press release 
to be particularly important, far less of any interest to audiences 
beyond the research community.
Author: What happened the last time you did a press release?
Peter: Well, the last time we did one it gained lots of visibility […] 
it was an experimental study, but the public relations officer put 
a very catchy title on the press release and that led to it gaining 
attention in the US. It was not widely distributed in Sweden, no 
news agencies or anything wrote about it. But in the US it was 
widely distributed.
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The title chosen by the communication professional hinted that 
the findings could potentially make people smarter. Peter ascribes 
the attention the press release received not to the actual findings 
it reported, which according to him were minor, but to the catchy 
title chosen by the press officer that struck a chord with the public.
In addition to inherent newsworthiness, the intended readers’ 
ability to relate to the message of the press release appears cru-
cial to its ability to attract public interest. In other words, rather 
than announce something as completely new, an effective press 
release will make the findings sufficiently recognizable to fit with 
what is already familiar to the expected audience. In the genre of 
medical press releases, the content element is not merely a matter 
of accounting for breakthroughs or ‘newish’ findings in order for 
communication to be successful.
Conclusions
Although there may not be any firm boundaries between the scientific 
community and the public, there are differences in the genres used 
when communicating findings among researchers and audiences 
who are not medical experts. Genres differ in form and content, 
they do not have the same aims, and they are intended for a variety 
of contexts (Kjellberg 2009). The examples and material discussed 
here illustrate how medical knowledge adapts as it circulates between 
research practices and the practice of writing press releases. The dif-
ferences between the genres used in these contexts demand adaption.
The communication professionals and researchers interviewed 
in this study generally have a shared understanding of the kind of 
communicative activities that press releases are intended to achieve 
when reaching out to non-academic audiences via the media. They 
also have a shared understanding of how research must be shaped 
in style and content in order for this to happen. In the interview 
material discussed above, press releases are described as connect-
ing audiences and researchers based on scientific findings, the 
conventions of news reporting, and things familiar to non-experts. 
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Thinking in terms of genre as a communicative activity, the themes 
and examples considered here illustrate how press releases differ 
from academic publications in form. Press releases are clearly asso-
ciated with visibility, accounting for something supposedly new yet 
 familiar enough to make non-experts interested. The success of a 
press release does not depend on the importance ascribed to the 
findings by the research community, but on how well the reported 
findings could be represented in a way that corresponded with some-
thing the intended audience could relate to. One way of describing 
the work of writing press releases is that it is about taking findings 
designed to slot into the existing knowledge in an academic field 
and adapting them to the conventions of news reporting in terms 
of both content and form, reflecting their move into a different 
context, from scholarly publication into the news media.
Turning medical knowledge into press releases is not unprob-
lematic. Points of tension are evident in the interviewees’ reflections 
on the necessary negotiations when presenting findings in press 
releases, whether between research practice and how the news 
media works, and what each demands in order to be successful, or 
between an eagerness for visibility and a fear of building exaggerated 
expectations. When a balance is struck, however, a press release may 
not only operate as a mediator of visibility, but can also facilitate 
dialogue between researchers and patients. Scientific press releases 
constitute one kind of document that reports on popular science, 
retaining their ties to the scientific process by their connection to 
the original peer-reviewed publication of the findings, but also to 
the lives of non-scientists by accommodating the content, context, 
form, and aim in ways that non-experts can identify with.
Notes
 1 This theme has been discussed by researchers from a variety of disciplines, for 
 example STS (for example, Brown 2003; Felt & Fochler 2012), ethnology (for example, 
Hansson 2005; Ideland 2002), rhetoric (for example, Fahnestock 1998), literature 
(for example, Johnson & Littlefield 2012), and others (for example, Nelkin 1996; 
Sumner et al. 2014)
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The ethical tool 
of informed consent
How mutual trust is co-produced through  
entanglements and disentanglements of the body
Markus Idvall
I [doctor’s name] have explained the plan and the aim of the 
study to [patient’s name].
I [patient’s name] have been verbally informed about the study 
described above, have received the attached written information, 
and have had the opportunity to discuss its contents with the 
responsible doctor. I agree to participate in the study and I feel 
that my participation is wholly voluntary. I can at any time and 
without explanation stop my participation without this having 
any effect on my future care.  
These statements are taken from a copy of an informed consent form 
that was used in a clinical trial, which a few years ago explored cell 
transplantation as a possible treatment for patients with Parkinson’s 
disease. I received an unused electronic copy of the document 
from one of the researchers I interviewed as an example of how 
his research team had enrolled research subjects in the trial. The 
informed consent form was several pages long, its primary goal 
being to make individual patients consider whether to accept the 
possibility of undergoing a neurosurgical operation. Besides infor-
mation about the different steps of the cell transplant research, the 
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document comprised detailed information about risks and discom-
fort associated with the various tests and interventions. An MRI 
test, it was explained, can be experienced as strenuous because the 
subject has to be held still in a space which is confined and noisy. 
Implantation in the brain entails several risks, such as the spread 
of contaminants, but the surgery itself is associated with a risk 
for cerebral haemorrhage. Positive effects were also mentioned in 
the information sheet. Some patients who had undergone similar 
surgery earlier had been able to cut down on their anti-Parkinson’s 
medication after the implantation. The paragraphs quoted above 
came on the last page of the consent sheet, and served as a transition 
into the part of the form where the doctor (the researcher) and the 
patient (the research subject) were to sign. The passage spelt out 
what the two sides were agreeing to: the doctor/researcher stated 
that they had ‘explained the plan and the aim of the study’, while 
the patient/research subject declared that they had been ‘verbally 
informed about the study’, had ‘received the attached written infor-
mation’, and had had ‘the opportunity to discuss’ it.
Obviously, this was some kind of pledge that the two partners 
verbalized relative to each other. But what else is at stake in these few 
lines? What does it mean to give or obtain consent to participation 
in a research project in this way? What role does information or 
knowledge play in this context? In this chapter I will problematize 
how informed consent is practised in the everyday situations of 
a biomedical research process. In the analysis the focus will not 
be on the national legislation per se that exists as a foundation for 
how research subjects are informed about research participation, 
but rather the co-productive practices that constitute the informed 
consent procedures between research subjects and researchers. 
Informed consent, in a cultural analysis, is not only a signed doc-
ument with legal connotations, but primarily an ethical tool for 
realizing research, and, as a consequence, a social process whereby 
the actors face each other under different circumstances. I will thus 
explore the constitution of the social process of informed con-
sent, which researchers and research subjects and their respective 
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allies—research nurses and family members—are engaged in, and 
thus learn more about informed consent as a co-production of 
mutual engagement and responsibility in the participating networks 
of the two negotiating sides.
Co-production and embodied entanglements
Informed consent, in its physical and non-physical forms, will 
thus be seen as a form of ethical tool that the two sides apply 
in relation to each other while simultaneously realizing clinical 
science. Informed consent is here closely linked to ‘co-produc-
tion’, which is Sheila Jasanoff ’s term for how science, technology, 
and society operate together in the production of knowledge. In 
States of Knowledge, Jasanoff and colleagues (2004) enlarge on this 
perspective in a number of different kinds of contexts: climate 
science, science policy, genetic science, and so on. Central for my 
own work is Vololona Rabeharisoa and Michel Callon’s chapter, 
‘Patients and scientists in French muscular dystrophy research’, 
which develops an understanding of how lay interventions into 
biomedical research change the conditions for how scientists work. 
Rabeharisoa and Callon, who look at a patients’ association’s role in 
relation to science, focus on various aspects of a lay model of sup-
port for research. One of these aspects concerns ‘the tools’ applied 
by the patients’ association for ‘the orientation, the steering and 
the evaluation’ of how it supports research (Rabeharisoa & Callon 
2004, 144). My focus will be on how informed consent—just like 
the films, photographs, books, and testimonies in Rabeharisoa and 
Callon’s examples—operates as a tool for the orientation, steering, 
and evaluation for how scientists and patients collaborate in order 
to make clinical research ethical and thus feasible.
Thus I draw on both Jasanoff ’s and Rabeharisoa and Callon’s 
discussions of co-production to distinguish that the knowledge 
that was co-produced in the cell transplant research information 
procedures was not the type of new biomedical knowledge that 
eventually changes people’s treatments, or even their ways of being 
movement of knowledge
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cured. Rather, what was co-produced in this process was a sort of 
shared information about the other side, which in the long run 
may in part be beneficial for how the other type of knowledge, 
the findings, may be achieved, but which in the process of the trial 
was essentially about establishing co-productive trust between 
the two sides. Informed trust, rather than consent, is in this way 
co- produced through what Rabeharisoa and Callon call ‘mutual 
learning’ (2004, 144) (see also Hansson & Irwin in this volume). 
Scientists learn about the participants by securing individual patients 
for the research project, and simultaneously listening to the ques-
tions and concerns that these participants have. The participants in 
their turn learn about the research by seeking answers to their own 
questions in the information process and by listening strategically 
to the scientists. Therefore, unlike Rabeharisoa and Callon, I focus 
on individuals in action rather than on a model of an organization. 
On the pathway of the informed consent procedure, along which 
information circulates between the two sides and also transforms 
the positions of the two sides into networks of participating actors, 
a platform for new biomedical knowledge (and technologies) is 
co-produced.
In the midst of this co-production is a form of mutual, ethical 
labour based on the specific tool of informed consent, which  centres 
on the human body in that particular situation, and where the 
objective is not only to entangle the body in the action, but also 
to disentangle it from the context that eventually may appear. In 
Tissue Economies, Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell (2006, 60) 
write of one type of economic entanglement and disentanglement 
as ‘analytical categories … to explore how embryos move from the 
human body to clinics, laboratory, and stem cell banks’. A stem 
cell bank, according to Waldby and Mitchell, ‘performs a complex 
double role’ when it manages its ‘complex regimes of ontological, 
ethical, therapeutic, and commercial value’ (60).
On the one hand, it [the stem cell bank] assists in the technical 
work of disentangling tissues by facilitating the donation, stand-
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ardization, and global circulation of stem cells. Yet on the other 
hand, it performs ethical work that involves a certain re-entangle-
ment, for by placing certain limits on the marketing of cell lines 
and the commercialization of research, it attempts to divert the 
epistemological value of research into the categories of the pub-
lic good and the national health. (Waldby & Mitchell 2006, 60)
In the case of the informed consent procedure studied here, the 
process of how the human body is made useful to research goes 
from entanglements of the human body to disentanglements—
something which will be clarified below in a discussion of the 
move from teaching consent to de/signing (of which more later), 
documenting and, finally, reporting consent.
Material and method
Before I turn to the question of informed consent, I want to say 
a few words about fieldwork. Parkinson’s disease, the disorder 
on which I concentrated in my fieldwork, is a neurodegenerative 
disease that was first designated by the British doctor James Par-
kinson (1755–1824) in the early nineteenth century. The cause of 
the disease, however, is still unknown. The disease is elicited by the 
continuous death of a certain type of cell in the brain: dopamine 
cells. With the loss of these cells specific symptoms arise: rigidity, 
shaking, problems with balance, and loss of the power of volunt-
ary movement. Non-motor symptoms such as tiredness, sleeping 
problems, anxiety, depression, and dementia can also develop. 
Different pharmaceutical treatments, including levodopa, have an 
effect on the symptoms, but cannot cure the disease itself. Moreover, 
these treatments function well only in the beginning; ultimately 
the positive effects are reduced and instead side effects develop, 
for example dyskinesias (impairment of voluntary movements) 
(Hagell 2004, 78 ff.). Parkinsonism is therefore the target of many 
clinical trials in the world today. The scientists use different kinds 
of approaches in order to understand the disease better and to find 
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new treatments for the condition. The research focus shifts between 
neuroprotective strategies, the role of physical exercise, genetic 
disposition, cell transplantations, and so on (Palfreman 2015). For 
some years (2012–18) I had the opportunity to learn more about 
this research when I conducted fieldwork at a university clinic that 
specializes in research on Parkinson’s disease. I happened to focus 
on cell transplantation research, but I also encountered other types 
of biomedical research, for example the mapping of genetic heritage 
and the implantation of human growth factor. My fieldwork was 
conducted at intervals and included various methods: observations, 
focus-group interviews, individual interviews, etc. (Idvall et al. 
2013; Idvall 2017a–b). Here I will examine the individual interviews 
and how this part of the fieldwork, conducted between 2015 and 
2018, revealed a form of split collaboration between researchers 
and research subjects regarding how the two relate to clinical trials 
and informed consent. 
The interviewed researchers were a relatively homogeneous 
professional staff of five doctors and five research nurses. Two out 
of the five doctors specialized in cell transplantations. The research 
subjects who I interviewed were a more heterogeneous category, 
with individuals with Parkinson’s disease as well as relatives of some 
of those affected. Nine individuals with Parkinson’s disease were 
interviewed individually, while seven individuals were interviewed 
together with a family member. Only three individuals had first-
hand experience of cell transplantation research; however, several 
individuals had experience of taking part in medical research, and 
those few who did not were able to talk about science and clinical 
trials from a perspective that included their personal experience 
of living with the illness.
In the individual interviews I took an ethnographic approach 
to learn more about the cultural encounters between researchers 
and research subjects (Idvall 2005). I tried to map how the co- 
production of informed consent was realized between researchers 
and research subjects. Doctors and research nurses were asked 
how they went about obtaining informed consent from potential 
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participants in the clinical trials, and we discussed how they as 
scientific staff retained consent during the trials and what role 
consent played afterwards. In interviewing the research subjects, 
I likewise charted their experiences of the process of informed 
consent in a clinical trial. Individuals with Parkinson’s disease and, 
where relevant, their family members were asked how they had 
consented, their experiences of taking part in a research project, 
their understanding of the information given by the medical staff, 
and the extent to which they felt themselves to be autonomous 
in their decisions. Those interviewees who did not have personal 
experience of taking part in a clinical trial discussed the topic on 
the basis of their illness experience.
Teaching consent
In the event, my analysis of co-productive practices as the realization 
of mutual consent was sparked by an observation rather than an 
interview. That moment came at the beginning of my fieldwork. 
I was in an audience of around 40 in a lecture room on the very 
top floor of a university hospital building, the panoramic view 
of the city darkening as the sun went down. We in the audience 
were mostly strangers to one another, but I suspected many had 
Parkinson’s disease or were family members, since they all were 
of the age when Parkinson’s disease usually first presents, that is 
in their fifties, sixties, or seventies. A few had visible symptoms of 
the disease, however, and then there was a scattering of my own 
sort—medical and social scientists. 
The critical moment of the evening, which I remember so clearly, 
was when the first speaker, a senior specialist, started his presenta-
tion. Everyone listened carefully because he was well known as a 
successful, experienced clinical scientist at the university clinic. 
He had been part of the clinical trials conducted in the 1980s, 
and he was expected to be involved in new clinical trials in the 
near future. In his presentation, he gave an overview of the status 
of the ongoing research and listed some of the challenges ahead. 
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I experienced his presentation as professional and objective. He 
gave no unfounded promises; his was a realistic account of what 
the immediate future might hold. The audience seemed satisfied 
with his picture of things. Still, they had a great many questions 
afterwards. One of course was when clinical trials were expected 
to start. The specialist, whose calm and neutral way of reasoning 
never deserted him, could not point to any specific time.
He was not the only speaker that evening. Two people with 
 Parkinson’s disease also gave presentations. Like the specialist, 
they were quite well known to the audience, being leading patient 
 activists. On this occasion they presented their views on what science 
can do for patients with Parkinson’s disease and their families. What 
struck me was that their presentations gave us a more personal view 
on how scientists and patients can work together to achieve new 
treatments for Parkinson’s disease. Both had a grasp of the science 
and could discuss their disease using scientific insights—but they 
could also talk about their personal experience of the disease in 
a compellingly authentic way. The audience seemed enthusiastic. 
Like the senior specialist, the two patients were peppered with 
questions and reflections afterwards.
During my time with the biomedical research programme I 
attended three or four co-productive events of this sort. What I 
encountered at these events were two kinds of objective, embodied 
ways of relating to the biomedical knowledge that was discussed. 
On the one hand, there were the explanations by the scientists, 
who spoke and ‘framed’ the issues individually and mostly from 
the front of the lecture room. They were, in Anthony Giddens’s 
words (1991, 109–143), the expertise at these events. On the 
other hand, I saw a different kind of participation, which was 
more indirect and personal and mostly realized in the seats of 
the lecture room—what laypeople do when following discussions 
about scientific progress on-site. In this case it was, in Giddens’s 
perspective, more a manifestation of lay views on biomedical 
knowledge, which hold a great deal of embodied expertise in 
the specific setting.
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These events, flagged as science cafés, were arranged on the 
initiative of members of a highly prestigious research programme 
on cell transplantation that hoped to launch new clinical trials with 
Parkinson’s patients within a few years. Inspired by the French tradi-
tion of cafés scientifiques (Russell 2010, 92–3), they were meant as a 
way of communicating science in mutual dialogue with people in 
general and patients in particular. The plan was to have at least two 
meetings a year, one in the spring and one in the autumn. Mainly it 
was seen as a possibility for patients and relatives to learn about the 
science that was taking place at the university hospital, but it was 
also for the scientists to learn about the families and their situation. 
The unspoken ambition was that laypeople and scientists would 
meet as equals at these events (Russell 2010, 92–3).
What the science cafés represent is a keen co-productive approach, 
which it was hoped would overflow into how scientists and par-
ticipants work together in clinical trials. With their lectures and 
audiences, they may be seen as a form of start-up for the patients’ 
participation in clinical trials; an active learning platform where 
potential subjects in future trials and their family members can 
find out about the science involved. Listening to a specialist give a 
lecture is like reading the patient association’s periodical (Parkin-
sonjournalen)—a way to take responsibility and be informed about 
one’s own illness. A central aspect of this learning moment is that 
all the individuals are exposed to the instrumental use of Parkin-
sonism bodies in clinical science, and are forced to imagine their 
own body’s possible ‘usefulness’ in upcoming trials (see Goodman 
et al. 2003).
For the clinical scientists, in their turn, it is important that patients 
reflect on the research. The more conscious their patients are about 
the science, the easier it is for the scientists to do science—that at 
least appears to be the argument. Transparency turns out to be a 
crucial ideal for scientists and research nurses. But of course, theirs 
is a partial or tactical transparency. There is no question of full open-
ness about what takes place in laboratories and operation theatres; 
rather, a relative openness that can interest people in supporting 
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developments (Idvall 2003). As patient, one becomes entangled in 
the scientific process and feels more and more committed to the 
goals that science offers in that particular situation.
De/signing consent
The process of informed consent can start in the lecture room or the 
science café, but the document itself—the co-productive tool—is 
never in evidence at this stage. As a patient, one can add one’s name 
to a list to receive further information about the research, or, like 
one research subject did, hand one’s business card to a lecturing 
researcher, but the informed consent form will not be produced 
until the moment comes to enrol potential participants in a clin-
ical trial. This is done by the researchers who plan and design the 
project’s procedure of informed consent. The informed consent 
form is drawn up in a pre-phase of the clinical trial. In drafting the 
research protocol, the scientists turn to an ethics committee and 
propose a procedure for how to recruit patients to the project with 
informed consent: the principal investigator is thus responsible for 
the design of the informed consent procedure in dialogue with the 
ethics committee. The protocol, which directs everything in the 
research project, is central to how informed consent is structured 
and put into practice.
Subjects are not presented with an informed consent form until 
they are to be enrolled in a trial. The co-productive tool is part of 
a process that often begins with the clinical scientists approaching 
patients who they have met in the clinic—their ‘own’ patients—
although in some cases others who do not attend the clinic contact 
the scientists and ask to take part in a study (see Hansson 2017). 
One clinical scientist (Interview no. 19) explained that when this 
happens she needs to judge whether the person is eligible to be 
a research participant. For example, she has to consider whether 
there are indications of ‘cognitive weakness’, or a tendency to fail 
to come to appointments. As a scientist she never says yes imme-
diately, for example by email. Instead, she asks the patients to send 
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her copies of their medical notes (patientjournal). Sometimes she 
has to reject patient requests when they do not meet the study’s 
inclusion criteria.
The informed consent form is signed either at the potential 
research subject’s home or at the university clinic; where exactly 
will depend on the nature of the research project—whether it is 
invasive or not—and whom the patients are to interact with. When 
the research project in question is less invasive it is expected that 
potential participants can make the decision on their own or together 
with a family member, in which case they usually sign at home. 
They may receive a letter from the clinic, asking that if they agree 
they return the completed consent form back to the clinic. In more 
invasive studies, potential participants may receive information at 
home, but wait until their next meeting at the clinic to sign there 
in the company of a doctor or a nurse.
With a co-productive approach, in the early phase of recruiting 
research subjects and possibly obtaining consent, both written and 
verbal information is included. Some of the interviewees stated that 
the written information was the most important for them. One man 
(Interview no. 6) who took part in a trial together with his wife felt 
that he needed to revisit the information more than once. This is 
an important argument for having written information: to be able 
to reread it at home, with extra time to consider one’s options. It 
can also be a way to discuss the alternatives with one’s family. One 
interviewee (Interview no. 12) thought that verbal information 
can always be misunderstood, and he needed written information 
in order to be able to discuss it with his wife at home, whom he 
felt was more perceptive than he was about this kind of question.
However, verbal information had its proponents too. One  woman 
(Interview no. 5) explained that the verbal information made it 
possible for her to put direct questions about the surgery to the 
clinical scientist. Another interviewee (Interview no. 15) described 
how he accepted participation in a trial on the spot. He was not 
interested in reading any information, the verbal information had 
convinced him to participate because some of the scientists who 
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were responsible for the project had been involved in earlier trials, 
and therefore in his view had important insights about how best 
to do this new project. This research subject was focused on the 
scientists’ authority rather than on the risk–benefit assessment 
offered in the written information.
Proof, verification or contract?
What does the signed consent form, the two signatures, repres-
ent for the individuals concerned? For the researchers, the two 
signatures are proof that information has been given and consent 
has been obtained in that specific situation. Regarding signing, 
the scientists explained that by doing so they certified that the 
research subject had had the chance to ask them questions. One 
research nurse (Interview no. 21) stressed that the act of signing 
is an active stance by the participants. The signed consent form 
here becomes a kind of declaration of responsibility which the 
participants express towards science. Signing, in the eyes of the 
scientists, also becomes a way of preventing patients from taking 
participation too lightly: some are ‘quite fast’ when deciding to 
take part in a study. As a clinical scientist, one needs to make sure 
that the patients really have read the information and understood 
it. A patient must from this viewpoint be aware that by signing a 
consent form they have a responsibility to understand the infor-
mation that they have received.
Proof was perhaps not what the research subjects first thought 
of when they reflected on the meaning of informed consent. Still, 
a few realized that the signing of the consent form was more for 
the scientists than for the sake of the subjects. One woman and 
her husband (Interview no. 8) said that by signing it protects the 
scientists; it gives them carte blanche in that particular situation. 
The signing of the consent form means that the scientists are taking 
a belt and braces approach—‘både hängslen och livrem’—in order 
to be certain in their work, as one participant put it (Interview no. 
3). However, most of the interviewees agreed on what the scientists 
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thought about it—signing is a sort of verification of their respon-
sible participation in clinical science. Perceptions of responsibility 
can in this way be something that all participants experience when 
signing a consent form. One woman (Interview no. 5) explained 
that she had a responsibility as a research subject; one should not 
withdraw from a research project on a whim, or mismanage one’s 
medication, if participating in a trial. For another of the interviewees 
(Interview no. 9), consent in writing was ‘a type of contract’, since 
participation in the trial would be ‘a big thing’.
In sum, the de/signing of the informed consent form appears to 
be, as Nikolas Rose (1999, 154) would have it, a form of governing 
style where ‘responsibilization’ becomes an essential cultural ingre-
dient in how individuals act towards research within the frames 
of a neoliberal society. Responsibilization here is intimately linked 
with a certain degree of parallel freedom—‘autonomization’, as Rose 
calls it—for both the research subjects and the scientists: a dyadic 
or co-productive process of governing, which, as will be seen, is 
essential in the next phase of how informed trust is formed.
Documenting consent
In the phase of the research process when the participants are sub-
ject to different tests and interventions, signed consent becomes a 
tool that exists both on paper and as an electronic copy in a range 
of contexts. The participant’s signed consent form is saved in the 
original in a folder that is stored in a locker or on a shelf in a locked 
room. The signature therefore exists as a physical object, safely 
archived in the university hospital for the lifetime of the research 
project. Electronically, the signed consent form is also included in 
the participant’s medical notes, making their participation in the 
clinical trial plain to all their caregivers.
A paper copy of the signed consent form is also offered to the 
participants themselves. In this case the signed form exists as a 
reminder of an action in the past, brought home for keeping by a 
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multitude of individuals with different routines for saving medical 
information and ‘important papers’.
This anxious documenting of informed consent reflects the 
fact that consent is always negotiable, and in that sense must be 
defended throughout a research process. The fragility of mutual 
trust stems from the continuous straddling of the co-production 
process between Rose’s two principles of responsibilization and 
autonomization (1999). The signed informed consent form is, as 
we have seen, a responsibilization tool, but it only works as long 
as both sides—the researchers and the patients—know they can 
act with autonomy relative to the other. For the researchers, this 
autonomy comes with the act of documenting consent. Armed with 
this documentation, the researchers have some sort of recourse 
when faced by unexpected events not of their own making. In some 
instances, research subjects can misunderstand or even forget what 
they have consented to. For the doctors and nurses, the archived 
consent form can serve as proof in dealings with research subjects 
who fail to comprehend what they approved to earlier. The document 
is almost never referred to in this process. However, if a patient 
were to forget a test or intervention needed in order to fulfil the 
project criteria, the research staff can discharge their responsibil-
ity by showing the patient the document, even though, given the 
situation, they might not insist on continuing the collaboration.
Thus, if discharge is a way out for the researcher, withdrawal is 
what the research subjects can do in order to assert their autonomy 
in relation to the research project. The withdrawal alternative is 
included in the informed consent agreement from the beginning. If 
a research subject decides to withdraw they do not have to explain 
why; it is a way out that does not have to be defended. In my inter-
views with research participants, none had withdrawn, even though 
some had been disappointed by their participation in a project. One 
man (Interview no. 15) told me that he started in an observation 
group before he was randomized into a transplant group, but after a 
while he was resassigned to the control group of the cell transplant 
study. This was very hard on him psychologically. He had got used 
147
the ethical tool of informed consent
to the idea that he was going to have a transplant, and nursed the 
hope that he would be cured. He indicated his disappointment 
with his participation in the biomedical research throughout the 
interview. Still, when I asked him if he was considering withdraw-
ing from the project he replied without hesitation that he was not.
As previous studies show (Brown 2003; Lundin 2004; Novas 
2006; Rubin 2008), patients have expectations of their participa-
tion in research projects. A certain treatment can be a reason for 
participation, with the project a chance to get something beyond 
the regular treatments. One of my interviewees (Interview no. 10) 
spoke frankly of considering withdrawing from a project when he 
realized that he was not going to get the experimental treatment he 
was hoping for. Finding himself in the control group, he sensed that 
he no longer had a goal. It felt like ‘a kick in the stomach’ when he 
realized he was not going to get the cells and, as he saw it, eventually 
be cured. Still, he decided to stay in the project, and afterwards he 
felt he could use his experience against the project—for example, 
when he attended a hospital appointment abroad in order to take 
some tests which were mandatory for the trial, he ordered, at the 
expense of the research project, a hotel room that was a bit larger 
than standard and he also got a special flight ticket. Moreover, when 
the scientists heard that he was considering opting out, it was his 
impression that they offered him something in return if he stayed 
on: after the project was finished, he would be going to be first in 
line for participation in two other projects that were about to start. 
In effect they offered him, as the participant expressed it, ‘a small 
sack of candy’. The promise of being prioritized as a candidate for 
other studies with experimental treatments can be motivation 
enough for people in the control group of a clinical trial.
The motives for withdrawing have many elements. Disappoint-
ment is one of them. Being a research subject is in itself a vulner-
able position and, like Tove Godskesen (2015) demonstrates in 
her dissertation Patients in Clinical Cancer Trials, may in some 
instances generate unrealistic hopes among individuals, which 
can eventually lead to great disappointment as well. However, it 
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does not always have to be disappointment that drives someone to 
withdraw from a project. In my material, it happens mostly because 
research subjects become more ill or experience growing tiredness 
due to their chronic disorder. One way of handling this kind of risk 
of withdrawal is for the research staff to offer participants house 
calls instead of meeting them at the hospital. A scientist together 
with a research nurse may decide to conduct the tests on the trial 
participants at home, sparing participants the journey to the hospital.
Withdrawal and discharge are thus essential aspects of auto-
nomization for how the documentation phase of the trial process 
eventually moves on to the stage when the results are ready to be 
communicated in various scientific contexts. In this latter phase, 
which ostensibly ends the participation of the trial subjects, mutual 
trust between researchers and participants is still defended in the 
form of the ethical format of the scientific periodicals.
Reporting consent
The protocol was reviewed and approved by the institutional re-
view board of each participating centre as well as the performance 
and safety monitoring board of the National Institutes of Health. 
After providing written informed consent, patients underwent 
laboratory screening and were excluded from further participation 
if they had evidence of infection with human immunodeficiency 
virus, hepatitis, or syphilis. (Olanow et al. 2003, 404)
The quote is from a scientific article in which a number of North 
American scientists described a cell transplant study where  placebo 
surgery had been used to study the effect and survival of foetal 
cells in the brain of Parkinson’s subjects. These surgeries were not 
uncontroversial, and gave rise to an ethical debate about whether 
it was acceptable to use placebo or sham surgery on the research 
subjects under such circumstances (Idvall 2017a, 132–6). In the 
article, the research subjects’ written consent to participate in the 
research is treated as little more than a technicality—‘After providing 
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written informed consent’ is all that is said about the presumably 
long process of teaching, de/signing, and documenting consent—
and as such the consent process is reduced to an anonym ous and 
collective event in the past. Each individual informed act of consent 
is not communicated. Instead, what is reported is a type of collec-
tive consent, summarizing how a whole group chose to become 
research participants.
After clinical trials have ended, informed consent thus loses its 
character as evidence for the scientists and instead becomes an 
active element in the reporting of the results. Usually the obliga-
tory section on methods and source materials in a scientific article 
includes a description of how the informed consent procedure was 
conducted. It is rarely as brief as in the article quoted above, but 
regardless, what is said about the consent procedure is essential 
in the reporting context. Without this ethical format, biomedical 
scientists may not be allowed to publish their results in scientific 
periodicals, since most journals have rules which prohibit publi-
cation if informed consent is not reported in the study.
The anonymous reporting of collective consent may be seen as 
an example of a disentanglement of the particular embodied ‘gift’ 
which the ‘useful body’ of the research subject represents in the 
context of clinical studies. Waldby and Mitchell’s discussion (2006, 
69–73) of how embryos, as body parts used in science, emerge out 
of embodied social relations, but are disentangled from this com-
plexity by means of informed consent processes, is eye-opening in 
this respect. They describe informed consent as a form of surro-
gate property contract between recipients and donors. Informed 
consent becomes a way for the recipient of embryonic cells and 
tissues to disentangle the embodied gift from the donor, as well as 
the complex context in which the donated cells and tissues have 
their origin, making it possible for the recipient to take control of 
the embodied gift.
In cell transplant research the disentanglement that reporting 
consent achieves means that researchers ultimately take symbolic 
control of the research subjects’ bodies—those ‘useful’ bodies that 
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were examined and subjected to interventions in the earlier stages of 
the research process, but which are now transformed into numbers 
and figures. For the research subjects themselves, the disembodying 
of individual consent that disentanglement leads to becomes a ques-
tion of how to continue their participation in science. Taking part in 
a clinical trial is often associated with the chance of obtaining more 
information than patients in general. Participants seem to expect 
communications that are adjusted to their ability to understand the 
essentials of the results. In my interviews with research subjects, 
many felt they lacked information about how far the research was 
from a breakthrough or a new discovery. Perceptions of slowness of 
science were ubiquitous among patients and their family members. 
The time frame set by what they perceived as the slow progress of 
science (Idvall 2017b; see also Wiszmeg 2019) far exceeded their 
own lifetimes. One patient (Interview no. 11) explained that she 
had had Parkinson’s disease for more than ten years. During that 
period she had heard about stem cells continuously, but nothing 
happens, she exclaimed. A man (Interview no. 14) who had been ill 
for twelve years thought that things did not move fast enough for 
the scientists. He felt that a lot more could be done, but he guessed 
that there was not enough funding.
The lack of information can be quite unsettling for many par-
ticipants. One research subject (Interview no. 10) expressed his 
frustration at getting very little information, saying that no one 
asked how the ‘rat’ felt (his way of articulating his sense of being 
a guinea pig). He added that participants and scientists will never 
be equals, since the participant does not have a clue about what 
the scientist is doing and the scientist has a ‘helicopter perspective’. 
Similarly, one woman (Interview no. 5) said that she felt a disadvant-
age next to the scientists, since she had not received any results or 
information after her last tests. Another person (Interview no. 11) 
explained that only a ‘short call about the benefits’ of the research 
that she had participated in would have been ‘enough’ to make it 
acceptable. One couple (Interview no. 14) acknowledged that their 
research participation felt a bit ‘thin’ after they received no feedback 
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about the findings following the tests. A man (Interview no. 15) 
who was currently participating in a project complained that he 
had not had any information about research outcomes, whether 
personally from the researchers or from the project website, because 
of that he felt he had no influence at all on the research.
The opposite can also be the case, for not all participants are 
interested in the results. As one man (Interview no. 6) explained, it 
was a good thing that he and his wife joined in a clinical trial, but 
they were never really interested in the potential findings. Another 
interviewee (Interview no. 7) emphasized that one does not have to 
be interested in the specific research project in order to participate. 
It is more a question of being willing to help for the good of all—it 
is part of one’s responsibility, as she said.
Movements of informed consent
I have shown how the co-production of biomedical knowledge 
and mutual trust are dependent on the ethical tool of informed 
consent, which involves a process of negotiation between scientists 
and participants. In this process, informed consent takes different 
forms—verbal, paper, electronic—and goes through different phases. 
In an early phase, scientific cafés can be a way of establishing an 
effective co-productive dialogue between researchers and research 
subjects. A teaching mode is central to preparing for informed con-
sent. In the recruiting phase the actual negotiation starts between 
the scientists and the participants. A critical decision-making 
situation is struck up between individuals, representing the two 
negotiating parties when the consent form is designed and signed: 
a form of entangling responsibilization is enacted by researchers 
and research subjects in a mutual dialogue. Further on, in the test 
and intervention phase, the fragility of informed consent is a con-
sequence of different techniques of autonomization. Withdrawal 
is open to research subjects who are too ill, tired, or disappointed 
to continue. For scientists, freedom is grasped through the sort 
of discharge of responsibility that a completed informed consent 
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form can offer in situations of uncertainty and disagreement. In 
the final phase, informed consent procedures can be traced in the 
scientific publications, often in the sections on material and method. 
By this stage the individual bodies of the research subjects have 
been disentangled from the embodied social relations of the orig-
inal informed consent. At the same time the research subjects can 
experience this end-phase of the scientific project as marking their 
exclusion from information flows and from actual participation.
Thus, teaching, de/signing, documenting, and reporting con-
sent and mutual trust together make up the various aspects of an 
embodied ethics, which deals with the moral dilemmas of clinical 
science and the vitality of the human body (Rose 2007, 254), but 
which also, paradoxically, includes a disembodying factor, through 
the impact of the scientific journals, that blurs and de-personalizes 
how the knowledge was originally co-produced.
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Facilitating the implementation of  
care models in hospital-based home care
Kristofer Hansson, Gabriella Nilsson & Irén Tiberg
In recent decades, it has become standard for health care, both 
medical treatments and nursing praxis, to be based on research, 
so-called evidence-based care. Healthcare has increasingly come 
to operate on an evidence-based paradigm, with its rationale that 
research should have a stronger position. This applies not only to 
changes in treatment routines, but also to views on how patients and 
their relatives should be treated, and what constitutes the best, most 
appropriate care. The implementation of research-based knowledge 
in care praxis has proved difficult and cannot be said to happen by 
itself. It is therefore crucial to further develop existing implemen-
tation methods, in order to facilitate the application of research 
findings in practice by integrating them into existing care praxis 
(Barrett 2004; Saetren 2005; Richards & Rahm Hallberg 2015).1 
Thus, the research-based knowledge to be implemented in a 
healthcare setting amounts to an ontology of sorts, which brings 
with it certain ways of considering such entities as healthcare, 
patients, treatment, and so on (Law 1996; Mol 1999, 2002). A 
consequence is, when research-based knowledge is to be put into 
daily practice—when the research model is to be translated into care 
practice—there is a risk that differences of opinion will arise if these 
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findings are misunderstood, obstructed, or result in unintended 
practices; dissent then becomes apparent when implementing new 
care models, where research-based knowledge conflicts with the 
values behind the health professionals’ existing practices, habits, 
and ideas (Nilsson et al. 2018).2
This chapter explores the potential of using ethnographic methods 
to support medical personnel who are in the process of replacing 
existing practice with a new research-based care practice—in other 
words, when an new evidence-based care model is operationalized 
(see also Woolgar 1988; Ashmore 1989; Bragesjö 2004). The method 
presented here centres on offering support to the member of the 
medical team who is to facilitate the actual implementation—the 
so-called facilitator—so the team can better understand the pro-
cesses at work (Tiberg et al. 2017). The purpose is to highlight how 
ethnographic methods can make the facilitator’s task of driving the 
implementation easier.
Research-based, evidence-based
Before describing the ethnographic method, the project and the 
importance of implementation in the healthcare sector will be 
discussed by addressing the growing interest in scientific evi-
dence (see Irwin in this volume). Internationally, there has been a 
move towards evidence-based healthcare in recent decades (Bohlin 
& Sager 2011; Richards & Rahm Hallberg 2015). This is in part 
because evidence-based healthcare is thought to promote equitable, 
high-quality care by reducing variations in healthcare provision, 
which might otherwise leave some patients without access to the 
best available care. Another reason is that there is a gap between 
healthcare praxis and the research findings that are available, which 
leads to care that is less effective and, at worst, harmful to the patient 
(Svensk sjuksköterskeförening 2016). This is the case made by the 
WHO (2006), concerned by the challenges facing health services 
because of increasingly stretched resources.
The example presented here is an evidence-based care model 
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designed to promote alternative learning outcomes for families 
with a child recently diagnosed with diabetes. In the study that 
forms the basis of the model, families felt satisfied with the care 
and information about diabetes and its treatment they received 
while they were in hospital, but problems arose when they were 
discharged. Once home, they felt that what they had learnt was 
inadequate in the home environment (Wennick 2007). In response, 
a new care model was designed and tested that is better suited to 
the various families’ daily lives, specifically to improve the families’ 
ability to care for children in a way that maintained good blood 
sugar control over time. This new evidence-based care model was 
termed hospital-based home care.3 
Closely focused on each family’s needs, hospital-based home 
care is a tailored adaptation to lifestyles and habits, designed to 
help families rapidly and successfully integrate diabetes care into 
their everyday lives. The defining property of the care model is that 
it should be possible for families to sustain routines learnt in the 
initial phase of the disease over the long term. This is achieved by 
healthcare staff helping parents and children learn on their own 
terms, rather than by overwhelming them with facts according 
to a predetermined script. Healthcare professionals have a long 
tradition of being the experts on how to manage diabetes, but 
have often operated on the assumption that families will simply 
follow instructions and adapt their lives to suit the information 
and advice given. However, patients and families do not always 
choose to do so; instead, they do what fits their own lifestyle. 
Hospital-based home care is about trying to improve on this 
approach so that medical personnel listen to the needs of individual 
families, and concentrate on supplying the necessary information. 
Doing so together families and professionals can find a way to 
manage insulin therapy that both maintains a steady blood sugar 
level and is within the bounds of reason for the family and child 
to adapt to (see Hansson in this volume). Hospital-based home 
care is therefore predicated on families themselves asking for the 
information they need to manage a range of everyday situations, 
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and learning from others’ experiences, putting that information 
into practice (Tiberg 2012).
What does this new approach demand? It can involve learning 
how to calculate the right amount of insulin relative to what the 
children have eaten and how much exercise they have taken that 
day, how different foods affect the child’s blood sugar levels, and 
how to reverse an episode of low blood sugar. The ambition is that 
families should stay in hospital no longer than necessary to stabilize 
the child’s blood sugar levels. When they feel ready, they should 
be given every opportunity to return home to learn how to handle 
their new situation in a home setting. Hospital-based home care is 
thus intended to organize healthcare in a way that makes diabetes 
care more accessible.4 
The model has been evaluated in a randomized controlled trial 
by a health science research group, comparing hospital-based home 
care to existing diabetes care (Tiberg 2012). The study established 
that the use of hospital-based home care was associated with positive 
outcomes. Parents were reportedly more satisfied with the infor-
mation they received, and in addition there were health economic 
benefits. The study also found that fathers showed a greater, lasting 
involvement in the child’s care. As it was a randomized controlled 
trial, hospital-based home care thus approaches what in healthcare 
would be considered an evidence-based model. In other words it is 
the healthcare model which, based on the available research, could 
be considered the best suitable paediatric diabetes care practice for 
those with a new diagnosis.5 The model can also be said to meet 
modern healthcare standards, as patients are given greater oppor-
tunity to influence their own care (participation) while also being 
given more responsibility for their own health (self-care) (Nordgren 
2009; Alftberg & Hansson 2012). The operation of hospital-based 
home care can thus be understood as a way of organizing healthcare 
in a manner that reflects a certain understanding of what modern 
healthcare is, central to which are opportunities for the rationali-
zation and prioritization of the healthcare sector’s finite—and thus 
limited—resources. In consultation with the research group, the 
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hospital where the study had been conducted decided to proceed 
with the implementation of hospital-based home care.
When the ambition is to offer patients evidence-based care, it 
is essential that the care model itself—here, hospital-based home 
care—with its necessary modifications to organizations and care 
methods, is translated into care practice. This often requires complex 
changes to be made to healthcare operations on many different lev-
els. Implementation being a slow process, the changes are unlikely 
to be immediate or even apparent, and that merely adds to the 
complexity. The personnel in, say, an endocrinology department 
first need to be made aware of how they currently handle patients 
and their relatives, before gradually changing how they go about 
it. Since it is difficult to change everyday healthcare practices, 
there is a focus in implementation research on what prevents and 
promotes change (Rycroft-Malone et al. 2013). The ability to see 
not only the opportunities, but also the stages and challenges of 
any implementation process, is crucial to realizing change and 
improving the care on offer (Nilsson et al 2018).
This chapter is not concerned with the various steps involved in 
implementation, but rather how the ethnographic method can be 
used to support the changes that implementation entails.6 We set out 
a method with which to identify the less successful implementation 
processes and the differences of opinion that can otherwise mount 
up, presenting the organization with challenges. The ethnographic 
method was applied as two ethnologists—Kristofer Hansson and 
Gabriella Nilsson—observed healthcare staff meetings where the 
implementation of hospital-based home care was discussed, while 
a medical team facilitator—Irén Tiberg—was present to support 
the process of change. Hansson and Nilsson subsequently observed 
clinical encounters between medical staff, patients and their relatives.
Diffraction and ethnographic methods
We argue that linking traditional ethnography to the theoretical 
concept of diffraction (see also Haraway 1988, 1992, 1997; Barad 
2007; Johnson 2020) offers a fruitful method with which to examine 
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the implementation processes of evidence-based healthcare prac-
tices. The term diffraction is taken from physics, and describes how 
light, encountering an obstacle, spreads out rather than propagat-
ing in a straight line. Similarly, an implementation process can be 
understood as diffractive, with a variety of understandings made 
visible during the process. Instead of focusing only on the antici-
pated and desired processes of change and on the difference that 
is thereby generated, with the diffractive method the ethnographer 
can identify the various forms of differentness present (Jackson & 
Mazzei 2012; Wiszmeg 2017). This differentness is actively evoked 
when ethnographer and facilitator together problematize the imple-
mentation process. The method highlights that knowledge is not 
a one-sided entity, but rather, as the ethnologist Andréa Wiszmeg 
notes, something ‘highly situational and fluid, with varying dura-
bility’ (2017, 74).
How, then, to translate the theory into actual practice? There is 
a risk in assuming the facilitator’s task is limited to communicating 
the care model to the healthcare personnel who are then to change 
their care practices. Applying the diffraction method, however, 
makes it possible for the ethnographer to be involved in the various 
relationships that constitute the implementation process. Through 
these relationships, we argue, new knowledge can be generated with 
which to understand the ongoing processes (see also Winther 2017). 
Metaphorically, the method can be likened to the ethnographer 
holding up a lantern in a dark room (Barad 2007, Wiszmeg 2017).7 
In this metaphor, there are two ways for the ethnographer to hold 
the lantern: holding it still, the light can be used to study the room 
while moving around; swinging it about, the lantern itself and the 
play of the light come into focus. The first way to hold the lantern 
can be compared to traditional ethnography, where the ethnographer 
studies the cultural expressions that appear in a specific context; the 
second way makes the lantern—the implementation—the object 
of the study, not just the means of the study. Swinging the lantern 
makes it possible to see not only the implementation process, but 
the various actors’ understandings and knowledges of the process. 
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The lantern’s sweep is what results in the dissemination of different 
knowledge, as Wiszmeg writes: 
This takes into consideration how the participants hold, in a meta-
phorical way, the ethnographer firmly or loosely, but also what 
kind of knowledge they gain by doing so and what they can set in 
motion. If we presuppose a boundary between the ethnographer 
and the ‘other’, we should remember that the ethnographer is not 
only holding, but is also being held. Much like the ethnographer, 
the ‘other’ will use the research situation to explore the world 
surrounding them, together as well as separately. The researcher, 
too, will be the researched. (Wiszmeg 2017, 76)
From this perspective, not only is there a reflexive approach to 
the implementation under study, but—or perhaps instead—the 
ethnographer, together with the facilitator, forms—and evokes—a 
situated knowledge (Haraway 1988). This is not knowledge in 
terms of the ethnographer being a neutral observer of an ongoing 
process, but knowledge arising from situational relationships of 
which ethnographer and facilitator alike are part. Ethnographic-
ally speaking, the diffractive method creates knowledge, which, 
as Wiszmeg (2017) points out, is the result of both reflection and 
a disruptive process (see also Mellander & Wiszmeg 2016, 103). 
Wiszmeg therefore argues that ‘It is part of the ethnographers’ quest 
to trace the differences that matter in the subsequent interference 
patterns’ (Wiszmeg 2017, 78).
How can this be done methodologically? In our case the method 
consisted of many different steps. The ethnographers were present 
in the initial phase of the process to observe the staff meetings at 
which the facilitator first presented and discussed the planned 
implementation. After every meeting, the ethnographers wrote 
down their observations, and the facilitator read and commented 
on the texts. Through this reading, a positional shift was made pos-
sible where the ethnographers no longer studied a defined object, 
but together with the facilitator explored the ongoing process of 
movement of knowledge
162
implementation. It is primarily this material that is presented in this 
chapter. Subsequently, based on joint experiences from the ethno-
graphic material, two interviews were conducted with the facilitator 
in order to further explore the possibilities and limitations of the 
implementation—of swinging the lamp rather than holding it still. 
The entirety of the collected material shows how ethnographers 
and facilitator together sought new experiences, so increasing the 
understanding of this particular ongoing implementation process. 
For the purpose of this chapter, two themes have been selected 
where these processes were especially evident.
The daily business of implementation
Applying the diffractive ethnographic method, two empirical 
 examples have been selected where the ethnographers and the facil-
itator together created a new understanding of the implementation 
process. These examples, representing situations of ‘messiness’ and 
‘vagueness’, highlight how the facilitator was given the opportunity 
to actively relate to the processes that had been initiated.
Messiness
The first meetings the facilitator held with the paediatric diabetes 
care teams that were to implement hospital-based home care, can be 
viewed as a learning process. This learning process  not only included 
the presentation of a new way of thinking about care and clinical 
encounters, but was also a negotiation (Fixsen et al. 2005). In order 
for a sustainable change to come about, it is crucial that from the first 
there should be an understanding of how and why the change should 
be implemented, as well as a desire for change (Weiner 2009). For 
this reason, it is crucial that time is allocated for in-depth discussions 
between all the personnel involved and the facilitator, and that the 
latter is being alert to the assumptions and modi operandi that the 
new evidence-based model might call into question. This matters 
particularly if the model is likely to challenge working methods that 
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are the basis of the staff ’s professional identity (Nilsson et al. 2018). 
Previous research within the project indicates that this is often a very 
demanding process for the facilitator (Tiberg et al. 2017).
In implementing hospital-based home care, the facilitator began 
by holding regular information meetings with personnel from 
two hospital departments (here called Team I and Team II). The 
teams consisted of different professional categories: paediatricians, 
paediatric nurses, dieticians and social workers. The aim was both 
to inform them what the new model would entail in terms of 
actual care methods and to negotiate a constructive approach to 
the implementation of the change. At the information meetings, 
it became clear that staff shortages were felt to be an obstacle to 
implementation, but equally that staff initially found some of the 
fundamentals of the model problematic—earlier discharge from 
hospital, for example. Here it was important that the facilitator 
gradually changed her way of communicating with the staff in 
order to mitigate what they saw as ambiguities and contradictions, 
and to prepare them mentally and emotionally for the changes to 
come. The latter has been singled out in implementation research 
as ‘readiness for change’ (Weiner 2009).
In order for the facilitator to fully relate to what happened at the 
staff meetings, not only were the ethnographers present as observers, 
but their resultant ethnographic texts were made available to the 
facilitator, which she read and annotated. This enabled her to relate 
to the ethnographic descriptions in the course of the project. The 
example here is of an observation, commented on by the facilitator, 
which concerned the departments’ prospects for change. At this 
point, the discussion had turned to staff shortages in the health 
service in general, and in the departments in particular, as the rea-
son why it was difficult to implement all the changes they wanted 
to see. Here this change was about one form of patient monitoring 
they wanted to try in both Team I and Team II:
The discussion changes direction, and now there is a conversation 
about staff shortages in the hospital and that staff are finding it 
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difficult to arrange cover because they are so short-staffed. At the 
same time, the hospital has imposed a recruitment freeze on all 
departments and clinics. I was a little unsure about the transition 
between the various discussions at the meeting, but think it is 
the senior consultant who changes the topic the group is talking 
about. Suddenly they are discussing who should do what about 
the most recent patient monitoring when staff shortages are so 
severe. It is the senior consultant who drives the discussion, 
and everyone seemed to agree. One of the nurses tried to solve 
the immediate practical problem by saying that as she was not 
working 100 per cent she could increase her hours if it would 
help. They conclude that there is no solution to be had, but the 
discussion has at least raised the problem. It is very clear, from 
my perspective, that Team I is in a difficult situation.
The facilitator’s comment upon reading: Spot on—it’s like a fog 
smothering the team’s whole being, at the same time as what is 
said in this discussion is hollow words. The same views have 
existed the same way for the 13 years I have been in the team, 
and although the situation has gradually deteriorated and never 
been as bad as it is now, words have become pretty much mean-
ingless. There is a resignedness about it all—we cannot influence 
the situation but still have to try and find solutions and continue 
the business of improving.
By being present from the start, the ethnographers had the chance 
to capture how the discussion about the implementation of hos-
pital-based home care was introduced, and what opportunities 
and limitations the personnel identified. These opportunities and 
limitations did not necessarily have anything to do with the imple-
mentation itself, as seen here, but as readers of this ethnography 
we could see from the senior consultant’s way of describing the 
shortages of personnel, that theirs was a demanding situation that 
was unlikely to be made any easier by the team simultaneously 
having to change the way they worked. That said, in this instance 
the facilitator was well aware of the situation, and could confirm 
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the ethnographers’ observations, putting into words a sequence 
of events that long predated this specific situation. How did this 
way of identifying and talking about limitations and opportunities 
impact on the implementation itself?
First and foremost, this type of diffractive ethnographic obser-
vation can problematize the idea that implementation is the ‘main-
stream of innovation within an organization’ (Greenhalgh et al. 2004, 
582). ‘Mainstream’ becomes a metaphor for implementation as a 
process of change that can be redirected relatively easily, depending 
on the innovation to be introduced; a metaphor that likens such 
a process to a stream, and one where it is easy to redirect its flow. 
However, as much of the literature stresses, healthcare is noted 
for its ‘messiness’ (Woolf 2008; Hertzum et al. 2017). This messi-
ness, we argue, must be addressed in any implementation process. 
Though messiness too, obviously, is a metaphor, it is a metaphor that 
shows the opposite: what is running counter to what is expected 
or not working at all; what is refusing all attempts to redirect it or 
is redirected far too quickly.
The facilitator, together with the observing ethnographers, could 
make the processes of implementation visible in a way that either 
strengthened the centripetal ‘mainstream’ forces or actively try to 
relate to what is collectively defined as its ‘messiness’. By choosing 
the latter situated knowledges of various kinds were constructed, that 
would help with other approaches when the facilitator next met the 
group. The ethnographic text is not only a way to make the things 
the facilitator cannot see or relate to visible, but it also confirms the 
facilitator’s existing perspectives, which might need some thought.
In looking for alterative perspectives on the implementation—
creating fresh contextual understandings together—one of the 
ethnographers chose to conduct interviews with the facilitator, in 
part to go over the facilitator’s comments on the ethnography. By 
doing so, they arrived at further situated interpretations to apply 
to the ongoing implementation process. The ethnographer reading 
the facilitator’s annotations, quoted above, aloud, preceded this 
section of the interview:
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Facilitator: There is a helplessness.
Ethnographer: There is a helplessness to this. We cannot influence 
the situation, but we still have to try to find solutions. Continue 
with the changes. But then it’s…
Facilitator: It’s really difficult. It really is.
Ethnographer: But it’s down to the entire hospital management. 
That’s all you see in the media … healthcare scandal.
Facilitator: And we’re powerless in the face of it. A bit dejected. 
I think so. We are a bit dejected by it actually.
Ethnographer: But for Team II it’s … even though it’s the same 
hospital [after a reorganization], they’re a bit better off … or is 
it the same for them?
Facilitator: Well it’s because last autumn… Team I is a slightly 
larger team than Team II, and we’ve had two full-time diabetes 
nurses in each. I used to be one of the ones in Department I. In 
Department II there was the diabetes nurse who was one of the 
first diabetes nurses in Sweden. A tower of strength, such a support 
… She’s been an incredibly important member of their team in 
Department II. She retired in the autumn and then the resources 
for the diabetes nurses halved. […] Which means this spring the 
resources for the diabetic nurses have been thin on the ground. 
When it comes to doctors too things are really tight. So all told, 
this spring the staffing situation has been truly awful. […] It’s a 
major obstacle, and at the same time so you’re powerless. Oh yes, 
we’re working on it, and the idea is that soon things will be back 
to us having two full-time positions. There’s something going on 
behind the scenes that we don’t really know about. I feel a bit as if 
you have to try to look past it and do what we can in the meanwhile.
Together, the ethnographer and facilitator help find a form of inter-
change which gives them an idea of the current situation in Team I 
and II. By holding the lantern together, they create an understanding 
of what is going on in the background, behind the actual imple-
mentation process. This means not only that the ethnographer has 
a better idea of what is going on in the implementation process, 
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but that the facilitator has the chance to get new insights about the 
process of change that is underway—putting feelings into words 
and finding different explanations for them. It does not have to be 
limited to things that are already known if not understood, how-
ever, as the method can also be used to make previously invisible 
processes visible.
Vagueness
The facilitator was not always aware of exactly what she had commu-
nicated at staff meetings, but rather, as the second example shows, 
it became clear when she read the ethnography afterwards. This 
not only made any issues visible, but also put them into words. The 
following ethnography illustrates the course of events: 
The facilitator mentions that the project can be seen as individ-
ualized care and in the same breath says that this is ‘a bit vague’, 
I have no idea what she means by vague. Is she referring to some 
general context at this particular workplace which means individ-
ualized care has been seen as being vague? Or is it that she wants 
somehow to reduce the value of her own study, that it’d make it 
too important in relation to all the problems they’re facing now, 
such as the staff shortage? It’s crucial to avoid pop psychology, 
but the connection between vagueness and individualized care 
says something about how a project is presented.
Facilitator’s written comment upon reading: Given your reaction 
I am embarrassed by my choice of words, and at the same time 
very grateful to be able to read it. The reason I use the word is 
that I think (and have heard lots of times too) that individual-
ized is felt to be very abstract and nobody really knows what it 
means. One standard comment is that’s what we do already. I use 
the word because I think I take some key people with me as they 
are (diabetic nurses and to some extent even doctors) by using 
their terminology. The majority of these people have heard me 
present the study findings several times, and the term ‘individu-
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alized care’ is a central concept. Every time I talk about this with 
people in the teams, I try to find other ways of expressing myself 
so that they can see or understand the meaning of the concept.
The facilitator went on to list the advantages of the new care method 
to be implemented—better blood sugar levels, beneficial for the 
children discharged to go home, happier children and families, 
and it all costs less—and here the emphasis was no longer on the 
‘messiness’ of healthcare, but rather on the way the facilitator pre-
sented the key features of the new hospital-based home care model. 
As an ethnographer, it is possible to observe not only what is said, 
but also the context in which it was said and how people react to 
it, both physically and verbally. By drawing up a detailed account 
of the process, it becomes possible for the facilitator to revisit and 
reflect on the situation later.
Implementation that focuses too much on the mainstream meta-
phor risks accounting for the process in an overly simplistic fashion 
where, for example, the facilitator can relatively easily communicate 
an evidence-based care model to the personnel who are to put it 
into action. In research, knowledge is often talked about in terms 
of knowledge translation, as just such one-way communication 
(Engelbretsen et al. 2017). Yet as the example above makes plain, 
there is not necessarily so simple a transfer when hospital-based 
home care is ‘translated’ from one individual to the next in real 
life; rather, it is a complex process, coloured by both the facilitator’s 
own approach to the implementation of hospital-based home care, 
and the sense healthcare professionals make of what is said at staff 
meetings of the kind described here.
In the interview, this formulation is a topic of some discussion 
between the ethnographer and the facilitator. Further layers of 
interpretation were added to how the facilitator could relate to the 
ongoing implementation process. As the facilitator said, 
My aim is they should see or understand the meaning of the term 
[individualized care]. Because when you read it like this, that word 
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sounds utterly stupid. As you wrote … introducing individual-
ized care … well, it’s just vague. So that I realize it doesn’t seem 
very professional. My focus is always to try to meet the people in 
that room where they are. I don’t think it’s such an odd choice of 
word for them, actually. […] So, you’ve got something that’s very 
abstract and you don’t understand, and you… I sometimes feel 
that there is a genuine interest, actually, if you only knew how. But 
you don’t know how. So I reckon this is definitely harder. We’ve 
come back to it several times. How can I somehow contribute to 
this change of attitude?
The facilitator ultimately asks the most important question—how 
can she drive the changes needed for the implementation process. 
With ethnography, it is possible to make this process visible and to 
reflect on it afterwards. It is this reflective work that offers oppor-
tunities to create situated knowledge together of a kind that can 
alter the ongoing process. The ethnographers draw one form of 
understanding from the actual observation, and another form—
or multiple forms—when the facilitator comments on events by 
annotating the ethnographic texts. When they then talk through 
the observations and the facilitator’s written comments, a further 
form of situated knowledge is achieved. Here knowledge is not 
just something that is in circulation at staff meetings, but which 
all parties involved must work with far more actively throughout 
the implementation process, creating situated knowledge together 
on a variety of occasions, in the realization that such varieties of 
knowledge are a way forward. How the facilitator was affected on 
each occasion, and how the varieties of situated knowledge fed 
back into the implementation process, are things that are harder 
to quantify retrospectively. The point of this chapter is to explore 
how an approach in which a facilitator and ethnographers work 
closely together might further the implementation of a new care 
method, but at the same time their collaboration amounts to an 
important ethnographic fact, which can be adduced in the cultural 




With changes to a variety of healthcare practices, the implementa-
tion of evidence-based models has become increasingly common. 
Implementation can be understood as the process by which a care 
model—in this instance, hospital-based home care—translates into 
a new care method, but it is also a theoretical perspective which 
concentrates on how change transpires. The purpose of this chapter 
has been to show that such changes are often opaquely complex, 
which gives weight to the argument that continued in-depth research 
on implementation processes is needed. What should be singled 
out is the importance of research that focuses on the significance 
of context—or organizational culture, if one prefers—in whether 
or not an implementation process will lead to sustainable change.
The chapter explores the possibilities open to ethnographers 
and facilitators to band together to create situated knowledge that 
can benefit the implementation process. The term diffraction is 
suggested as a possible method with which to generate a variety of 
situated knowledges during a process (Haraway 1997; Barad 2007; 
Wiszmeg 2017). Just two examples have been discussed here, but 
the working method is unlimited in scope, and a wide variety of 
themes could result from joint efforts of this kind.
One finding is the way in which the various processes are best 
understood. Three different perspectives on knowledge are apparent, 
each of which brings home the full complexity of implementa-
tion, and shows how the proposed method can be understood in 
relation to processes of knowledge and change in general—from 
evidence-based knowledge, via care models and care practices, to 
situated knowledge:
(i) In a contemporary perspective on healthcare, scientific, so-called 
evidence-based knowledge is evidently a primary category—know-
ledge with capital K. When it comes to healthcare research, this 
knowledge can best be described in terms of a model for practice, 
here a care model. In this chapter, hospital-based home care is the 
care model implemented.
171
the co-creation of situated knowledge
(ii) For evidence-based knowledge to be operationalized, the result-
ant care model must be reframed as a care method, adapted to 
the specific care context in which the model will be applied. This 
translation process can vary in problematics or scope, depending 
on the readiness and willingness to change. Regardless, there is 
inevitably a point at which the different care methods meet—the 
method supported by the model and the method (the professional 
knowledge) already in operation in the healthcare context—which 
here was hospital-based home care and the traditional hospital 
care. The reason for the implementation is to replace the previous 
care method with the new evidence-based method. In order for 
this to be successful, we would argue that it is necessary to think 
not in terms of replacing traditional care outright, but rather to try 
to achieve a coalition of the two methods in what we have termed 
situated knowledge.
(iii) By using the method we propose here, where the ethnogra-
phers and facilitator work diffractively, knowledge is generated 
which draws on both the evidence-based model and the profes-
sional knowledge already found in the context of the new model’s 
implementation. It is co-created knowledge that combines all the 
evidence, with its potential outcomes, in the specific context where 
it is implemented.
Diffractive ethnography is largely reliant on ethnographers dar-
ing to abandon their personal reflexive interpretations—which 
easily create a distance to the study object (Barad 2007; Wiszmeg 
2017)—to meet the person being studied partway in a joint inter-
pretation. Together they hold the lantern so that the facilitator, the 
other, becomes an important factor in the way situated knowledge 
is generated, influencing the processes of change that are already 




 1 We wish to thank Andréa Wiszmeg for her comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
 2 Implementation research identifies four main factors as having an impact on imple-
mentation: (i) innovation; (ii) how innovation is communicated; (iii) time; and (iv) 
the sociocultural system in which innovation is implemented (Rogers 2003).
 3 Our account of the implementation process enlarges on our previous publication ‘Att 
implementera tillgänglighet i vården’ (‘Implementing accessibility in healthcare’) in 
Hansson & Nilsson 2017. 
 4 The Swedish Health and Medical Services Act of 2017 (Hälso- och sjukvårdslagen 
2017:30) said of accessibility that ‘Healthcare must be provided so that the require-
ments for good care are met. This means that care in particular should be readily 
accessible.’
 5 At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that a single study does not con-
stitute a sufficient basis, but together with other research with similar findings the 
evidence becomes stronger. Central to this are proven experience and a consensus 
among the professionals who provide the care that children will do best in a home 
environment as far as possible. The crucial question is thus whether it is safe for a 
child newly diagnosed with type 1 diabetes to be at home rather than in hospital. 
This was a source of anxiety for some of the nursing staff who were to work with 
hospital-based home care, and led some to resist its implementation (discussed in 
greater detail in Nilsson et al. 2018). 
 6 The implementation process can in theory be broken down into different steps, from 
preparatory work to full implementation as a sustainable practice. In brief, they can 
be said to be (i) installation, (ii) initial implementation, and (iii) full implementation. 
This chapter is based on the division of the implementation process presented in the 
survey ‘Implementation Research: A Synthesis of the Literature’ (Fixsen et al. 2005; 
see also Rogers 2003). 
 7 We draw on Andréa Wiszmeg’s reading (2017) of Karen Michelle Barad’s philosophy 
where Barad’s stick becomes a lantern, linking it to an older ethnological trope of 
the searchlight (see Daun 2010). As Barad says of her metaphor, ‘One need only 
remember here the sensation, often cited by psychologists, which every one has 
experienced when attempting to orient himself in a dark room with a stick. When the 
stick is held loosely, it appears to the sense of touch to be an object. When, however, 
it is held firmly, we lose the sensation that it is a foreign body, and the impression 
of touch becomes immediately localized at the point where the stick is touching the 
body under investigation’ (2007, 154).
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A number in circulation
HbA1c as standardized knowledge  
in diabetes care
Kristofer Hansson
A glycosylated haemoglobin test, HbA1c, is a blood test that 
 me asures how much sugar is bound to the red blood cells, or 
haemo globin (Hb). Since red blood cells break down after about 
120 days and new ones are formed, HbA1c can be used to check 
the average blood sugar over the last two to three months, and 
thus how a patient is managing their diabetes. If the patient’s blood 
sugar levels have been good, less sugar will be attached to the 
haemoglobin. On 1 September 2010, HbA1c tests in Sweden were 
changed from being given as a percentage to being given in mmol/
mol. As a result, patients’ HbA1c results became comparable, not 
only individually, but also across cohorts of patients, and as an 
average value for regions and the entire country. It even became 
internationally comparable between countries. In other words, 
HbA1c tests circulated on an entirely new scale and took on various 
meanings in relation to the diagnosis of diabetes. In this chapter, 
HbA1c is investigated as a form of standardized knowledge in 
diabetes care and the significance this form of knowledge has for 
a variety of practices is explored. HbA1c is discussed here as a 
value expressed in figures, but where the figures are interpreted, 
translated, and understood—enacted—in different ways, depend-
ing on the practice presenting or using the figures. Ethnographic 
methods allow us to follow the figures and how they are discussed, 
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whether at staff meetings or in individual clinical encounters with 
parents whose children have recently been diagnosed with diabetes. 
These are figures which can serve as a key metric in the narrative 
that professionals create in the clinical encounter, a narrative that 
emphasizes the importance of managing one’s diabetes (Arduser 
2017). It can also be a narrative that visualizes developments at an 
endocrinology department in a national comparison with other 
departments’ averages for HbA1c. However, the representation 
of figures produced by HbA1c testing is not limited to narratives 
or visualizations, but is used for a wide range of quantifications, 
measure ments, and standardizations according to the subject—
doctor, nurse, patient, parent, and so on (see Larsen & Røyrvik 
2017). In other words, it forms the normative guidelines to which 
various subjects relate differently—it is a conditional circulation.
This chapter explores how figures are used in medicine to create 
normative guidelines, and how figures are variously interpreted and 
used depending on the contextual practice. I begin by presenting 
HbA1c and the study’s methods and implementation, and then 
trace the figures from the clinical encounters to staff meetings, 
all in a Swedish welfare context.1 Clinical encounters establish 
the significance of the figures for the interaction of medical staff 
and children with diabetes and their families. This practice is 
then compared to how the professionals discuss and use HbA1c 
at staff meetings, and how this relates to a national context, which 
sees medical professionals use the figures to compare themselves 
with other endocrinology departments. The chapter concludes 
by addressing not only how HbA1c creates figures which are in 
constant circulation, but also by examining the subjectification 
processes in which the individual becomes ‘diabetic’ by the use of 
these figures and others (see Agamben 2014). In the next section I 
begin the chapter by addressing the question of the realities where 
these specific figures—these dispositifs—apply.
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The all-important figure of 52
A dispositif is a theoretical concept that renders visible the rela-
tions that arise when a harmless object such as HbA1c is put into 
practice, creating a network of power relations between, say, a 
medical institution and the individual (see Agamben 2014). It is 
in the meeting of individual and dispositif—here, HbA1c—that 
the subject proclaims itself, be they doctor, nurse, patient, or rel-
ative. This assertion was something I saw in one of the many staff 
meetings I attended which brought together all the department’s 
specialists to discuss, on this occasion, a leaflet about HbA1c for 
families whose children have diabetes. There were nearly twenty 
people seated at a long table, mainly doctors and nurses, but also 
dieticians, counsellors, psychologists, and medical secretaries, 
who together made up the hospital’s diabetes team. Most of them 
fetched mugs of coffee or tea, and, having agreed on the agenda, 
began by discussing the leaflet.
One of the key points in the leaflet was that ‘Your diabetes treat-
ment goal’ was an HbA1c of 52 mmol/mol.2 This was a test done 
when the patient attended the hospital clinic; it was not something 
the child or their family could measure on their own.3 To achieve this 
goal, the diabetic child had to keep their blood sugar at a low level. 
The leaflet therefore spelt out these levels, with, for example, ‘Blood 
sugar before a meal: 4–6 mmol/l’ and ‘Target value at bedtime 5–7 
mmol/l’.4 If the family arranged everyday life practices so the child’s 
blood sugar remained within these averages, then the chances of 
achieving the HbA1c target of 52 mmol/mol increased. In order 
to achieve this the leaflet had a section with ‘Help reaching your 
goals’, which began with ‘Test your blood sugar before every meal!’ 
followed by ‘Hypoglycaemia’, ‘Correction dose’, ‘Counting carbs’, 
and ‘Exercise’. These points summed up the hope that the family 
would take responsibility not only for the child’s treatment, but also 
for reaching their health goals with a form of self-care (Alftberg 
& Hansson 2012; Arduser 2017; Liu and Lundin in this volume).
What was this self-care that the parents or patient were expected 
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to manage? Hypoglycaemia is when blood sugar falls below 3.5–4 
mmol/l, which the individual should treat with glucose to raise their 
blood sugar. If their blood sugar is above 8 mmol/l then they need 
to take a correction dose of insulin, and their blood sugar should be 
checked again after two hours. Family and teenage patients should 
learn to count carbs, adjusting the insulin dose according to how 
many carbohydrates there are in the meal the patient will eat and 
what physical activity is planned afterwards. By looking at both, 
the family can ‘estimate how much insulin is needed for a certain 
quantity of carbohydrates’. It is thus not a question of there being a 
fixed dose of insulin to take, but rather a form of self-care in which 
the family calculates the correct dose of insulin. When it comes to 
exercise, the leaflet pointed out that ‘Physical activity will help you 
reach your goal. Regular exercise will help keep your blood sugar 
stable and you will feel better in both the short and the long term!’ 
This information imposes a dispositif on the family that not only 
creates a relation to the ‘standardized knowledge’ of healthcare 
(Agamben 2014), but also makes visible the knowledge subject 
who has experience enough to practise self-care (Foucault 1978; 
Alftberg & Hansson 2012).
At the staff meeting, the first person to talk about the leaflet 
was one of the doctors, Emma, who wanted to stress it was very 
useful, because it gave the family information about HbA1c and 
because ‘patients are happier for taking something with them’ when 
leaving the clinic (meaning that most families of children with 
newly diagnosed diabetes liked having both verbal and written 
information). One of the other doctors, Anders, objected, noting 
that ‘At the same time they get the diabetes book, and that says 
that you should not obsess about HbA1c’. Emma believed that 
the perspective in the diabetes book was incorrect, and she had a 
different experience from her clinical encounters, namely that the 
need for information about HbA1c varied from family to family: 
‘Good to have it on paper, but it’s individual.’ By way of example, 
she talked about a family where the parents had separated and 
‘don’t know which way they’re facing’: for them, the target values 
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in the leaflet were a help. The goals were something the parents 
could agree on, and set the tone in both households for how the 
two should manage their child’s diabetes. Kerstin, one of the older 
doctors, pointed out that HbA1c risked ‘being judge and jury’ for 
families who, not as successful at managing their child’s disease, 
had readings well above the target value of 52 mmol/mol. Many 
around the table wanted to comment on this—plainly, Kerstin’s 
statement was the sort that elicited differing opinions. Some said 
there was a risk of creating ‘neurotic parents and patients’ because 
of all the endless calculations they would have to do to reach an 
HbA1c of 52 or below. Emma defended her position, once again 
referring to the families who were happy with the information by 
saying that ‘many people think it’s comforting’. Kerstin qualified 
her earlier statement by saying it was important that they ‘never 
hand out the document without saying how it should be used’, and 
finished by saying ‘one must discuss it’.
This ethnographic description of how the leaflet was discussed 
by medical professionals shows that HbA1c is not value-neutral. 
Instead, it comes down to a figure linked to medical treatment 
guidelines, which are understood and interpreted according to the 
practices of the healthcare professionals at the staff meeting. The 
medical staff fell into at least two camps. One welcomed parents 
and children being given information about how they should 
manage their treatment in their everyday lives to reach an HbA1c 
of 52 mmol/mol. They pointed out that parents and older children 
could aim for this with regular blood sugar monitoring, counting 
carbohydrates before taking insulin, and encouraging exercise. 
Under those circumstances the HbA1c test taken when the family 
attended the hospital clinic would not be an abstract value, but 
rather could be an acknowledgment that the family had success-
fully treated the child’s diabetes on a daily basis. Given this, we 
can better understand Emma’s statement that ‘it’s comforting’ for 
parents to know about the target value and that it is worth trying 
to reach it. The professionals who objected to the leaflet felt that the 
focus on figures, insulin doses, carbohydrates, and exercise meant 
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that the illness featured too prominantly in family life. This is not 
immediately evident from this ethnographic description, but it was 
an enduring topic of discussion at staff meetings where the health-
care professionals looked at diabetes care. There were parents and 
patients, they said, who overdid the counting and became ‘neurotic’, 
forgetting to carry on living their lives as before the diagnosis.5 The 
attitude was that today’s advanced diabetes treatment should not 
only reduce the long-term sequelae, but can also enable families 
to continue living much as before. Some felt that an HbA1c of 
52 mmol/mol could be felt by families and children to be casting 
blame, instead of encouraging them to work with medical staff to 
become better at managing the disease.
A central feature of the discussion was how the medical profes-
sionals used the figure of 52 in certain ways to argue for their views 
of diabetes care. The figure thus took on different meanings. Was 
it a figure parents and patients should strive to attain, or was it a 
figure that should be hidden away and not talked about in clinical 
encounters? Was it only of relevance to medical staff, or should 
families and children be told it was a target value? There is no easy 
answer to these questions; as we will see, the different uses are reli-
ant on the data to accord to the practice. At the staff meeting, the 
figure was an opportunity for individuals to position themselves 
on how they as professionals related to the treatment of diabetes. 
The figure was not simply a figure, but also a naming practice that 
made the world intelligible to the professionals (Eliassen 2008). 
The professionals could talk about the parents and patients as those 
who reached the target and those who failed and thus needed more 
help from the healthcare system. There was the latitude to include 
in this the ‘neurotic’ families who were too controlling of their chil-
dren. Whose attempts to manage the disease had an adverse effect 
on family life, and similarly to reflect on the clinical encounter and 
that some patients and families felt the figure was ‘judge and jury’ 
on whether they had taken responsibility for their child’s self-care. 
The figure allowed them to pigeonhole families and patients they 
met in clinical encounters into what amounted to a naming practice.
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Gunhild Tøndel argues there are two naming processes, where the 
one seen here is to use figures to name and identify things (2017). 
HbA1c enables medical staff to identify patients, in the same way 
that patients and their families can relate to it as a value—a form of 
subjectification process (Agamben 2014). In the second of Tøndel’s 
naming processes it gives each patient an identity, and can thus 
follow their development using the figure. Here the name is a tool 
that enables social and material organization (Tøndel 2017). By 
taking an HbA1c test every time the patient attends the clinic, it 
becomes possible to monitor each patient’s progress. This is a form 
of the desubjectification process: it is nearly impossible for the 
family and the patient to avoid the dispositif, and instead they are 
subject to HbA1c’s specific way of ordering reality (Agamben 2014).
The HbA1c test thus generates categorizations, embodied in 
figures that differentiate between values—values thought of as good 
for patient health versus values thought to have a negative impact 
on patient health. The categorizations are also central to the inter-
action between the subject and the figures (Hacking 1999). In the 
ethnography above, this interaction took the form of positioning, 
as the various professions—the doctors primarily—chose how to 
relate to the blood test, which resulted not only in their differing 
approaches to HbA1c, but also in that interaction being placed 
front and centre in the clinical encounter. The categories impact 
how the subject perceives and acts in daily life—in the lifeworld 
(Husserl 2002)—but at the same time they serve as exclusionary 
mechanisms by ensuring that one interaction takes place but not 
another, so creating standardized knowledge which, depending on 
the practice, has a claim to power (Foucault 1993).6 As described in 
the ethnography above, it was the doctors who positioned them-
selves most strongly and used their standardized medical knowledge 
of HbA1c to express their views on the best diabetes care, which 
came down to a choice between providing families and patients 
with a great deal of information or limiting it somewhat. We can 
thus follow HbA1c as a test of a range of practices, charting how 
standardized knowledge generated by the figures takes on different 
movement of knowledge
184
meanings according to how those figures are used. One central 
practice in healthcare is the clinical encounter, but before studying 
how HbA1c is mediated and negotiated—or used, I will turn to the 
study’s methods and materials.
Follow the numbers
Ethnographic descriptions have been used to follow medical things 
in a variety of practices (Prout 1996; Whyte et al. 2002). In the 
present study HbA1c is just such a thing, which we can follow 
and describe as it is produced, used, and transformed in different 
situations. These descriptions use a wide range of ethnographic 
methods, and generate a multifaceted material with which to capture 
the full complexity of HbA1c (Marcus 1995). The study is largely 
based on observations, but such methods as observation-based 
conversations and document analysis were also used.
Ethnographic observations require the researcher to be present 
in the setting to be studied, and to record the specific context by 
describing in words the course of events and settings. An example 
of this kind of ethnographic description is given above. It is by 
the researcher’s presence it becomes possible to not only describe 
how figures are presented and discussed, but also how they are 
used, interpreted, rejected, problematized, promoted, or ignored. 
Frequently this is hard to capture, because those involved do not 
necessarily reflect on the process or because it happens uncon-
sciously; being present, observing, gives the ethnographer a greater 
chance to observe, which is not always possible with interviews or 
questionnaires (Frykman & Gilje 2003; Ehn & Löfgren 2010). It 
is central to the method that the researcher is present on different 
occasions, in order to then compare and problematize the observa-
tions. In this study, this comparative perspective is used to analyse 
how figures circulated and acquired different meanings depending 
on the practice.
Presence is a particular feature of the ethnographic method, 
and results in a unique empirical material that would not have 
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been possible if the researcher had not been present, observing. 
The corollary is that the material is coloured by the researcher’s 
gaze and powers of observation. In this chapter, this is evident in 
occasional moments of self-reflection when the researcher’s position 
becomes visible (Beckman 2009). This positioning is crucial in order 
to identify the circumstances of the observation and subsequent 
analysis. While this empiricism may appear subjective, the unique 
source material is invaluable for highlighting and problematizing 
cultural processes which are non-standard in medical and health-
care research (Skott 2013).
Five staff meetings, similar to the one described in the passage 
above, were observed in the space of eight months. Some meetings 
were quite brief—over in an hour and a half—while others were 
longer and took a whole morning or afternoon. As the research-
er I sat at the table, but to one side, and I avoided joining in the 
conversation. The professionals’ conversations and actions were 
observed and written down in a notebook, and immediately after 
each observation the notes were assembled in a digital observation 
text about ten pages long. I also attached the documents that the 
group’s professionals had produced or discussed on that occasion, 
whether the medical staff ’s working papers or information leaflets 
for patients and parents. Before and after the meetings I chatted with 
the staff, thus forming relationships that coloured my impression 
of them as individuals and as a group. Some of them I came to 
know in their professional roles, and in that way they became key 
informants, helping me understand the healthcare system better.
Another class of source material is the clinical encounter. For the 
present study I followed seven families, all with children recently 
diagnosed with diabetes, who had therefore been admitted to hos-
pital on a fairly urgent basis. Treatment had fallen to the parents 
almost immediately—with the child participating if in late teenage 
years—and after a few days they could return home, initially on 
day release, but soon sleeping at home. After a week or so, the 
patient was discharged, but with a referral to the hospital clinic for 
follow-up care and regular check-ups. In most cases, as researcher I 
movement of knowledge
186
entered the picture a few days after their first emergency admission 
to hospital, and I followed the family for three or four weeks. I was 
present for a number of their clinical encounters, seated quietly in 
the background, recording the conversation and associated events. 
The resultant observation notes formed the basis of the observation 
texts. These varied in length because the number of observations 
was different for each family; they range from ten to twenty pages 
of computer-written text. For each clinical encounter, I always 
arrived with the medical staff in the hospital department where 
the family were waiting. In the clinic, I rarely spoke to families in 
the waiting room, and instead remained with the doctor or the 
nurse. I deliberately avoided striking up a social relationship with 
the families or their children, having chosen this approach to my 
informants because the study is primarily focused on the healthcare 
professionals’ daily lives, not on parents’ or children’s experiences 
of diabetes care.
The study was approved in advance by an ethical board, and 
besides complying with the principles of research ethics the 
fieldwork was discussed at length with colleagues during the 
project. This is a sensitive area of study, and the researcher must 
always consider the special situations that can arise when people 
meet in healthcare settings such as clinical encounters. It is not 
enough in an ethnographic study to conduct an ethical review; 
the researcher must maintain an ethical approach throughout, 
endeavouring to see the individual—the subject—and understand 
their situation (Hansson 2013; Fioretos et al. 2013). If nothing else, 
this approach lends itself to fieldwork, where researchers must be 
quick to adapt to any situation. This was also the reason I chose to 
follow the medical staff, leaving it to them to be the first to meet 
the patient and the family, and why I was always careful to be in 
the background in clinical encounters. All those involved have 
been anonymized for this chapter, and any identifiable personal 
characteristics removed.
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Figures in clinical encounters
When Annemarie Mol (2002) followed hospital cases of athero-
sclerosis to study how bodies with the disease are not just specific 
actors as described in, for example, patient information, she found 
instead there were a variety of explanations when the diagnosis 
and the diseased body met in the clinical encounter, when doctors 
spoke at conferences, when testing and diagnosing patients, and so 
on. To capture this complexity, she suggests the concept of the body 
multiple; a very useful approach to understanding how different 
bodies are created by the healthcare system, depending on the 
practice. The term does not necessarily equate with a fragmenta-
tion of healthcare or a life with a disease, but rather that varying 
practices arise depending on the situation where diagnosis, body, 
and disease become visible, as something for all actors to relate to.
Much of the bodies’ visibility is achieved with the figures found in 
the healthcare system’s many practices. The figures are co- creators 
of the bodies that materialize when the patient undergoes the tests 
to generate data with which to make diagnoses and prognoses 
(Gadamer 1996). The patient’s body could be one with good test 
values—good figures—and thus the individual or family is praised 
by the staff for managing their treatment properly. It might be that 
they show the patient’s health is failing, whereupon another type of 
body results, one which must be corrected. The figures thus have 
the character of things that can either disregard the body or bring 
it sharply into focus when the figures bode ill (Heidegger 2013; 
Agamben 2014).7 The following ethnographic examples from one 
clinical encounter demonstrate this interaction, and how a single 
consultation can feature the body multiple.
The clinical encounter in question was a consultation with a 
doctor and a nurse at a diabetes clinic by a mother and father and 
their 4-year-old son. The boy had been diagnosed with diabetes a 
few weeks before, and the family had recently returned home and 
were now trying to fit diabetes treatment into their normal lives. 
The boy had gone back to preschool, but his mother was at home 
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with him the rest of the time. The consultation began with the 
nurse showing them how to download the blood sugar data from 
the boy’s glucometer, which stores the readings taken by  the family. 
The computer for this was out in the waiting room, and in future 
the staff expected them to do the download on their own before 
the doctor saw them, but the parents had yet to learn because it 
was their first time at the clinic since their son had been admitted 
to hospital. After the data was transferred, the nurse took the boy 
and his parents to a test room to do an HbA1c test. The nurse 
turned to the parents to say, ‘He’ll have a lower HbA1c than when 
he came in sick.’ By stressing that the diagnosis had a before and 
an after, the nurse implied there were two bodies even before she 
did the test: when the parents took the boy to hospital there was 
the sick body that needed urgent care, and now after a few weeks 
of treatment here was this body, with its more stable blood sugar 
levels. This distinction was to recur in the clinical encounter, it 
being fundamental to this disease, because the patient will always 
have diabetes and so will always have to manage the treatment.
The parents did not comment on the nurse’s remark, and instead 
the mother asked a question that seemed to be on her mind: at what 
point should they, the parents, check whether the boy has ketones. 
The nurse began by explaining what ketones are—the product of the 
breakdown of fatty acids, a substance the body forms when there 
is a lack of insulin or if the patient has taken too little insulin. Too 
many ketones will make a patient ill, and so-called ketone poisoning 
is life-threatening. To answer the mother’s question, she added that 
they could ‘try checking some time with a pee stick’. The mother 
wondered ‘How?’ and the nurse explained how to do it by holding 
the stick under the stream of urine for a second—but ‘don’t dip it 
into pee’. She also pointed out how important it was to do the test 
whenever the boy had an upset stomach or was vomiting to rule 
out ketone poisoning, because the symptoms are the same. After 
this exchange there was suddenly another body in the test room, a 
body which could become acutely ill, requiring the parents to act 
quickly and drive the child to A & E.
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Suddenly, the machine measuring the HbA1c beeped, and the 
nurse said ‘55’ aloud so the parents could hear. The mother said 
immediately, ‘But that’s not 52.’ The nurse responded by saying, ‘But 
on the right track.’ Previous consultations when they were staying 
on the ward, together with the paperwork they had been given by 
the staff, had impressed on the family they needed to get the boy’s 
HbA1c down to 52 mmol/mol, so it was not surprising that the 
mother reacted as she did: 55 was a value she felt was a failure. Yet 
as the nurse pointed out, it takes time for the level to fall from a 
pre-diagnosis high. The mother initially did not see things that 
way, and the figure of 55 attached itself to the boy’s body as if he 
were still sick. The nurse was able to nuance the mother’s reading 
of the situation, spelling out that the figure should be taken as a 
positive sign and testimony to the parents’ successful management 
of their son’s diabetes at home.
The blood test complete, it was time to see the doctor. The nurse 
showed the family into the room where the doctor was waiting, 
and sat down on a chair. This marked it as a new situation, with 
the doctor leading the clinical encounter. She began by looking at 
the boy and asking ‘Have you got any questions’, but the boy said 
nothing. Instead, the mother said, ‘You do have a question. How 
long do people have this disease?’ The doctor looked at the boy and 
said, ‘You have it all the time, but you’re well. You have to take your 
medicine or you can get very sick’. The nurse filled in by saying ‘Did 
you hear that?’ Just as the nurse had initially visualized two bodies, 
one before and one after treatment began, the doctor’s answer to 
the boy’s question also actualized two bodies. If the parents were to 
successfully treat their son as prescribed, the health service would 
define him as having a healthy body, meaning almost life as normal 
before the diabetes diagnosis (Nilsson & Hansson 2016); fail in the 
treatment and diabetes would emerge again, and the boy would 
count as ill, which would be reflected in the HbA1c test.
After their opening exchange, the doctor addressed the parents 
directly to comment on the HbA1c test. Like the nurse earlier, she 
said ‘It’s looking good, it’s on the right track.’ She then explained 
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HbA1c. Both the doctor and the nurse used the same travel meta-
phor: the family would travel ahead in time and their hard work 
would be rewarded with better figures. Metaphors are common in 
healthcare, used to translate abstract reasoning into more man-
ageable facts (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Sontag 1989; Gustafsson & 
Hommerberg 2016). Here too there is another body—a body that is 
not static but changes over time, and for which parents must invest 
time and commitment if the HbA1c is to fall within the target val-
ues. It is standard for these metaphors to be framed as stories about 
the future; in the clinical encounter, this is about what the patient, 
or the family, can achieve if they follow medical advice. Medical 
advice often takes the form of instrumental narratives, focusing 
on the procedures involved in the treatment (Hansson 2007), as 
against the stories about the future, which are rather moral narra-
tives about the state of health patients and families should aim for, 
focused on an imagined future in which the patient has improved, 
and frequently with an ethical dimension about the extent of patient 
or family responsibility for the disease and its treatment (Ricoeur 
1990; Frid 2004). At the same time, in the clinical encounter there 
is an obligation on patients or families to accept these stories about 
the reasons for treatment (Hansson 2007).
One such instrumental narrative was the next stage in the con-
sultation, when the doctor moved on from the HbA1c test to the 
blood sugar data which the family had uploaded with the nurse’s 
help when they arrived at the clinic. When the doctor looked at 
the figures, shown as a curve on her computer screen, she had 
nothing but praise for the family’s efforts to take responsibility 
for their son’s treatment: ‘He’s following his curve perfectly; he’s 
following it perfectly,’ she said. Since the doctor was so positive, 
the consultation took another turn as the mother and the doctor 
went over the Social Insurance Agency paperwork which would 
allow the mother to be at home with her son a while longer. To 
bring the consultation to a close, the doctor turned to both parents 
and said ‘Anything else that’s happened?’ The father now joined 
the conversation, saying ‘There were some weird values where 
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it shot up,’ adding that the nurse had ‘told us why, that is that he 
was going down with something’. The father continued, trying to 
give a medical explanation for why he thought the numbers odd. 
The doctor’s response to this was not to answer directly, but to ask 
briefly ‘What doses is he on?’ The mother gave the insulin doses 
as a sequence of figures for a twenty-four-hour period. The doctor, 
looking for an answer, then wanted to know what his afternoon 
dose was. The mother turned to the father for help but he looked 
blank, so the mother got out her mobile phone, where she had all 
the doses noted down. After a little searching she found the value 
the doctor had asked for. The doctor brought up the day in ques-
tion on her screen, and looking at it said ‘That looks fine to me’. 
The nurse now joined in, pointing at the value and asking ‘Was it 
that one?’ to which the mother said yes, and the doctor once again 
pointed out ‘He’s not that low there. You get what we call recoil, 
because the body counteracts with hormones. Much later you get 
a higher value,’ she added, pointing at the screen.
In this way, moral narratives also surfaced about the family’s 
normal life—their lifeworld (Husserl 2002)—and how it related to 
the boy’s figures. The parents had tried to come up with an answer 
for what the different figures meant. In the clinical encounter their 
lifeworld altered so it was now the physician, and partly the nurse, 
who had the interpretive precedence in explaining the figures. The 
doctor seemed unworried by the parents’ anxiety. In this way, at 
least two further bodies took their place in the clinical encounter. 
There was the body the parents dealt with every day, seen when they 
tried to grasp what they felt was a variety of figures, and there was 
also a more medicalized body that the doctor could easily define 
as completely within the hoped-for normal values. The doctor was 
satisfied with how the parents had taken responsibility for the instru-
mental narrative—how best to manage the child’s diabetes—and 
in that way had taken responsibility for the moral narrative too.
The mother, though, was not satisfied, and continued to discuss 
her thoughts about the boy’s different figures with the doctor, 
giving different scenarios from their daily life and explaining her 
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thinking. The doctor listened and gave her picture of things, while 
the father stayed out of the conversation. At one point, the  mother 
said ‘We talked it over’ to make it clear she had her husband’s 
support, but her ‘we’ was largely governed by her being the one at 
home with their son and shouldering much of the responsibility 
for his treatment. Thus, there also appeared to be two bodies in the 
family’s daily life: the mother’s view of the boy’s body as one that 
had to be cared for; and the father stepping back and entrusting 
responsibility for the boy’s body to the mother. This view of the 
boy’s body was also evident in the father’s comment that ‘We’re 
squabbling a fair bit’ about what figures the boy should have. The 
doctor tried to help the parents agree, and said straightaway that 
the boy should be around 6 for a good HbA1c. ‘What I said’, said 
the mother, displaying that she was taking responsibility for the 
child’s body. Towards the end of the consultation, the division 
became even clearer when it transpired that the mother had been 
worried by the boy’s body and figures: she said that now ‘I don’t 
feel that kind of stress’ about the figures, and the doctor praised 
her with the words ‘That’s good, important’, while the father added, 
‘You’ve calmed down’. The mother’s response was ‘Thank you’, to 
which the doctor said, ‘It’s a lot’, referring to the burden carried by 
the mother on a daily basis.
With Mol’s concept (2002) of the body multiple, we can see how 
one and the same body can be interpreted and understood in dif-
ferent situations, and that it affects—enacts—how each individual 
relates to the figures from that body. The figures are thus not only 
a form of standardized knowledge, circulating freely in the clinical 
encounter, but to a far greater extent they also have the character 
of things, shaping and shaped by the individuals who use that 
knowledge (Agamben 2014). These are the same figures that the 
doctor, nurse, mother, and father see, but they all seem to respond 
differently. Here, the worries voiced by the mother are perhaps 
most revealing about her adoption of a mothering role, where the 
figures—the dispositif—seem to speak to her concerns about their 
child’s health and well-being (Agamben 2014). Blood sugar levels 
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are now central to her lifeworld, but HbA1c was in a way proof of 
whether she had succeeded or not. HbA1c is not only a value that 
categorizes the child’s body, it also recruits the mother into caring 
for that body. Measurements and standardization thus create not 
only standardized knowledge of the child’s body in a variety of situ-
ations, but also the subjectification processes by which the mother 
evolves a specific form of self-care for the child’s body, with HbA1c 
the ratification process that distinguishes this body from the rest 
as an autonomous object in the world, and simultaneously creates 
a desubjectification process whereby the mother is drawn into that 
specific form of self-care (Agamben 2014). The self-care the mother 
has to adhere to is of the medical professionals’ making, and in the 
clinical encounter she does not get across her realities in her own 
lifeworld, whether to her husband or to the doctor.
The figure of 52 is expressed in various ways in the clinical encoun-
ter, being bound up with the medical narratives and practices that 
the parents relate to in their lifeworld (Kleinman 1988). A central 
perspective when critiquing how medical ‘facts’ become auto nomous 
things, being dispositif in our daily lives, is Edmund Husserl’s Die 
Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phänomenologie of 1936. He described ‘psychologism’ as a discipline 
that distorts the human subject within its own lifeworld; his was a 
critique of modernity and of how it generates the desubjectification 
processes that alienate, here, the patient and their relatives in their 
own lifeworlds.8 There is no need to claim that the figure of 52 distorts 
the family in their lifeworld for us to use the perspective to identify 
the practices changed and renegotiated in the clinical encounter, 
where the medical perspective prevails at the expense of the fami-
ly’s personal experience. It should be recognized that standardized 
knowledge not only is generated in the clinical encounter, but has 
obvious power differentials there, and impacts how the family sees 
the doctor and the nurse.9 Despite the criticism, as this particular 
consultation drew to a close the parents seemed satisfied. They had 
been given new information to take home, where they would continue 
caring for their son in the best manner possible.
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The professionals and 52
To understand why the figure of 52 is so important in the clinical 
encounter, we must look beyond patients and families’ needs for 
information in managing diabetes in their daily lives. The figure 
is also of great importance for how medical staff, and especially 
doctors and nurses, think and talk about what they do. As we have 
seen, HbA1c today is comparable not only individually, but also 
as a metric of all the diabetes clinics in the country, and thus a 
control mechanism—‘know-how’—for relations between various 
clinics, between clinics and hospital management, between clinics 
and government, between clinics and patient associations, and so 
on (Rose & Miller 1992). As the literature has found, it presents 
the opportunity to manage a clinic from a distance, for example by 
defining the range of target values the clinic should meet (Latour 
1987; Bloomfield 1991). Here 52 is little more than a control mech-
anism that determines hospital care by labelling specific forms of 
performance in the health service (Tøndel 2017).10 A key point in 
this is found in the literary analyses by Knut Ove Eliassen (2008), 
who writes that naming—in the sense of designation—is not only 
about giving people individual identities that make it possible to 
follow them throughout their lives, but is also about identifying 
things. It is by naming that the world becomes understandable to an 
organization, while the organization is distanced from the world by 
the act of naming. Eliassen’s point is similar to the subjectification 
and desubjectification processes already described, but here the 
focus is instead the organization  (Nilsson & Sjöstedt Landén 2017).
The question of HbA1c arose at the first staff meeting I observed. 
Although the meeting was about something else, they still ended up 
discussing the figure of 52 and whether the clinic should work to 
have the best average value in Sweden, which was not then the case. 
The doctor who was head of the clinic said that ‘We’re going to be 
the best team in Sweden’, and that they should work to allow patients 
to become independent, supported with the correct knowledge to 
manage their diabetes. The fact that the lead doctor could even 
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suggest it was because the clinic had joined a network of diabetes 
clinics across Sweden, where each submitted their HbA1c averages 
and thus made themselves comparable—a control mechanism for 
the clinics, as the figures determine a number of their priorities. 
Also, however, this had given rise to certain idioms. Some of the 
medical staff had attended a national conference where various 
clinics’ averages had been compared, and at a staff meeting on their 
return said ‘It’s fun that the HbA1c has gone down’, while another 
interjected ‘It’s nice, it takes a while to see the change’.
To achieve this goal, the endocrinology department would have 
to be unequivocal with families and patients about the blood sugar 
levels they were to aim for. At the staff meeting, one nurse responsible 
for the HbA1c work said that the clinic ‘should continue working 
on high HbA1c’, supporting families who have not got their child’s 
diabetes treatment under control. One way was to be clear with 
families and give them the leaflet discussed at the start of this 
chapter, as it spells out the guidelines the clinic expects families to 
follow in daily life. One of the doctors said how important it was 
to ‘show the document to those who are going over 60’, indicating 
it was crucial to identify the patients who needed extra help. The 
figure of 52 was thus not only a control mechanism that shaped the 
clinic’s operations, but also served as a marker for those patients 
who failed to meet the target.
It was imperative that staff identify and engage with families 
and patients who fell outside the target values, as their health was 
at risk of deterioration and they needed extra support in their 
self-care, and they pushed up the clinic’s average HbA1c. One late 
afternoon, shortly after one of the staff meetings I observed, I was 
walking with some of the doctors and nurses through the hospital. 
They were chatting a little more freely as it was not a formal meet-
ing, and the conversation turned to the clinic’s ‘duffers’, who had 
poor HbA1c values and glucometer readings that were all over the 
place, and who doctors felt were not telling staff the truth about 
how they managed their diabetes. In informal conversation, these 
patients became actors who not only risked their own health, but 
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also ensured the clinic had worse results than the other clinics in 
Sweden. One of the staff said that it only took a single patient like 
that to affect the clinic’s national ranking.11
The healthcare professionals kept coming back to this form of 
categorization, worrying about how to get medical information 
across to patients and families. There was one such dialogue at a 
staff meeting about coming to grips with patients who failed to 
meet the guidelines set by the endocrinology department. One 
of the doctors noted that one particular family was finding things 
exceedingly difficult, because the father had diabetes too and never 
checked his blood sugar and the mother had cancer. Their son’s 
blood sugar levels were worrying, and the doctor asked ‘Who is 
going to support this boy?’ The doctor’s suggestion was to try a 
home visit. Another of the doctors, picking up on the idea, said ‘I 
think you’re absolutely right, we have to find new ways. But at the 
same time, hospital appointments are important for getting things 
to work.’ The first doctor’s response was that ‘For some it feels utterly 
pointless. This is a patient who needs help making treatment part 
of normal life.’ One of the nurses said home visits that should not 
be routine, but could be an important ‘tool in the toolbox’. A third 
doctor suggested ‘finding an ally at the school’, but the nurses 
pointed out that it needed considerable effort to make that work. 
The doctor who sparked the discussion ended it by saying ‘Those 
with a high HbA1c are the ones we haven’t reached; if we had, we 
wouldn’t have them.’
In the discussions between the medical staff the notion of an 
ideal family can be glimpsed—one that has developed its self-care, 
and with it not only an understanding of the diabetic child’s body, 
but also of how the family can take responsibility for the diabetes 
treatment. Yet there are also those who fall outside this, where 
neither the family nor the child seems able to take responsibility as 
the medical staff wish they would: they lack what in healthcare is 
known as compliance (Arduser 2017). It is as if these bodies defy 
the clinic’s ways of categorizing and organizing patients, and are 
instead identified as anomalies that must be persuaded back into 
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the system one way or another. Many of the meetings I observed 
were about how doctors, nurses, dieticians, or counsellors could 
best talk to these patients and families: how to teach them and 
how to reach out to them in their lifeworlds. Central to this was 
individualized care, tailored to meet the needs of the individual or 
family ‘where they are’, and at the same time give them the tools to 
make their own decisions—but it was obvious that not all families 
were anywhere near that. As for the more problematic patients—
the ‘duffers’—staff could report them to social services as a final 
recourse. As one of the doctors said at a staff meeting, she ‘doesn’t 
report the ones who are finding it hard going as long as they’re not 
stroppy’, but at the same time she wondered aloud, ‘How long can 
they be up at 110?’ None of those present ventured to answer, but 
all understood the trouble with such a high figure when the goal 
was for everyone to be 52 or below.
What my ethnographic cultural analysis shows is there is a form 
of enactment, as Mol (2002) points out, which is influenced by the 
tools the staff can enact with. There are no predetermined subjects, 
for they are created by the healthcare practices, whether a staff 
meeting or a clinical encounter. Here Mol, invoking Judith Butler 
in Gender Trouble (1990), notes that the subject ‘is not given but 
practiced. The pervasive and mundane acts in which this is done 
make people what they are’ (2002, 37). HbA1c is just such a tool 
in the medical practices where the body multiple is defined and 
categorized as a form of enactment, and thus appears as normal 
and unproblematic—or as an anomaly that the healthcare system 
must work particularly hard to bring back into the medical fold. 
Central to Mol’s theory (2002) is her argument that medicine is 
nothing if not an exercise in power, where the strongest form of 
enactment is the one that can be imposed. In this she is informed 
by Bruno Latour’s dictum that ‘The strongest reason always yields 
to the reason of the strongest’ (Latour 1993, cited in Mol 2002, 
108). The strongest reason identified here would appear to be the 
figures—the dispositifs (Agamben 2014)—for HbA1c, and their 
power to categorize bodies according to practice, and thus to enter 
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the lifeworlds of patients and families, affecting their relationship 
with the treatment and a normal life with diabetes. This form of 
categorization seems based on the healthcare system’s require-
ments, though, and not necessarily the patients’ or the families’ 
best interests, despite the patient’s best interest being the first thing 
any healthcare professional would point to as the reason it is so 
important to track HbA1c and blood sugar levels. The standardized 
knowledge associated with the figure of 52 directly affects how 
bodies—in this chapter seen as bodies multiple—are categorized 
and related to in different practices.
Conclusions 
The figure of 52 is found in this chapter to be a thing, a dispositif, 
which exerts a centripetal force on a range of practices in Swedish 
diabetes care and beyond. It is not only a figure for patients and 
families to aim for in managing the disease, it also generates a 
relationship of sorts between them and medical staff, and it affects 
healthcare provision and how staff design patient care and categorize 
patients. The result is that 52 is an ethnographic route to understand-
ing how today’s medicine objectifies, measures, and standardizes 
the diabetes care on offer. In the chapter, this is discussed in terms 
of subjectification and desubjectification processes, where patients, 
families, and staff are all subject to the HbA1c test’s ordering of 
reality (Agamben 2014). While the figure engenders practices 
which the actors should enact in their everyday lives—at home or 
in hospital—it simultaneously renders other practices impossible.
Central here is the fact that the figure of 52 can be considered 
standardized knowledge. This form of knowledge is not necessar-
ily mutable or even mouldable; rather, it is locked into a specific 
state of knowing about what diabetes is and how it should be best 
treated. Standardization makes it awkward for patients, families, 
and staff to question the figure, and so it continues as a point of 
reference, as something to comment on or relate to. HbA1c not only 
generates and controls a number of practices, but those practices 
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are self-sustaining and can be said to underscore the significance 
of the figure of 52 in diabetes care. Given the way HbA1c has been 
used, its standardizing function is fixed, confirming it as the key 
perspective in healthcare of this type.
Diabetes care is just one of many examples of healthcare where 
we can see a similar trend, with figures being increasingly central 
to standardized knowledge processes of all kinds. To some extent, 
this development has been driven by new control mechanisms in 
healthcare and digitalization. Today’s healthcare control mech-
anisms are designed to turn healthcare practices not only into 
categorizable figures, but also into figures that can be followed up 
and compared; and different strategies can be chosen according 
to how the figures are categorized (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000). It is 
in its figures the organization manifests itself and thus exercises a 
degree of control over its operations (Bornemark 2018). But it is 
not only in relation to its organization that figures have become 
increasingly central to the health service; in the form of quality 
registry data, figures are essential in shaping views of specific 
diagnoses or whether a treatment should be retained or altered 
(Lindh & Rivano Eckerdal 2016). Ongoing digitalization has made 
it easier to compile large quantities of data and compare them by 
patient, by clinic, or by region. Without digitalization, it is hard to 
imagine that this particular standardized knowledge could have 
expanded as it did.  Many patients’ HbA1c readings, combined with 
other facts and figures over prolonged periods makes it possible to 
compare, develop, and change healthcare.
The significance of 52 thus stems from the practices in which it 
operates, and with the help of Mol’s perspective (2002) we can discuss 
the body multiple and its interpretations, which vary from practice 
to practice. The concept of the body multiple is an indication of 
how standardized knowledge is coded and embedded in a context 
with multiple exclusion mechanisms (Foucault 1993), where some 
perspectives are defined as problematic or are rendered invisible, 
while others are categorized as important. This dispositif offers 
actors the prospect of action while eliminating other activities, 
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so that actors are subjected to the way HBA1c—or the figure of 
52—arranges reality.
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine how figures 
can create normative guidelines in a medical setting, and how they 
are interpreted and used according to their contextual practices, 
setting out in brief what these normative guidelines might mean. 
However, as is evident from the ethnography, there is also the cru-
cial factor that standardized knowledge does not in any way, shape, 
or form standardize the lived lifeworlds of patients, families, and 
staff. Rather, the figure of 52 is something to relate to, for it is only 
then the figure is set in motion, knowledge and all.
Notes
 1 In Sweden, where the study was conducted, the public health service is the respon-
sibility of 21 health regions. There are thus variations in organization and supply, 
but in most regions all non-hospital care is free for children and adolescents under 
the age of 20. Prescription medicines are free for those under the age 18, as are most 
medical aids. 
 2 The target value was subsequently reduced and at time of writing is 48 mmol/mol. 
 3 The HbA1c test requires expensive equipment—not something a family can have at 
home, although they can take blood samples at home and send them in to a pathol-
ogy laboratory. In most Swedish hospitals the HbA1c test machine is in the diabetes 
clinic, where it is convenient for patients to be tested during regular appointments.
 4 The leaflet is above all a document (Buckland 1997, see Markus Idvall’s chapter in 
this book)—and an element in the dispositif—which can create a variety of values 
for families. To be handed the document can be the closing ritual of a clinical 
encounter (Whyte et al. 2002); it might be thought a gift of trust which the family 
now has to take responsibility for (Mauss 2001); it can be a non-human actor linking 
the family’s actions with the health service (Latour 1992). In my thesis (Hansson 
2007), I write about another class of medical document with similar characteristics: 
prescriptions. A prescription too can act as a closing ritual, leaving the patient at the 
end of a consultation feeling positive about their medical problems (Whyte et al. 2002, 
123 ff.), and in the position to actualize their treatment with their own personal 
medical object. But like any medical object, a prescription also refers to the doctor 
and their instructions, ‘freezing’ the spoken word as writing or thing, which only 
enhances the doctor’s authority. 
 5 Gabriella Nilsson and I have drawn attention to this elsewhere, arguing that its effect 
is to encourage families to alter their view of their child’s diabetes from a disease 
perspective to a lifestyle perspective, where the disease, rather than a limit on life, 
is seen as part of life (Nilsson & Hansson 2016, 262).
 6 A lifeworld is also commonly equated with morphological structure, for even though 
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it is an inaccurate, intersubjective consciousness, the lifeworld still builds on scientific 
knowledge or countenances scientific knowledge (Wallenstein 2011).
 7 This is a form of desubjectification: it is virtually impossible for the family and the 
patient to avoid the dispositif, and instead they are subject to HbA1c’s specific way 
of ordering reality (Agamben 2014). As per Martin Heidegger (2013), this process 
is a form of alienation that modern people can extricate themselves from only with 
difficulty. 
 8 Alienation is the term Karl Marx (2018) coined for his critical theory of modernity, 
and it can also be found in Husserl (1993), albeit with a slightly different meaning. 
In this chapter, it is applied to the dispositif, and with it the web of power which 
envelopes the individual, but which may be difficult to see or criticize (Agamben 
2014; see also Heidegger 2013). These systems of power can be capitalist—Marx—or 
scientific—Husserl.
 9 In this I follow Michel Foucault’s argument (2003) that power creates counter-power, 
but it is for another occasion to explore what patients and families can do in the face 
of these power structures.
 10 This is comparable to the umbrella term of new public management, which describes 
how public services mimic business organizations, for example by defining metrics 
as targets to be followed up and evaluated (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000; Karlsson 2017).
 11 Not that staff could not provide excellent care for their patients otherwise—during 
my fieldwork, for example, I heard of a doctor who had his mobile phone on out-
side working hours so patients and families could ring for help in managing daily 
life—but rather it marks a form of (de)subjectification process, by which healthcare 
professionals subjectify individuals and take extra care of them, while desubjectifying 
them by translating them into figures and values to be managed. 
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Aesthetic experience as an  
epistemological boundary object 
Max Liljefors
In November 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) released 
one of its evidence reports, which it had commissioned on the pos-
itive health effects of the arts, What is the evidence on the role of the 
arts in improving health and well-being? (Fancourt & Finn 2019). 
It is far from the first to show that doing and experiencing art can 
have healing and rehabilitative effects, but the WHO report is the 
most comprehensive of its kind to date.1 With its global perspective 
(albeit with an emphasis on Europe), it brings together findings 
from nearly 4,000 scholarly studies. Art’s effects are found to span 
the entire human life cycle, from antenatal to geriatric and palliative 
care, and to take many forms, whether faster rehabilitation, reduced 
medication, fewer doctor’s visits, the alleviation of a variety of 
physical and mental symptoms, and greater well-being and quality 
of life. The report concludes that the arts can have both health and 
socio-economic benefits, and should therefore be integrated into 
the WHO’s European health policy, Health 2020.2
The WHO’s evidence report is the most ambitious to date, with 
far-reaching ramifications for art and health as a field of research. 
In terms of the humanities, however, the most startling thing 
about the report is the knowledge that is not there, the knowledge 
that is noticeable by its absence. The report lacks any reference to 
the aesthetic disciplines—art history, musicology, literary studies, 
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theatre studies—which traditionally steward the academic legacy of 
arts scholarship and continue to push back the boundaries. When 
the WHO report enumerates the theoretical basis of the studies 
it includes—‘psychology, psychiatry, epidemiology, philosophy, 
ecology, history, health economics, neuroscience, medicine, health 
geography, public health, anthropology, and sociology, among 
others’ (Fancourt & Finn 2019, 52)—there is not a word about the 
aesthetic disciplines. At best, their inclusion is implied by ‘history’, 
‘philosophy’, or ‘others’. The WHO report is not unique in this. 
In the field of arts and health, aesthetic subjects are significantly 
under-represented compared to medicine and healthcare.
It is only in recent decades that arts and health came together 
as a unified, international field of research. How did it come about 
that the aesthetic subjects, with learned traditions that date back 
centuries, have such a small part to play? It is no exaggeration to 
say that two worlds of knowledge have formed around art and 
the experience of art—two epistemological fields with the same 
object of study, which for simplicity’s sake I refer to as the ‘aesthetic 
experience’, but which by and large are untroubled by academic 
exchange with each other.3 One world of knowledge consists of 
the aesthetic disciplines as pursued in the humanities, the other of 
the various branches of scholarship in the field of arts and health. 
Why do they talk to each other so little? Could they, should they 
communicate more?
One object of study, separate worlds of knowledge
The prevailing situation means that the aesthetic experience has 
evolved into an epistemological boundary object. The concept of 
boundary objects was introduced by Susan Leigh Star and James 
R. Griesemer (1989) as a term for things and information that have 
a variety of meanings, and are handled in different ways in differ-
ent social contexts, but which nevertheless have a settled content 
that ensures they are delimited in the same fashion, whatever the 
context. As a concept, it has gained currency in the theorization of 
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interdisciplinary research. Writing on ‘Credibility and Legitimacy’ 
(2012), Elin Bommenel considers how it is that boundary objects 
facilitate communication between different branches of scholarship. 
When a variety of disciplines study the same object, it is usually 
with differing views of knowledge. Each discipline has its own 
research questions, methods, and results, which are considered 
legitimate and worthwhile. These knowledge criteria, Bommenel 
explains, have a dual function, for they guarantee scholarly quality 
within each discipline, while serving as a mechanism to exclude 
representatives of other academic (and non-academic) traditions. 
Interdisciplinary research into boundary objects requires research-
ers to lift their eyes from their own particular specialisms in two 
ways. The first is to accept that other disciplines operate under the 
principles of other knowledge criteria that are just as valid as their 
own criteria in their own field. The second (which is closely linked 
to the first) is to view their own criteria from a meta perspective 
as just one of several paths to knowledge. To have one’s horizons 
broadened in this way is not to lessen the scholarly relevance of one’s 
own knowledge criteria. What it does do, however, is encourage 
researchers to see whether lessons learnt from other disciplines 
can enrich their own fields, and whether their own knowledge has 
perhaps unanticipated relevance to other disciplines.
In what follows, I will discuss what is arguably a key factor in 
the different views of knowledge between the humanities’ aesthetic 
studies and arts and health: the question of the instrumentaliza-
tion of art. I also have a tentative proposal for how to bridge the 
epistemological gap, at least provisionally. A central role is played 
by the ‘co-production of knowledge’, a concept coined by Sheila 
Jasanoff (2004a, 3) to describe how knowledge is both the result 
of various scholarly disciplines’ systematic studies of reality and 
various social and political interests. Co-production, as Jasanoff 
points out, is not a theory that claims comprehensive explanatory 
validity, but rather should be seen as an idiom, an interpretive 
perspective with which to avoid falling into the traps of social or 
scientific determinism, by recognizing both nature and society as 
movement of knowledge
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factors in knowledge production (Jasanoff 2004a, 3; Jasanoff 2004b, 
20). An interpretative, negotiating idiom of this type is particularly 
useful in interdisciplinary research about epistemological boundary 
objects, as it is neutral on the question of the hierarchy of different 
forms of knowledge. As she puts it:
Unlike ‘laws of nature’, the idiom of co-production does not 
seek to foreclose competing explanations by laying claim to one 
dominant and all-powerful truth. It offers instead a new way of 
exploring the waters of human history, where politics, know-
ledge, and invention are continually in flux. (Jasanoff 2004b, 43)
Like Markus Idvall in his analysis of informed consent in the 
present volume, I draw inspiration from an article by Vololona 
Rabeharisoa and Michel Callon (2004) about how laypeople—
patients and relatives—have successfully contributed to advances 
in French biomedical research on muscular dystrophy. Rabeharisoa 
and Callon apply the co-production perspective to the interaction 
between laypeople and experts. I will do something similar here, 
but first I consider the exchange of knowledge between experts 
in different fields. The differences are smaller than might at first 
appear: an expert in one discipline is usually a layperson in most 
other disciplines. It is Rabeharisoa and Callon’s concept of ‘inter-
mediary discourse’ that has immediate bearing on my argument. 
They use the term for a two-way discourse between experts and 
laypeople, a form of communication that is deliberately held at a 
level that is neither exclusively technical nor strategic, and designed 
so that laypeople (remembering that in interdisciplinary research 
everyone is a layperson to some extent) can gain an insight into 
the research process without being swamped by technicalities. 
According to Rabeharisoa and Callon, it is about ‘going into the 
content of research without getting lost in it, that is to say, without 
losing sight of the goals’ (151).
Their use of the word ‘goal’ indicates that the research they 
have studied had a clear purpose, as in addition to the usual vague 
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scholarly ambition of increasing the sum of human knowledge 
their aim was to alleviate or cure a specific disease. This has direct 
relevance to my case here, since the gap that I argue exists between 
the aesthetic disciplines and the field of arts and health only exists 
courtesy of the instrumentalization of art—that is, whether the 
aesthetic experience can and should be anything other than an end 
in itself. The question of ends and means is also interesting because 
Bommenel (2012, 282) stipulates that successful interdisciplinary 
research demands that researchers from various disciplines agree 
on a common vision for their research goals. I believe this should be 
nuanced somewhat, since research is often conducted with several 
goals in mind, each with different degrees of generality, and specific 
goals do not necessarily have to be covered by the more general 
ones. I will return to the question of research objectives later.  
The question of instrumentalization
The aesthetic disciplines command a wide repertoire of theoretical 
frameworks and analytical methods, which fall outside the scope 
of this study. The same is true of arts and health, if not even more 
so, because the field brings together so many disciplines. Aes-
thetic experiences are subjective in nature, and it is not obvious 
how their effects should be measured. As a rule, the medical and 
health sciences work with randomized controlled trials, quantita-
tive designs, and predefined health outcomes, while ethnological 
research uses small case studies, qualitative analyses, and a strong 
element of argument and interpretation (Priebe & Sager 2014, 
69–70). The result is very different types of data, so their mutual 
weighting is not straightforward. Studies tend to avoid talking in 
terms of cause and effect, and instead look for ‘correlations’ between 
art and health. A British report calls for a ‘realistic approach’, to 
include verifiable data of several kinds (APPGAHW 2017, 40–2). 
The WHO Evidence Report also holds back from specifying a 
hierarchy of different types of data and methods.
Given such a diverse field of research, it may seem surprising 
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that the aesthetic disciplines do not already play a prominent part, 
especially as they have several centuries’ head start on the systematic 
study of the arts. The reason why, I believe, is not so much specific 
methods and theories, and more the underlying approach to the 
object of study, art. Kristofer Hansson and Rachel Irwin make the 
point in the introduction to this volume that value judgements 
about the validity of different forms of knowledge determine the 
direction taken by clinical research. This is no less true of aesthetics. 
In the history of art—I focus on my own discipline, Art History, 
in the belief that scholars in other aesthetic subjects can identify 
with my arguments—there is a firm conviction that art should not 
be subject to the requirement of being useful, that it should not be 
instrumentalized. Art scholars leap to the defence of the freedom 
of art whenever politicians set about controlling public art or the 
Church censors ‘inappropriate’ artworks. This is not only a political 
response, but stems from profound epistemological perspectives. 
It is worth dwelling on the most important.
The discipline of art history is strongly influenced by aesthetic 
philosophy, which periodically has been closely intertwined with art 
theory. The view that the aesthetic experience is essentially different 
to other types of experience is particularly dominant. Immanuel Kant 
(1724–1804), in his magisterial third critique,  Critique of the Power of 
Judgment (2002 [1790]), dissects the meaning of aesthetic judgement 
using a series of distinctions. The power of judgement constitutes 
its own form of knowledge, dissimilar to knowledge derived from 
pure reason and practical reason (the subjects of Kant’s two previous 
critiques). He separates judgement into aesthetic and teleological 
judgement, of which the former exists as four different types. One of 
these is the judgement of beauty, which for Kant falls into ‘adherent’ 
beauty, which means that it is conditioned by an idea of the object 
having a purpose, or ‘free’ beauty, free from every notion of how 
the object should look or function. Only free beauty, according to 
Kant, can give rise to ‘pure’ aesthetic judgement, uncontaminated 
by instrumental considerations, and it is this form that is associated 
with the fine arts. Kant admits that aesthetic judgement in reality 
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often exists in combination with other forms of judgement, and 
his third critique is indeed still subject to philosophical exegesis, 
but the point here is that art history has inherited the intellectual 
impulse to think about aesthetic experience in its purest form. It 
is primarily thought of in contrast to, and not together with, other 
forms of experience and receptiveness.
Other outlooks on knowledge are closely linked to this approach. 
Thus, history of art is traditionally noted for its analytical focus 
on the artwork per se, and the internal dynamics which give the 
artwork its distinct meaning-making and aesthetic force. Sweeping 
generalizations about different types of artworks or their histor-
ical origins are considered superficial, a sign of sloppy thinking. 
In short, each artwork should be presumed to constitute its own 
world of meanings—these can certainly vary in nature, depending 
on the historical context, but always manifest in and through the 
artwork itself.
Further, the discipline is wedded to a strong historiographical 
narrative that holds the (Western) history of art to be a progres-
sion towards independence and self-knowledge. In this view, art 
ever since the Enlightenment has gradually shed its political and 
religious shackles in order to focus on its own problems and an 
exploration of its own nature. Clement Greenberg (1982 [1965]), 
inspired by Kant, formulated one variation of this notion of his-
tory; Arthur Danto another (1997), in his case based on Friedrich 
Hegel’s (1770–1831) philosophy of history.
I would not claim that all art historians today agree with the views 
outlined above—views which within the discipline have been subject 
to close, extended critiques—but, regardless, I would argue they 
are cornerstones of art history, and have done much to shape the 
knowledge criteria and values of the discipline. These criteria and 
values remain powerful, even when the underlying philosophical 
arguments retreat into the background or are abandoned. One such 
value is art history’s deep scepticism about the instrumentalization 
of art. I believe this stems not so much from an impulse to defend 
artistic freedom, as a feeling that instrumentalization runs counter 
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to the very definition of art, and, above all, challenges the basis of 
the discipline’s knowledge criteria.
While utilitarianism in art is anathema to art history, the situation 
in arts and health is the opposite: art’s usefulness in the shape of 
its positive health effects is the field’s raison d’être. The knowledge 
criteria this gives rise to are very different. First, it is not the artwork 
itself that is the primary object of study, but the activities associated 
with the artwork—for example, a group of patients who discuss 
an exhibition they have seen, or who attend a creative workshop. 
The specifics of the artwork, its particularities and dynamics, rare-
ly feature much in the analysis. Instead, the focus is the patients’ 
physiological or psychological responses. Also, observable health 
effects in specific art activities are normally seen as the result of 
several interrelated factors. The aesthetic element coexists with 
other factors such as social interaction (activities often take place 
in groups) or physical movement, whose effects can rarely be iso-
lated from one another. Moreover, health effects can be  measured 
as physiological responses, such as stress hormone levels or car-
diovascular reactivity, or as certain types of neuronal activity in 
the brain. This necessitates studies of variations on a physiological 
basis that is common to all mental states and processes. Arts and 
health, unlike the aesthetic disciplines, rarely pauses to consider 
the aesthetic experience in its pure, idealized form.
These disparities in knowledge criteria result in different types 
of statements. Art history’s nuanced analyses seem to be of little 
relevance to arts and health, as they do not speak to that field’s 
main concern, the effect of art on patients. For arts and health, 
the principle that art is possessed of categorical autonomy, sepa-
rate from people’s encounters with it, lacks epistemological value. 
Conversely, for art history, the references in arts and health to 
patients’ observable responses are at best a trivialization of art. For 
art’s worth to be dictated by such utilitarian externalities would be 
to instrumentalize it, to superficialize it in a manner that skids over 
the depths of meaning and meaningfulness that are intrinsic to the 
specificities of the work. Ultimately, statements made in the one 
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sphere of knowledge do not meet the basic criteria for legitimate 
scholarship in the other.
There are exceptions, just as there are hybrid forms, and research-
ers in their respective spheres of knowledge are not unaware of one 
another’s rationales and motives; however, the dividing lines are 
still so entrenched that knowledge exchanges between the fields 
are complicated, and thus far have been remarkably rare. How to 
make it easier? As an epistemological boundary object, can the 
aesthetic experience facilitate a reflective cross-disciplinary dia-
logue? As already noted, co-production is a fruitful way to think 
about knowledge, as it requires us to explicitly refrain from ranking 
the various forms of knowledge, the better to understand their 
inherent complexities. What, then, would be the contours of an 
‘intermediary discourse’, as Rabeharisoa and Callon (2004) call it, 
which can bring together experts and laypeople (or experts from 
a variety of fields)? It is not a question of ignoring the differences 
in order to plough ahead and unify the criteria from all spheres 
of knowledge into a single coherent system. Rather, efforts should 
concentrate on identifying specific, local overlaps, preferably where 
the dividing lines are at their clearest. The instrumentalization of 
art offers just one such opportunity.
Existential health as the basis 
for an intermediary discourse
To bridge the gap between the aesthetic disciplines and arts and 
health, one possibility is to reflect on the concept of health. When 
the WHO was founded in 1948, it adopted a three-pronged defi-
nition of health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.4 
This has been criticized for being unrealistic, since no one is like-
ly to achieve complete well-being in all three health dimensions, 
physical, mental, and social. But there have been calls from some 
quarters in recent years for the WHO’s definition to be extended 
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by the addition of another health dimension, usually referred to 
as existential or spiritual health (Sigurdson 2014; Melder 2011). 
The point of this fourth dimension would be to transect the other 
three, rather than being some sort of appendage. It is important 
to note that the term spiritual does not equate to religious, in 
the sense of confessional affiliation; rather, existential or spiritual 
health is about a subjective sense of meaningfulness, participation 
in something greater, and self-understanding. Insoo Hyun (2016, 
128), who has studied spiritual distress in the face of illness, sees 
spirituality as the ‘experiential and emotional aspects of personal 
connection, inner peace, and support’, which some people find in 
religious traditions and others in nature, music, the arts or social 
community. Ola Sigurdson (2014, 34–6) distinguishes between 
spiritual and existential health, arguing that the existential dimen-
sion is characterized by self-reflection, which means that it cuts 
through or embraces all the other dimensions. That is the sense in 
which I use the term existential health here.
Atul Gawande’s book Being Mortal (2014), about palliative care, 
provides some very useful insights. Gawande does not refer to 
existential health per se, but he writes about a form of well-being 
that captures much of what the concept is about. He believes that 
all care should reflect the fact that people are mortal. Accept that, 
he says, and care becomes more than a fight to extend the patient’s 
life as long as possible. An equally important goal is to make it pos-
sible for the patient to experience meaningfulness and satisfaction, 
even when life is marked by illness, loss, or approaching death. 
Gawande uses the example of a study at Massachusetts General 
Hospital of a group of lung cancer patients who chose to combine 
standard oncology treatment with palliative care, where they were 
given support in thinking through what they found meaningful 
in life given their circumstances. When the researchers compared 
them with a control group who had chosen only the oncology 
treatment, those who had palliative care were found to experience 
a sign ificantly higher quality of life and to exhibit fewer signs of 
depression. Further, the hospice group lived on average 25 per 
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cent longer, despite receiving less life-sustaining treatment in the 
final stages of their illness (Gawande 2014, 177–8; see also Temel 
et al. 2010).
Gawande identifies two factors as crucial to this kind of well-being, 
which I argue is existential health in all but name. One is autonomy; 
the other is breaking the isolation that often accompanies illness. By 
autonomy, he does not mean an absence of external constraints—the 
freedom to do whatever you want—for it is obvious that life will be 
limited by illness and disability. Instead, it is an inner autonomy; the 
ability to experience meaningfulness even when your external life is 
much curtailed, and to find a way to relate to your life. In Gawande’s 
words, it is about making space to be ‘the authors of our lives’, even 
in situations not of our choosing such as illness or imminent death 
(140). Such existential well-being may certainly come with objec-
tively measurable health effects, as in the Massachusetts study, but 
it cannot be reduced to metrics or evaluated solely on the basis of 
quantifiable outcomes. Instead, it has intrinsic worth.
Existential health, if understood as inner autonomy and con-
nection, shares a great deal with the characterization of aesthetic 
experience in the aesthetic disciplines. Therein lies its potential 
to bridge the gap, if only provisionally, between the two spheres 
of knowledge when it comes to the instrumentalization of art. 
This much is evident if we take a closer look at how certain philo-
sophers have described the aesthetic experience. Since Kant, a key 
theme in aesthetic philosophy is the special kind of freedom that 
character izes the aesthetic. Freedom from instrumental concerns 
gives free rein to both perception and cognition. Their free move-
ment, a kind of inner play which is satisfying in itself, is shaped by 
a dual dynamic, which coincides well with Gawande’s two aspects. 
On the one hand, the aesthetic creates a distance from mundane 
consciousness, leading to self-reflection; on the other, it gives an 
immediacy to the object viewed, and with that a greater sense of 
presence and participation (see Liljefors & Alftberg 2019).
Martin Seel (2014), pondering Hegel, Kant, and Adorno, talks 
of people’s receptiveness to the aesthetic as an ‘active passivity’, a 
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conscious willingness to accept experiences but never to grasp after 
them, to be unconditionally open to the dynamics of the artwork 
and its effects; an activity that involves being alert to aspects that 
mundane consciousness tends to overlook, a ‘being-there-with 
and going-along-with an abundance of forms and relations that 
we usually fail to recognize in our everyday modes of relating to 
the world’ (271). For Seel, an individual finds in this a freedom to 
renew one’s relations with the world, and thus to recalibrate one’s 
relations with oneself: ‘The central virtue of aesthetic sensibility 
consists in the capacity for finding oneself through detachment from 
oneself ’ (277). With a turn of phrase reminiscent of Gawande’s, 
Seel (who earlier in his career studied well-being) emphasizes that a 
free self-relationship in the aesthetic cannot be distinguished from 
sharing in the alterity of the artwork: ‘In other words, heteronomy 
must be an essential dimension of autonomy, if the latter is not to 
decay into isolation and alienation’ (275). The freedom in aesthet-
ics, writes Seel, subsists in this dynamic of active passivity (274). 
As he puts it, ‘aesthetic freedom is constitutive of the capacity for 
self-determination’ (280).
My point is that the characterizations of existential health and 
aesthetic experience substantially overlap, and this has implications 
for the question of the instrumentalization of art in the field of arts 
and health. If one concentrates on existential health rather than 
any other specific health effects, then art activities in healthcare no 
longer appear a trivializing instrumentalization of art for external 
purposes, but rather a realization of the genuine essence of aesthetic 
experience. This argument is consolidated by findings in the field 
of empirical aesthetics. Empirical aesthetics differ from arts and 
health in its aim to examine the aesthetic experience per se, without 
any external objective beyond a pure search for knowledge; but 
unlike philosophical aesthetics, which it otherwise resembles, it 
relies on empirical methods with quantifiable data, as is standard 
in arts and health.
Empirical studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) at New York University and the Max Planck Institute in 
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Frankfurt indicate that aesthetic experiences activate the default 
mode network (DMN) in the brain (Vessel et al. 2013; Vessel et al. 
2019). The DMN is a widespread but distinct neuronal network 
activated during resting wakefulness and in the spontaneous intro-
spective states of mind that follow on it, such as mind-wandering, 
past and future simulations, thinking of others’ mental states, 
and autobiographical recollections (Andrews-Hanna 2012). It is 
usually deactivated, though, when attention is directed to external 
objects and targets, at which point other neuronal systems take over. 
However, Vessel and colleagues found that for particularly intense 
aesthetic experiences—of artworks which their research subjects 
said affected them strongly—the deactivation of the DMN ceased, 
even when the subjects’ attention was directed to external stimuli 
(the artworks). In particular, high levels of activity were noted in 
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the subsystem associated 
with mental self-representation and self-esteem. Vessel and col-
leagues conclude: 
We propose that certain artworks can ‘resonate’ with an individual’s 
sense of self … This access [to the DMN], which other external 
stimuli normally do not obtain, allows the representation of the 
artwork to interact with the neural processes related to the self, 
affect them, and possibly even be incorporated into them (i.e., into 
the future, evolving representation of self). (Vessel et al. 2013, 6)
The results of fMRI studies thus appear to support the posited link 
between aesthetic experience and self-reflexivity, as theorized in 
philosophical aesthetics. This link, which empirical and philo-
sophical aesthetics postulates on the basis of differing theoretical 
frameworks and methods—that is, different knowledge criteria—is, 
in turn, in line with the characterization of existential health as 
being conditional on autonomy and participation.
This reasoning, with its voices from different disciplines, is 
intended as an example of an intermediary discourse that could 
explore the overlaps between different fields of knowledge. Here the 
movement of knowledge
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overlap means that the polar opposite approaches of the aesthetic 
disciplines and arts and health to the instrumentalization of art are 
brought into contact with each other and thus prompt fresh dia-
logue and knowledge exchange. It also demonstrates that aesthetic 
experiences really are epistemological boundary objects, studied in 
many academic fields using radically different knowledge criteria. 
If any intermediary discourse is to succeed, it is wise to set aside 
the question of the validity of each field’s fundamental knowledge 
criteria, if only temporarily, as such discussions tend to increase 
their polarization (see, for example, Rampley 2017). That said, one 
should not expect (nor do I see it as desirable) that the tensions 
between views on specific issues—such as here, the instrumental-
ization of art—are reduced to nothing. As Seel emphasizes, good 
can come of an aesthetic experience—insights, changes in attitude, 
broader perspectives—but above all it is worthwhile in itself: ‘The 
playgrounds of aesthetic openness are not a mere training camp 
in which special skills are learned’ (2014, 276).
Co-production of phenomenological knowledge
Thus far I have used ‘intermediary discourse’ to describe a pos-
sible dialogue between the various academic fields concerned 
with the aesthetic experience, much as Rabeharisoa and Callon 
(2004 passim) use the term to describe communication between 
biomedical researchers and patients and relatives, organized in 
a progressive patients’ association, or as Markus Idvall uses it in 
the present volume in studying communication between medical 
scientists and patients. I will now show that conversations during 
a visit by people with Parkinson’s disease to an art museum can be 
regarded as intermediary discourses, leading to the co-production 
of knowledge in a phenomenological perspective, privileging the 
subjective understanding of the individual who has the experience 
over objectively verifiable descriptions. It should be noted that 
‘intermediary discourse’ risks losing its analytical edge if applied 
in too many differing empirical circumstances. However, I would 
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argue that the fact that it can be operationalized in different contexts 
is testimony to the concept’s usefulness. My example is taken from 
a research collaboration, Presence-Oriented Art Pedagogy, with the 
art historian Peter Bengtsen and the ethnologist Åsa Alftberg, with 
the aim to develop a mediation methodology for encounters with 
art, which focuses on the sensation of presence rather than on inter-
pretation of the artworks’ meanings, which otherwise is a common 
focus of art pedagogy.5 In the project, informed by Hans Ulrich 
Gumbrecht’s distinction (2003) between meaning and presence as 
two fundamental elements in the aesthetic experience, we used a 
three-step method of our own making to mediate art (Appendix, 
Figure 8.2). In the first step, participants concentrate on the artwork, 
alert to their perception of it. In the second step, they describe their 
perceptions to the group, each making a conscious effort to listen 
to the others’ perceptions. The third step is a deepening of their 
awareness of their perceptions, which comes of verbalizing their 
own experiences and hearing others’ descriptions. A more detailed 
description of the method is found in the Appendix to this chapter. 
The method makes the most of group dynamics and the alternation 
between quiet contemplation and social interaction. By switching 
between attention to one’s own perceptions and engaging in the 
other participants’ verbal communications, the participants engaged 
in a playful examination of what Seel describes as ‘an abundance 
of forms and relationships that we usually fail to recognize’ (2014, 
271). We saw a notable increase in the participants’ involvement 
and initiative, both when interacting with the artworks and with 
one another, compared to when the same group had been to an art 
exhibition under more conventional conditions. The group now 
spent significantly longer time taking in the artworks.
The experiment addressed many aspects of perception and its 
verbalization, but here I limit myself to one: how statements made 
within the group served to co-produce knowledge, with which the 
participants helped one another deepen their experience of the 
artworks. At the Museum of Artistic Process and Public Art, Lund 
University’s art museum, where the experiment was conducted, there 
movement of knowledge
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is a plaster model by the British artist Henry Moore (1898–1986) 
for his sculpture Hill Arches (1973), which is now found realized in 
bronze in several places around the world. One photo (Appendix, 
Figure 8.1) shows a reconstruction of the situation with participants 
seated in front of Moore’s model. Very little seems to be happening, 
but in fact they are engrossed in the first step, making themselves 
aware of their perception of the work. 
When it was time for the second step of the method, verbalization, 
one participant began by saying, ‘The sculpture has its dark side 
towards us.’ It would be easy to think it a simple statement of fact, 
but in the context in which it was said it was above all a description 
of an experience. In all its simplicity, it is a blueprint for what can 
be called the anatomy of presence—including all its constitutive 
elements. There are three such elements: the artwork, the beholder, 
and the space that encompasses them both. The statement shows that 
the participant sensed their specific relationship in that situation: 
because of the way the light fell in the room, they were sitting in 
the sculpture’s shadow. The participants were together on the same 
side of the artwork in this case—they had looked at other works 
from different positions—and the other participants’ statements 
about the sculpture were to broadly the same effect: ‘The sculpture 
is between us and the window.’ ‘It’s blocking the light.’ All of them 
include the work, the room, and the beholder, whether explicitly 
or implicitly. They thus express the fundamental phenomenologi-
cal condition for the experience of presence: our body constitutes 
a volume in a space we share with other bodies. It brings with it 
a myriad of aspects and nuances for perception to explore—our 
project revolved around their identification and systematization 
for use in our mediation method.
In the present context, however, the key point was that partici-
pants built their knowledge, their awareness of perception, in 
dialogue with one another. In an evaluation after they had gone 
round the exhibition, participants stressed how valuable the group 
conversation had been in giving them a more profound experience. 
The process amounted to the participants being engaged in the 
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co-production of phenomenological knowledge—phenomeno-
logical in the sense that their statements only had meaning under 
the specific conditions in which they were said. Far from being a 
statement of objective fact—for example, ‘The sculpture is white 
and made from plaster’, which is true, regardless of who says it and 
where—the statements made by the participants are valid only if 
said right there, in the shadow of Hill Arches. By articulating what 
is in this sense phenomenological knowledge, the project’s method 
serves to intensify the aesthetic experience.
Can art historians join in this kind of co-production of phe-
nom eno logical knowledge? If so, under what circumstances? The 
instinctive answer is that of course they can participate, for the simple 
reason that art historians, like anyone else, are able (and presumably 
willing) to be open to aesthetic experiences. The primary condition 
for their participation in a phenomenological exchange of knowledge 
is thus that they accept their role as participants, and that they ascribe 
their subjective aesthetic experiences the status of knowledge in the 
framework of the intermediary discourse.6 However, there is also a 
more specialized level on which the art historian’s scholarship has 
a part to play in intermediary discourses. The aesthetic disciplines 
are guardians of a long legacy of knowledge about things aesthetic. 
The fact that this knowledge is largely separate from the field of 
arts and health is perhaps the most detrimental effect of the gap 
between the two spheres of knowledge. If the gap could be bridged 
it would be very useful, especially for the reflexive element in arts 
and health activities. For example, the art historian Alois Riegl 
(1858–1905), one of the significant figures of the discipline, used 
his book on group portraits in Dutch art in the seventeenth century 
(1999 [1902/1931]) to develop the formalist approach for which 
he is known into a theory that relies on the beholder’s relation to 
the artwork and the artwork’s appeal to the beholder. He saw the 
beholder and artwork as joined in a mutual recognition, because 
the beholder has a sense, as an element embedded in his aesthetic 
consideration, that the artwork is looking back at him. As Margaret 
Olin (1989, 295) notes, Riegl’s views were not far removed from 
movement of knowledge
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his contemporary Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and his phenom-
enological philosophy, or indeed Martin Buber (1878–1965) and 
his theological theories of intersubjectivity in what he termed the 
I–Thou relationship. This mutual attentiveness (Aufmerksamkeit, 
a term Riegl operationalizes) is notably free from what Margaret 
Iversen calls ‘egotistic isolation’ (1993, 94), and rather is suffused 
by fundamental respect for the other (Riegl 1999, 313) as well as 
self-respect—here Olin (1989, 291) reminds us that the term respect 
comes from the Latin respicere, to look back.
This notion—that in aesthetic receptivity there is an element of 
being addressed or ‘seen’ by the artwork—articulates something 
we noticed in conversation as the participants went round the 
exhibition, albeit only as hints rather than fully formulated reflec-
tions. That is where art history could help with the co-production 
of phenomenological knowledge, linking what the participants are 
hinting at to the corresponding elements in the history of aesthetic 
thought. It could offer the cognitive and conceptual tools with 
which to express experience in words. This sort of articulation 
could strengthen people’s reflexive awareness of this component of 
the aesthetic experience, which as far as the project is concerned 
amounts to the method’s third step, to deepen the experience.
Shared or different goals 
when co-producing knowledge
Another example from the history of aesthetic thought that could 
enrich the field of arts and health is what is sometimes referred to 
as the West’s first aesthetic theory, which is also a theory of love. In 
Plato’s Symposium (c.385–370 BC), he has Socrates summarize the 
teachings of the priestess Diotima of Mantinea in what is known as 
the Ladder of Love (Plato 2001, 210a–212d). Diotima had explained 
that one who loves will learn the nature of beauty step by step, first 
by discovering the beauty of a single body, then in another body 
that is different from the first, and so on in an ever-increasing circle 
from the specific to the abstract, until finally seeing beauty itself:
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beginning from these beautiful things here, always to proceed on 
up for the sake of that beauty, using these beautiful things here as 
steps: from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; and 
from beautiful bodies to beautiful pursuits; and from pursuits to 
beautiful lessons; and from lessons to end at that lesson, which 
is the lesson of nothing else than the beautiful itself; and at last 
to know what is beauty itself. (211b–c)
How can an account written two and a half thousand years ago, 
and which ranges from physical homosexual desire to the divine, 
shed light on modern experiences of art in healthcare contexts? To 
answer that question we must first look at the related issue of what 
art history has to forego in order to join in an intermediary discourse 
of this kind. For Rabeharisoa and Callon, an intermediary discourse 
is an organized communication in which no party’s perspective 
is allowed to dominate (in their example, neither the researchers’ 
‘technical’ nor the patient organization’s ‘strategic’ perspectives). 
Each party thus has to sacrifice something from their own sphere 
of knowledge. The aesthetic disciplines are in the habit of thinking 
about aesthetic theories, such as Riegl’s or Plato’s, framed by the 
broad metaphysical frameworks or world views of the historical 
contexts where the theories took shape: Riegl devised his reception 
theory, avant la lettre, from his historicist view of artistic idiom as 
an expression of national temperament; Diotima’s Ladder of Love 
was based in Plato’s Theory of Forms. Understanding the thinking 
about aesthetics in the light of its historical context is central to the 
history of art. But this is precisely what I would argue art history has 
to abstain from to a certain extent, if only provisionally and tacti-
cally, if it is to have a part in the intermediary discourse sketched 
here. Instead, art history should hold up a phenomenological lens 
to aesthetic theories, seeing them as descriptions of experiences. 
Seen thus, Diotima’s Ladder was not just Plato’s way of expressing 
his Theory of Forms; it was a conceptualization of a certain aspect 
of aesthetic experience, an aspect which manifested in the art activ-
ity for people with Parkinson’s referred to above. It is found in the 
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tendency for the focus of aesthetic attentiveness to be transferred 
from a single object to several, and extending to take in the full 
scope of artwork–beholder–space, accompanied by an intensifi-
cation or consolidation of the aesthetic experience. Like Riegl’s 
theory,  Diotima’s Ladder of Love can be a cognitive tool with which 
to articulate a particular facet of experience that might be difficult 
to put into words otherwise—in this case, in the image of upward 
movement, towards a high vantage point with a wider horizon, 
from where one can see more. Such articulations can strengthen 
the reflexive element and help the mediation method develop.
If art history makes a concession—putting the historical meta-
physical frameworks to one side—to participate in an intermediary 
discourse, it can only be on a temporary, provisional basis in order 
to achieve a strategic goal in the field of arts and health. Historical 
contextualization is fundamental to the aesthetic disciplines’ sphere 
of knowledge, and cannot be abandoned. That is why I hold that 
Bommenel’s hypothesis, that any interdisciplinary research requires 
all its researchers to agree on a shared vision of their research goals, 
has to be nuanced. Research can have several goals, and not all of 
them need to apply in all circumstances. An example of a shared 
goal could be co-producing knowledge about the potential of the 
aesthetic experience in healthcare, but alongside that, the field of 
arts and health and the aesthetic disciplines could have different 
goals and research questions, rooted in their respective spheres of 
knowledge. For arts and health, it might be ‘How can we use the arts 
to improve the lives of the elderly and the sick?’ For the aesthetic 
disciplines, meanwhile, ‘What do such art activities teach us about 
the aesthetic experience?’
Notes
 1 For overviews see, for example, Sigurdson 2014; Sjölander & Sigurdson 2016; Crossick 
& Kaszynska 2016; and APPGAHW 2017.
 2 See also WHO 2019.
 3 Other things than art, such as nature or sport, can also offer an aesthetic experience 
of course, and far from all art has an aesthetic experience as its goal. My purpose 
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here is not to cover all the meanings of the concept, but rather to address a specific 
problem on which the concept has some bearing.
 4 Constitution of the World Health Organization, p. 1. The Constitution was adopted 
at the International Health Conference in New York, 17 June to 22 July 1946, and 
came into force on 7 April 1948.
 5 The project’s original name was ‘Systematic implementation of aesthetic experiences 
and artistic activities in the care of persons with Parkinson’s disease’, and was part 
of BAGADILICO, the Basal Ganglia Disorders Linnaeus Consortium, funded by 
the Swedish Research Council (2008–2018). See also Alftberg & Rosenqvist 2017; 
Rosenqvist & Suneson 2016; Mittelman & Epstein 2009; and Rosenberg et al. 2009.
 6 This might prompt in some practitioners a worry of the kind that has stalked the 
discipline since its inception concerning its legitimacy as Wissenschaft and the risk 
of being considered too subjective (see Rampley 2011).
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The purpose of the project Presence-oriented art pedagogy is to deve-
lop a method for the mediation of art, which privileges experiences 
of presence over interpretation of the artwork’s symbolic meanings. 
Summary 
The project develops a novel method of art pedagogy that combines results from our own 
experiments in mediation with insights from aesthetic philosophy. The project applies a 
phenomenological perspective to aesthetic philosophy, which means that the focus is not 
metaphysical frameworks, but expressions of experience. The starting point is the distinction 
made by the literary scholar Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht between meaning and presence as 
two basic elements in encounters with art. To interpret an artwork’s meaning is basically 
to explain it intellectually, in reference to, for example, the artist’s intentions, the work’s 
historical context, or the beholder’s associations. Most art pedagogy revolves around this 
kind of interpretation. To explore an artwork’s presence is instead to become aware of one’s 
perceptual sensations of the work here-and-now. The project’s method does not preclude 
interpretation, but is nevertheless primarily concerned with the experience of presence. 
The project members have observed greater initiative and commitment from participants 
in the experiments with a presence-oriented method. 
Figure 8.1. Participants are looking at Henry Moore’s Hill Arches (1973) at the Musuem of Artistic Pro-
cess and Public Art in Lund. They are paying attention to their perceptions of the sculpture, in Step 
1 of the pedagogical model. (The photo shows a reconstruction.) Photographer: Peter Bengtsen. 
II
Method 
The method is a three-step model (Figure 
8.2). 
In the first step, participants alert themselves 
to their own perceptions of an artwork. In the 
second step, they verbalize their sensations by 
describing them to the other participants, and 
listen to the others’ verbalizations. The third 
step is the intensified experience that results 
from the verbalizations, which in turn can be 
the subject of keen awareness, and so the cycle 
begins again. The method uses the rhythm 
struck up between the individual participant’s 
silent attentiveness to the artwork and the 
social exchange between participants.
Artwork–beholder–space 
‘The sculpture has its dark side towards us.’ 
This statement by one of the participants, 
sitting looking at Henry Moore’s Hill Arches 
(Figure 8.2), articulates their sensation of 
the artwork in the here and now, represen-
ting a phenomenological knowledge that 
is only valid in the place and at the time it 
is uttered—in the shadow of the sculpture 
as sunlight shone through the window. It 
also contains all three key components of 
the experience of presence: the artwork, the 
beholder, and the space they share. 
What does phenomenological knowledge 
‘feel’ like compared to objective knowledge? 
The reader can find out by looking at the im -
age of Hill Arches (Figure 8.3) while thinking 
‘The sculpture is white and made from plas-
ter’—an objective statement which is correct 
regardless of where and when it is said. Then 
look at it again and think ‘The sculpture’s sunlit 
side is towards me.’ For some, this statement 
(which expresses phenomenological know-
ledge) gives them a sense that the artwork 
addresses them, even though their perception 
of it is mediated through a photograph.
Aesthetic experience 
People have created art for tens of thou-
sands of years. And for thousands of years 
they have formulated philosophical theories 
about the aesthetic experience. One eternal 
theme is that an aesthetic experience can be 
deeply satisfying and empowering. It can 
also be associated with feelings of love and 
gratitude. In recent years, academic studies 
have shown that aesthetic experiences can 
have many types of measurable, positive 
effects on health and well-being. The WHO 
recommends that art’s healing, strengthe-
ning, and rehabilitative potential should be 
systematically integrated into the WHO’s 
European Health Policy.
(1) Awareness of 
perception
(2) Verbalization(3) Intensified 
experience
Figure 8.2. Three-step pedagogical method for the 
mediation of art.
i re 8.2. Thre -st p pedagogical met od for 
the mediation of art.
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Figure 8.3. When the particpants take in the artwork from different positions, their perceptions 
of the artwork–beholder–space relation will differ. As they verbalize their experiences for one 
another, a dynamic shift in perceptions can take place. (The photo shows a reconstruction.) 
Photographer: Peter Bengtsen. 
Active passivity, or, the free play of 
perception and cognition
An important thought in the philosophy of 
aesthetics is that in any aesthetic experience 
the individual’s perception and cognition 
can play freely. Aesthetic attentiveness is 
not limited by expectations of how things 
should be perceived or what that should 
lead to. Therefore, the aesthetic experience is 
characterized by a greater sense of the here-
and-now, leaving it open for the individual to 
notice forms and relationships overlooked in 
a normal frame of mind. It creates an inner 
freedom unique to the aesthetic experience. 
This, in turn, can give the viewer a renewed 
sense of self, as someone who can have these 
perceptions, who appreciates these nuances, 
who sees these relationships in which he 
himself has a part. In this way, an aesthetic 
experience can reinforce the viewer’s inner 
autonomy. The philosopher Martin Seel calls 
the aesthetic approach ‘active passivity’, for 
as attention goes it is deliberately elicited, 
matched by a readiness to fully accept what 
the work of art can give.
Universal parameters 
Within the triad of artwork–beholder–space 
are a number of variables that factor into 
perception. They have been taken as the 
universal parameters for the project, because 
they are a feature of almost every aesthetic 
situation. Examples include colour, form, the 
play of light and shadow, and variations in 
distance, size, and spatial direction. Percep-
tion as such also has its variables, such as 
broad or narrow attentiveness, or a focus 
on specific characteristics and qualities. All 
such parameters can be used to vary and 
increase the individual’s awareness of per-
ception, and are therefore useful tools in any 
presence-oriented pedagogy.
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The play of light and shadow 
Looking at Carl Eldh’s models for a sculpture 
of August Strindberg (Figure 8.4), one par-
ticipant burst out ‘How beautifully the light 
falls on the sculptures!’  When the researchers 
asked the group to describe what they could 
see, the participants found it difficult to put 
it into words at first, perhaps because the 
scene is complex, with several free-standing 
figures. When asked to focus on what was 
lightest, however, they began by pointing 
out the parts of the sculptures which were 
in full sunlight. Then they went on to identify 
the darkest parts, which lay in the deepest 
shadow. From there, they went on to explore 
the nuances in between, the parts that are 
not so easily defined as ‘light’ or ‘dark’. The 
group were engaged in this exercise for over 
30 enthusiastic minutes. It is an example of 
how the method uses specific parameters—
in this case, light and shadow—to open up 
and consolidate the individual’s awareness 
of sensation.
Imaginative power
In aesthetic philosophy, there is always a 
sense in which the human imagination—or, 
as it is also called, imaginative power (Kant’s 
Einbildungskraft)—has a key role in many 
mental processes. It revolves around the abi-
lity to create and maintain an image or idea 
as an inner vision, ostensibly assembling the 
beholder’s impressions into a coherent repre-
sentation in the beholder’s mind. Looking at 
an Andy Goldsworthy installation (Figure 
8.5), the participants’ perceptions alternated 
between a number of such coherent ‘imagi-
nings’. For example, the installation’s bulrus-
hes were seen as forming a porous membra-
ne, which divided the space into two different 
‘light rooms’; or as a wall with an opening 
in the middle; or as dashes, the  traces of 
movement through the air, criss-cross ing 
in all directions; or frozen in the moment of 
tumbling down. These imaginings centre 
on different parameters, whether light– 
shadow or direction, and so on. The transitions 
between them are spontaneous, since the 
Figure 8.4. Models for Carl 
Eldh’s monument of August 
Strindberg, erected in Tegnér-
lunden park in Stockholm in 
1942. The Museum of Artistic 
Process and Public Art, Lund. 
Photographer: Max Liljefors.
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imaginative power of the aesthetic is free, 
and not dictated by logic or utility. None 
of these images are right or wrong, true or 
false. The imagination can also include the 
beholder, because the individual’s aesthetic 
attentiveness turns outwards, towards the 
work of art, and inwards, towards one’s own 
perceptions and cognition. The beholder 
feels that new perceptual and cognitive ideas 
take shape in the encounter with the artwork. 
Carl Eldh’s figures gave one participant the 
impression that the smallest sculpture was 
in fact huge. She saw herself standing in 
front of it, looking up at it (though in real­
i ty she was standing where the photo had 
been taken), and this gave her the feeling of 
looking at the scene from a long way off. This 
made participants aware of the difference 
between physical and perceived distance, 
another parameter in the project’s method. 
Participants could even imagine their own 
gaze as an invisible hand, with which they 
could reach out and touch the artworks.
The project Presence-Oriented Art Pedagogy started as part of the Linnaeus research programme 
BAGADILICO, Basal Ganglia Disorders Linnaeus Consortium, at Lund University, funded by the 
Swedish Research Council 2008–2018. BAGADILICO was a multi-disciplinary research programme 
uniting researchers from the medical, technological and humanistic faculties at Lund University, 
in research about Huntington’s and Parkinson’s diseases. Today, Presence-Oriented Art Pedagogy 
continues as a collaboration between the Research node for Medical Humanities and the Research 
node for Aesthetic Studies at the Department of Arts and Cultural Sciences, Lund University.
Figure 8.5. Installation by Andy Goldsworthy, 2017–2018, at the Museum of Artistic Process and 
Public Art, Lund. Photographer: Peter Bengtsen.
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chapter 9 
Medicines in the grey market
A sociocultural analysis of individual agency
Rui Liu & Susanne Lundin
Therefore, I prefer to get medicines myself so I have the oppor-
tunity to check the quality… In this way, I can ensure that no 
dangerous chemical stuff is used in the production process. My 
doctor knows I’m using cannabis, instead of the one he can pre-
scribe which only worsens my condition. 
This quote comes from our study Where and how do you buy 
medicines? 1 The respondent has been consuming cannabis for 
twelve years, claiming it works well to manage his pain. One way 
to obtain cannabis is to get family to send it from abroad. Can-
nabis consumption is not a common healing practice among our 
respondents. However, between the lines, this respondent articulates 
a complex yet increasingly common view of medicines and how to 
access them in contemporary society. Somehow, it hints at a desire 
to gain some control over one’s body, by skilfully distinguishing 
what are considered as good medicines from bad ones. Such practice 
is often characterized as self-care, as opposed to care provided by 
medical professionals. Furthermore, suggested in this quote is the 
emergence of an array of relations: markets entering institutions, 
self-care constituting public care, and lay perspectives encountering 
professional ones. Alongside, individual agency is taking shape.
Health systems, in Sweden as elsewhere, are often conceptualized 
as ‘knowledge economies that produce and mediate access to health 
movement of knowledge
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knowledge embedded in people, services and commodities’ (Bloom 
et al. 2008, 2077). Although medicines are commonly perceived 
as desirable and valuable things to transform the body, they may 
cause harm if handled improperly. The consumption of medicines 
is thus usually subject to many legal restrictions. Between people 
and medicines, there often stand medical professionals, whose 
institutional expertise allow them to act as medicine gatekeepers. 
Therefore, in the interaction of people and medicines at various 
stages from production to consumption, during and beyond clinical 
encounters, knowledge is materialized and mobilized in the form 
of the medicines. It means that knowledge can also be understood 
as a praxis or a form of doing. Following this line of thought, in the 
case of medicines knowledge does not merely represent awareness 
about how to take care of one’s body, but it denotes a set of skills 
obtained through everyday consumption praxis. In this chapter, 
we use this to investigate how knowledge as a praxis is intertwined 
with consumption in everyday life. We situate our discussion in the 
Swedish setting, while remaining attuned to the global  phenomenon 
that is the spread of poor-quality medicines on the market.
Setting the scene
In 2009, Sweden witnessed a shift in its retail pharmaceutical 
landscape. A liberal pharmacy market replaced forty years of state-
owned monopoly, Apoteket AB, and its nationwide control of 
drug supplies. Private suppliers were allowed to enter the market, 
and some over-the-counter (OTC) medicines can now be bought 
elsewhere than pharmacies. To further increase service efficiency, 
many kinds of digitalized healthcare services are now available 
to the public. Take an example, as of autumn 2015 all authorized 
Swedish pharmacies can sell medicines and medical advice online. 
Although online medicine purchases are much easier than ever 
before, this loosely regulated virtual market dissolves national 
borders and opens up for unauthorized provision of medicines. 
Unlicensed online pharmacies spring up, and a majority of them, if 
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not all, offer consumers unrestricted access to all kinds of medical 
products, including prescription-only medicines (POM), whose 
therapeutic quality cannot be guaranteed (Clark 2015; Liang & 
Mackey 2012). Even more worrying for the Swedish authorities, 
at the other end of the supply chain there are signs showing that 
increasing numbers of Swedish residents are buying medicines 
from unauthorized channels (Swedish Medical Products Agency 
2015). On the global scale, the trade in illicit medicines in the 
grey market is expanding tremendously, harming individuals and 
society (Newton et al. 2016). This affects all countries in the world 
and infiltrates all marketplaces, whether online or offline, formal 
or informal (Nayyar et al. 2019). To tackle this public health threat, 
national and international stakeholders have called for collabora-
tion. To facilitate collaborations, in May 2017 the WHO launched 
a working definition of these dangerous medicines—substandard 
and falsified (SF) medical products (WHO 2017).
In the current literature on the phenomenon of SF medical 
products, studies in medicine, law, and public health have led the 
way. Much of the focus is on the supply side, advocating techno-
logical innovation and harmonized international legal frameworks 
(Attaran 2015; Liu & Lundin 2016; Rebiere et al. 2017). Consumer 
perspectives, however, are usually omitted. When individuals are 
mentioned, they are often portrayed as either vulnerable victims 
or naïve consumers who risk their lives to buy medicines outside 
the legal market. Certainly, practical issues such as accessibility 
and affordability are important determining factors in the deci-
sion-making process, especially among populations with financial 
constraints (Alfadl et al. 2013; Nordstrom 2007). For this reason, 
welfare states like Sweden, with an established and functioning 
public healthcare system and nationwide healthcare insurance 
coverage, the increasingly common practice of buying medicines 
illicitly is intriguing.
A number of criminological studies in the British context pro-
vide some insights which account for this illicit act. They point to 
the direct link between the demand for medicines in general, the 
movement of knowledge
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widespread availability of illicit medical products, and often invisible 
grey markets (for example, Hall & Antonopoulos 2016; Sugiura 
2018). Nonetheless, the transition from demand to practice, meaning 
here the consumption of medicines, is not always straightforward. 
For example, buyers’ trust in informal drug sellers could be inter-
preted as a guarantee of medicine quality, as shown in a study of 
migrant buyers in South Africa (Hornberger & Cossa 2012). Or, 
as found in a UK study (Sugiura et al. 2012), a sense of entitlement 
may become the consumers’ argument for moving to the extra-legal 
market, regardless of the medicines’ legal status. Implied in these 
studies is that demand is expressed through different forms of con-
sumption strategy. And essentially, all such strategies are relational 
and contextual. Linking back to the portrayal of consumers in the 
literature on SF medical products, we argue that dichotomizing 
between passive victims and autonomous agents neither helps to 
explain why people buy medicines illicitly, nor does it elucidate 
how grey markets take form (see Gunnarson & Lundin 2015). On 
this account, by tracing the connections between knowledge as a 
form of doing and everyday consumption, we offer an alternative 
analysis of individual agency and various expressions of demand.
Researching medicines
Our primary source material is a survey comprising 155 answers 
from Swedish residents, collected by the authors in April and May 
2016 with the assistance of Lund University’s Folklife Archives. We 
also draw on results from netnographic observations conducted by 
another project member shortly after the survey (Brissman 2016). 
The data were coded as themes emerged and then categorized 
accordingly. Respondents have been anonymized to avoid identi-
fication. We would argue that the respondents’ answers serve as a 
keyhole to a larger research stream about grey markets. Notably, 
the patterns we identify in this chapter are not unique in the phe-
nomenon of SF medical products. The search for alternatives in 
the grey zones and the victim–agent dichotomy are not unusual 
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themes in studies of other socio-medical phenomena such as medical 
travel. In our analysis, we thus draw on insights from those studies 
to strengthen our arguments.
We begin by introducing two analytical concepts—liquid con-
sumption and prosumption—with which we explore how consump-
tion strategies reveal the enactment of agency and the movement of 
knowledge. The presentation of our findings and analysis is organ-
ized around three medicine-purchasing scenarios, each centred on 
a specific type of object: prescriptions in medical consultations, the 
logo of legal online pharmacies, and medical solutions that seem 
promising but are only available outside the legal market.
Liquidity and prosumption
Essentially, medicines are things attributed with social and sym-
bolic meaning (Whyte et al. 2002). Their thinginess not only gives 
 medicines a tangible shape and texture, but concretizes various 
types of dysphoria so that both healthcare receivers and providers 
can focus their efforts. This thinginess thus also allows medicines 
to stand on their own, independent from medical professionals and 
their expertise. This means they are not only the subject of medical 
consultations; they can also stay with patients afterwards in the 
form of prescriptions (Whyte et al. 2002). This independency leads 
to another layer of the thinginess, which lies in that medicines can 
move, locally and globally, beyond clinical settings to be exchanged 
as commodities. In that movement, they may enter and exit various 
forms of markets, transcend national borders, and bridge dialogues 
with people and between people.
Starting off as manmade objects with the potential to cure, 
 medicines are treated with a variety of contrasting, yet coexisting, 
attitudes and health beliefs such as hope and fear, trust and distrust, 
safe and dangerous, demand and resistance—even as generally good 
and bad. In turn, they also influence and shape people’s experiences 
and expectations in terms of how and where they should be accessed 
and consumed (Lock & Nguyen 2010). During this interactive 
movement of knowledge
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process, agency—the power to act—is enacted. Ideological notions 
of how people understand knowledge and authority need to be 
revisited. Liquidity, or rather the potential to become freer agents 
in loosely bonded relationships, emerges as a very relevant aspect.
The first concept is liquid consumption, proposed by Fleura Bardhi 
and Giana Eckhardt (2017). Rooted in Zygmunt Bauman’s theory 
of liquid modernity (2000), liquid consumption is characterized as 
access-based, ephemeral, and dematerialized, in contrast to solid 
consumption, which is ownership-based, enduring and materialized. 
These two kinds of consumption coexist on a spectrum in the con-
sumption experience. They intertwine yet remain distinguishable. 
In liquid consumption, the accessibility to products or services is 
attributed greater value than their possession. This fluidity ‘enables 
individuals to be flexible and highly adaptable to the unpredictable 
demands of global mobility, economy, and labour markets’ (Bardhi 
& Eckhardt 2017, 589). Quick circulation and immediate access 
are therefore emphasized in this form of consumption process. 
The use value and practical benefits of a product or service are 
prioritized over any social value. This redefined value-creation 
process implies that individuals may relate to social structures 
temporarily or only in a specific context. Another distinctive quality 
of liquid consumption practice is that individuals are inclined to 
form networks and mobilize resources within them. It differs from 
solid consumption, where one is more dependent on a particular 
channel to access services, products, or information.
The second concept is prosumption. Originally coined by Alvin 
Toffler in his book The Third Wave (1980), prosumption blurs 
production and consumption, and is historically framed by tech-
nological advances and the adoption of a neoliberal political- 
economic philosophy (Comor 2011). However, prosumption, 
like its derivative prosumer, remained unproblematized until very 
recently. Duly packaged, it has been embraced by marketers as a 
new form of civilization that frees individuals from immobility, 
heavy dependence on human relations, and suppression by explicit 
power relations. Prosumers are assumed to be imbued with creativity 
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and autonomy by dint of their participation in such activities as 
self-surveillance, self-help, and sharing. Nonetheless, as Edward 
Comor (2011, 322) argues, without fundamental changes in the 
political, cultural and economic structures, individuals who actively 
participate in any form of prosumption will almost always ‘serve 
status quo interests’ and remain exploited by what George Ritzer 
(2015) terms ‘prosumer capitalism’.
The concepts of liquid consumption and prosumption have useful 
implications for understanding why people buy medicines illegiti-
mately. They provide us with the language and analytical angles to 
chart emerging consumption practices and the formation of grey 
markets in relation to the spread of illicit medicines. We apply these 
concepts here to examine how assumedly solid social norms which 
order everyday consumption are fluid in actual social conditions.
Multiple authorities and networked knowledge
A medical prescription is an important object that amplifies the 
division of roles between medical professionals and lay individuals 
(Whyte et al. 2002). On the practical level, it often is the tangible 
outcome of a medical consultation, and a legitimate proof to access 
certain restricted medicines. When asked about whom to consult 
when a prescription is needed, ‘doctors’ is the answer from the 
majority of our respondents.2 But then this is followed by some 
confusion. To the rhetorical question ‘How would you get a pre-
scription-only medicine otherwise?’, our respondents acknowledge 
not only doctors’ authoritative status, but also the unavoidable 
part doctors play if one wants to obtain POMs legally. What is also 
implied is a recognition of the asymmetries between patients and 
doctors, in the sense that respondents position themselves as being 
dependent on doctors’ expertise and institutional legitimacy for 
access to medicines. One respondent further explains:
The very meaning of the word ‘prescription’ is associated with 
some regulations of access to medicines, right?… No matter 
movement of knowledge
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what, it is important, I think, to contact doctors, especially if it 
is about, for example, antibiotics whose use should be restrictive. 
In other situations, it is still important to discuss things like side 
effects and interaction with other medicines. 
This respondent understands that one should be careful with anti-
biotics and taking several medicines at the same time. By articulating 
this, she demonstrates a certain level of medical knowledge, precisely 
by admitting a lack of expertise in drug use. Quite a number of 
respondents also mention that doctors can check up on patients’ 
allergies and medical history to ensure the safe consumption of 
certain medicines. Accordingly, it is the patients’ expectation that 
doctors act as gatekeepers, applying their expertise to minimize 
the potential risks and to select the right medicines for patients. 
However, being dependent is not equivalent to taking a less power-
ful position. Whenever a respondent talks of having discussed 
a medical condition with their doctor, an equal and interactive 
relationship is depicted. A medical consultation is then turned into 
a conversation about the body and its subjective emotions. Thus, 
the doctor–patient dialogue is transformed into one between two 
forms of knowledge—the lay and the professional—and between 
two forms of care—self-care and public care (see Idvall in this 
volume). Instead of one party to the conversation automatically 
being in possession of absolute knowledge and power over the 
other, each contributes what they know about the body in order 
to formulate a treatment (although the body may have different 
meanings in this context, from a medical body for the doctor to an 
experienced body for the patient, see Mol 2002). On this account, 
a prescription is not simply an instruction, issued by doctors to 
tell patients what medications to take; it is also an individualized 
plan to treat the illness, and a type of contract endorsed by both 
patient and doctor. Thus, prescriptions can be thought of as the 
outcome of an embodied and emotional negotiation; a negotia-
tion underpinned by the individual’s self-reflexivity, in Anthony 
 Giddens’s term (1991, 218), accepting and presenting one’s own 
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body as ‘a site of interaction, appropriation and reappropriation’ 
where different forms of knowledge convene.
Some respondents take a relatively active part in medical con-
sultations. For example, one respondent says that she usually pre-
pares before visiting a doctor: ‘I often first read on my own and 
then leave a request for a medicine.’ Another respondent reflects 
on what happens after the visit, explaining that ‘I want to know 
what the doctor recommends, but then I’m not sure I’ll do exactly 
as he or she advises. But I consider it before I make my decision.’ 
Seeing a doctor is thus thought a legitimate approach, but there is 
a tendency to view doctors as counsellors, whose medical advice 
functions as an additional input or a second opinion. In this context, 
prescriptions do not hold much authority as contracts any more, 
because they leave so much room for patients to appropriate the 
knowledge for their own ends. In shaping a final consumption 
decision, information from various sources is brought into the 
process to evaluate doctors’ expertise. For instance, one respond-
ent says ‘I like it when the pharmacist says the same thing as the 
doctor. Then one knows the information is reliable’. The opinions 
of family and friends also play a role, as many respondents note, as 
do the so-called medical experts on the Internet (Brissman 2016). 
Gustav Brissman’s netnographic observation (2016) finds that in 
online chatrooms some anonymous people are often regarded as 
medical experts, whose opinions are much valued by other mem-
bers of the forum.
In the case of our survey respondents, we do not know  whether 
they consulted people in these virtual chatrooms, but what is clearly 
mapped out nonetheless is a network where multiple authorities 
coexist. In this network, there is a range of online and offline, formal 
and informal actors, mediated by medicines. In our material, these 
actors include doctors, nurses, pharmacists, anonymous online 
medical experts, even non-fiction books and social media. Rather 
than selecting one trusted authority, what our respondents are try-
ing to do is to evaluate and integrate different types of knowledge 
gained through consumption praxis before they make a decision. 
movement of knowledge
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Going one step further, what emerges is a dispersed yet relational 
network where knowledge is mobilized and prosumed. Bauman 
(2000) points out that the expression of numerous authorities itself 
presents a contradiction, in that these authorities tend to compete 
and counteract one another’s power and influence. In the end, it is 
‘by the courtesy of the chooser that a would-be authority becomes 
an authority’ (64). In the context of healthcare, laypeople are often 
framed as oppressed or passive, largely due to an imbalance in the 
possession of medical insight. Knowledge possessed by the (medi-
cal) authorities is usually deemed naturally superior. However, the 
respondents in our study do not merely take in knowledge from 
multiple sources in a network, they also synthesize it with their 
own understanding of the body. In this process, the information 
asymmetries in doctor–patient encounters are what motivates lay-
people to approach the professionals for their expertise. Through 
the enactment of individual agency, knowledge becomes the object 
of prosumption.
In contrast to the majority who believe it is necessary to consult 
medical professionals for POMs, some respondents, however, feel 
disappointed with the current healthcare system. One respondent 
still goes to doctors’ appointments for medical consultations and 
prescriptions, but her trust in medical expertise is low. She describes 
one instance when a doctor let her down.
The doctor offered to give me penicillin ‘if I wanted’, even though 
that doctor had found a viral infection in my body. Strange but 
true. It lowered my trust in the profession’s capabilities, not least 
about antibiotic resistance. 
Such an experience forces her to re-evaluate the healthcare service 
and how to relate to doctors, not only because that particular doctor 
wanted to treat a viral infection with antibiotics, but because the 
doctor was ready to prescribe whatever medicines the respondent 
asked for. The doctor may feel they are doing the patient a favour, 
but from the patient’s viewpoint the doctor is being negligent by 
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passing responsibility to the patient, and even abusing their medi-
cal authority to prescribe. A similar incident happened to another 
respondent, whose reaction is even more critical:
Have experiences with doctors who on several occasions prescribe 
medicines that have conflicted with other medicines I usually 
take. Don’t trust the system we have in Sweden when it comes 
to supervision of patients’ drug use. 
For this respondent, every time a doctor prescribes a medicine 
with the potential for an adverse drug interaction, his trust in 
doctors, even the Swedish healthcare system, is further reduced. 
As seen, a prescription materializes authority and expertise on 
the doctors’ part, but also trust on the patients’ part. Aware of 
the intrinsic institutional hierarchy and knowledge gap in any 
medical consultation, people approach doctors for their expertise 
and expect a certain quality of care. When prescribing is neither 
professional nor attentive, the quality and accountability of the 
service, together with the prescriptions, may arouse suspicion: 
the value of the official healthcare service will be reconsidered, 
and people may turn to alternative service providers. Individual 
freedom and liberal market logic are advocated across Swedish 
society. Paternalism, embedded in the once relatively solid doc-
tor–patient relationship, no longer determines how people process 
medical knowledge or conform to expertise, nor does it mandate 
how people should obtain their medicines. When healthcare 
services are increasingly digitalized, how then do people relate 
to institutional legitimacy on the Internet?
The logo
Turning from offline encounters to the online setting, our analysis 
starts with a logo. According to the annual report by the Swedish 
Pharmacy Association (2018), online retail sales by Swedish phar-
macies increased from SEK 80 million a month in 2015 to SEK 250 
movement of knowledge
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million a month by the end of 2017. In 2017, e-commerce accounted 
for over 90 per cent of the volume growth. To regulate the online 
pharmaceutical market, the European Commission launched a 
logo (Figure 9.1) in 2014, representing the authorization of online 
pharmacies. All online pharmacies that operate legally in EU must 
display the logo on their homepage, and that includes the authorized 
Swedish pharmacies. Yet little empirical data is available regarding 
its effectiveness among the public (Sugiura 2018).
Two-thirds of respondents in our survey did not recognize the 
logo, which echoes what the Swedish Medical Products Agency 
(MPA) (2015) reported. Nearly half of our respondents do not feel 
safe purchasing medicines online. In response to whether the EU 
logo would matter when shopping online for medicine, attitudes 
range from full support to total negation. Some respondents believe 
having a logo like this would ensure the quality of medicines sold 
in online pharmacies, ‘especially after the deregulation of the 
pharmaceutical market, it is important to know one is shopping 
in a real pharmacy’. But this logo alone does not seem persuasive 
enough for many respondents, because ‘it is possible to have this 
logo without being a real pharmacy. Together with other quality 
measures it would feel more legitimate’. At the other end of the scale, 
there was strong scepticism. The logo does not seem accountable 
because ‘it feels too easy to plagiarize and misuse logos on the 
Internet’. In between the two opposite attitudes, some respondents 
reacted with varying degrees of uncertainty, still planning to do 
some sort of quality control on online pharmacies, but doubting 
whether the EU’s logo counts as useful validation. Agency is 
Figure 9.1.
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manifested in different strategies to discern which medicines 
might be safe to be consumed, such as checking ‘if it is the same 
active ingredients’ or looking for ‘something on that website that 
I feel is reliable’.
Given the various responses, we would argue that the assumed 
association between the EU logo and authorization of online 
pharmacies is problematic. The logo was introduced with a clear 
political intention of flagging medicine quality and legal business 
operations, the assumption being that it would assist consumers in 
telling reliable online pharmacies apart from rogue ones. However, 
whether an online logo like this will be deemed valid hinges on 
other factors. For example, as one respondent explicitly stated, ‘If 
I bought medicine online and needed it cheap and fast, I would 
probably buy from the first website that offers it’. Further, despite 
some respondents embracing this top-down political initiative, 
the suspicion and resistance of many others is worth particular 
attention. In a dematerialized digital environment, the absence of 
tangibility or corporeality can lead to higher levels of uncertainty 
and perceived risk (Bardhi & Eckhardt 2017), in contrast to the 
traditional form of medical consultation, which is often charac-
terized as material, embodied, and sensual (Lupton 1997, 2018). 
In this scenario, the accumulation of trust in products or services 
rapidly dissipates, even as the consumer remains fully dependent 
on recognizing individual objects visualized on a flat computer 
screen. Our respondents, who in other respects have crafted at 
least some skills in everyday digital consumption, find it difficult 
to accept the logo’s institutional legitimacy. This also suggests that 
respondents form a multifaceted knowledge repertoire, which 
amounts to a knowledge network. Its scale extends beyond the con-
sumption of medicines to tie into a much larger setting—everyday 
consumption praxis. Market offerings, including the logo, are not 
taken passively. Instead, their value, and especially their practical 
benefit, is carefully reflected on by transferring information and 




Although the authorities frame the act of shopping for medi-
cines outside the legal market as risky and deviant (Sugiura 2018), 
respondents present themselves as digital consumers—indeed, as 
craft digital consumers (Campbell 2005)—capable of identifying 
the pitfalls in the virtual market. Whereas in liberal market think-
ing this skill is desirable as it produces empowered individuals, 
one side effect appears to be an ephemeral, fluid attachment to 
authority. People are increasingly expected to take care of their own 
health; failing to do so may lead to downgraded healthcare, and 
even a denial of access to welfare services in general (Michailakis 
& Schirmer 2010). Self-care is associated with strong morality, as 
responsibility falls on individuals to not just make a choice, but to 
make a right choice to perform the duty of good citizens (Alftberg 
& Hansson 2012). Yet as virtual platforms lift the restrictions 
on the provision of and access to medicines, it to some extent 
raises the bar to manifest individual responsibility in a more 
 flexible and reflexive manner. We have previously found that many 
 people believe the level of self-care should be measured against 
whether one should be prioritized to receive care (Funestrand et 
al. 2019; Lundin 2008). This is the backdrop to our respondents 
demonstrating complex attitudes towards the EU logo or liberal 
virtual markets. Although respondents claim that some kind of 
quality certification of online pharmacies is needed, the authority 
embodied by this specific logo seems limited, even invalidated. 
In other words, the effect of the logo’s assumed empowerment is 
countered by the enactment of individual agency, which enables 
people to ‘express themselves in ways that reify their individual-
ism’ (Comor 2011, 322).
Some respondents simply dismiss this way of buying medicine 
alternative out of hand. Neither supportive nor critical, they claim 
they would only shop in the bricks-and-mortar pharmacies, so 
they ‘don’t feel the need to check the authorization’ and the online 
authorization mark does not speak to them either. To understand 
this, we draw on the analytical concept of refusal. Refusal is rarely 
performed in the same way as resistance, nor does it have to involve 
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active non-conformity or strong criticism (Weiss 2016). Rather 
than focusing on structural reforms, refusers may put an empha-
sis on the ‘health and vitality of immediate social relations’ (Sobo 
2016, 343). It is evident that our respondents are well aware of the 
online alternative, but some choose to ignore or stay away from it. 
As a social act, refusal in the form of avoidance can thus be seen 
as privileging certain social relations over others (Sobo 2016). The 
respondents who refuse to shop for medicines online, regardless of 
logos and other types of quality control, choose to vest their trust in 
the more solid relations with physical pharmacies and more personal 
interactions. They also appear reluctant to transfer their established 
trust from physical pharmacies to digital shopping channels that 
seem dematerialized and less personal. Here refusal can be con-
ceptualized as an exercise in individual agency, designed to reduce 
risk by attributing authority to specific information channels. While 
agency is shaped and enabled by processes and structures, it also 
co-evolves with consumption practices (Fuentes & Sörum 2019). 
In the act of refusal, rather than just rebuffing new consumption 
alternatives, people intentionally disenable authority by shunning 
it. It is difficult to tell from the survey data exactly which worries 
discouraged the respondents from buying medicine online, but we 
can still conclude that respondents used their knowledge networks 
to make what they believe are sensible choices when it comes to 
shopping for medicines. Under the surface of quiet abstention 
(Weiss 2016), agency is practiced as a no to liquid social relations, 
but a yes to individual responsibility.
Is there a cure out there?
To capture the point at which respondents would consider leaving 
formal healthcare, we asked them in which situations they would 
consider buying medicines or treatments that are neither legal in 
Sweden nor scientifically proved. Most respondents comment that 
this is a difficult question, as they have never encountered such 
situa tions. However, the act of formulating an answer and imagining 
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a breaking point where they would move away from the legal zone 
uncovers any ambivalent feelings towards biotechnology.
There is consensus among respondents that being affected by a 
detrimental disease leaves people desperate. It therefore is under-
standable that they will try every possible treatment, because if 
‘one has a serious disease, one would be willing to do everything to 
become healthy again’. Here, the underlying message is that a healthy 
life is the norm that every person should aim for. In Swedish society, 
people are increasingly expected to live up to the ideal of having a 
healthy lifestyle (Michailakis & Schirmer 2010), which somehow 
legitimizes the hunt for a cure. Further, as we have argued in ear-
lier studies on the cultural meaning of biotechnology, the notion 
of health is elastic, because modern technologies are ascribed an 
enormous potential to heal and strengthen the body—‘Old truths 
about nature’s inflexibility are replaced by an understanding of its 
changeability’ (Lundin 2002, 339). Rather than being a solid form 
of existence, the body is increasingly conceptualized as an atomized 
object, modified to adapt to ever-emerging cultural ideals. Medicines 
then become one of the desired-for tools with which to calibrate 
the body to those ideals. National borders, coinciding with the 
legal boundaries, may give a sense of safety, signalling the quality 
assurance of the Swedish national health service. However, when 
‘doctors say no more alternatives are available’, or when ‘one doesn’t 
get help but is tossed back and forth like a ball’, many respondents 
consider this a legitimate reason to step outside the system and 
turn to the extra-legal market. This transition is not without its 
hesitations. It takes time, energy, bravery, and knowledge to deal 
with the dilemmas and uncertainties, and ultimately the optimism 
of envisaging a healthy life.
I think some medicines are illegal for a reason, so I would only 
do that in desperation, if I didn’t have other choices. In this case 
I would study the medicines as well as I can before I bought and 
used them. 
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Desperation is highlighted in many comments. When health pro-
fessionals announce the end of a search for cures and decide to 
withdraw treatment, the search for the patients’ part is far from 
over. To be desperate in no way equates to hopelessness or irrational 
choices; on the contrary, as the quote shows, it implies a determina-
tion to find the cure in a strategic manner, such as by studying the 
medicines very carefully. What can also be taken from this quote 
is a reluctance to leave formal healthcare for a market of unknown 
medicines. Medical expertise is still much needed and appreciated 
by the majority of laypeople, whose medical knowledge is rather 
limited, especially when their health is deteriorating. Even so, when 
all the possibilities of formal healthcare are exhausted, it leaves 
individuals little choice but to feel obliged to take responsibility on 
their own. In the dispersed, multidimensional knowledge network 
we conceptualized earlier, ‘authority is no longer an alternative 
to doubt’ (Giddens 1991, 195). This differs from the paternalistic 
doctor–patient relationship where doctors possess the authoritative 
power of giving orders to patients. Faced with serious diseases where 
no treatment or medicines are legally available, patients experience 
dependence on medical authority just as much as doubt towards it. 
The hunt for a cure continues, although reluctance persists.
Sometimes what holds together the search for a cure is a belief 
in medical pluralism. It is mediated through the increased mobility 
of people, goods and information across national boundaries.
Absolutely! I think there are different ways to look at medication 
in other countries and it’s not to be underestimated in serious 
situations. What we have in Sweden feels safe and (scientifically) 
proved, but not in the forefront. If I were diagnosed with a dis-
ease with no treatment in Sweden, I would look for alternatives 
on the Internet and abroad. 
It is obvious that this respondent conceives of a boundary, or more 
specifically limitations on the Swedish national healthcare system. 
She also exhibits an awareness of alternative medical systems in 
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other countries. Lack of legally available treatments in one system is 
not the end of the story, since cures might be found in other places 
where medical approaches are more aggressive or inclusive. Lay 
understanding of medicines may be insufficient, but identifying 
where and how to source information is already a crafted skill 
for many individuals. Further, clearly put by one respondent and 
echoed by many others, medicines and treatments that are illegit-
imate in Sweden ‘may actually be legally approved or scientifically 
established in other countries’. This view points at a blurred line 
between legality and illegality. It also illustrates an adaptive, fluid 
interpretation of medical knowledge.
‘Try googling various healing properties of cannabis. You may 
start wondering why it is forbidden’, a respondent suggests, a con-
fusion arising from a mismatch in information on the Internet 
and from medical authorities. One can choose to follow the advice 
of medical professionals who do not have much to offer at the 
moment, while out there, somewhere in the extra-legal market, 
there seems to be hope (see Brown & Michael 2003; for hope, see 
also Idvall in this volume). Who to believe and how to choose? At 
this crossroads many people, including but certainly not limited 
to our respondents, cast about for a moral standpoint, between 
taking individual responsibility on the one hand and assuming 
the role of ethical citizen-consumer on the other. In searching for 
a possible cure, national borders and the laws that define them 
are contested. More tellingly, it enables individuals to justify their 
transgressions without feeling morally wrong. This is the point at 
which the legally grey market is transformed into a moral market, 
which lessens the paradox of exercising individual agency without 
neglecting the duty of being a righteous citizen.
Whereas some respondents say they would be perfectly willing 
to grasp at straws, many adopt a calculating mindset, weighing up 
the worth of buying medicines illicitly. ‘There must be something 
that really convinces me that it’s worth trying’, says a respondent. 
Whether the treatment will outweigh its side effects; whether the 
medicine comes from a country one can trust; whether one can 
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financially afford such a medical solution: all these uncertain-
ties are pondered over by respondents. Between the lines of the 
imagined presuppositions, their resistance reveals how tempting 
it is to shift the moral boundaries. What is more, technological 
advancements pave the way for it. To some extent, technologies 
are evocative objects (Turkle 2011). Many respondents are positive 
towards technological innovations, but are caught in the dilemma 
of choosing between doctors and markets. Worth here seems to be 
a question with a mathematical answer, but much more than that: 
many uncertainties might worsen the present situation, yet that risk 
is balanced by a strong desire to live what is perceived as a normal, 
healthy life. Far from a simple calculation of pros and cons, this is 
also about now and then. As one respondent says, ‘Now I would 
never consider doing so, but if I were dying?’. With a future full 
of uncertainties, risk-taking is an essential and inescapable aspect 
of everyday life (Giddens 1991). What is left to leverage the final 
decision of leaving, or not, for the extra-legal market, is perhaps 
how much faith one has in biotechnologies, and how much con-
fidence one can afford to live with a disease. These are variables 
on a spectrum, engineering a variety of social realities which are 
then materialized as different consumption strategies. As a result, 
the value of medical products and healthcare services becomes 
fragile, particularly when doctors’ sole authority, together with 
their medical knowledge, is faced with competition.
Nonetheless, before making for the grey zone, one respondent 
leaves a final remark.
Doctors nowadays are constrained by rules and do not dare to seek 
in a scientific way for new knowledge; but often resign themselves 
(in my experience in recent years) to diagnosing and prescribing 
medicines. If the diagnosis can’t be made, the activity = zero and 
the answer is just Oh well… Oh yeah. That means there are gaps 
in the medics’ role in constantly improving medicine.
movement of knowledge
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There is a hope here, or rather an expectation, that doctors will 
take the lead. For many laypeople, doctors still play an important 
role in their healthcare. And people are willing to invest in a func-
tioning doctor–patient relationship (see Brown & Michael 2003). 
Following instructions on what to do and what not is regarded as 
obstructing doctors from fully utilizing their expertise and medical 
knowledge. Doctors’ inflexibility, as our respondents experience it, 
their refusal to step outside the safety zone, makes doctor–patient 
collaborations difficult. Furthermore, as skilled prosumers, our 
respondents claim equal power relationships with doctors—but 
while attempting to fit into the role of responsible citizens. The 
notion of taking care of one’s own body, however, does not indicate 
a dramatic overturning of the power hierarchy. In a society where 
medical knowledge, products, and services are far more accessible 
through multiple channels than ever before, marketplaces outside 
the official healthcare system appear more attractive to laypeople 
(see Hansson, Nilsson & Tiberg in this volume). One explanation 
might be that such marketplaces signal their potential to meet 
people’s basic needs for medical care. Perhaps more importantly, 
though, the grey zones in the market offer people tangible tools 
with which to conform to the image of an ethical, healthy citizen–
consumer (Kristensen et al. 2016).
Becoming a health agent
In a society saturated with digital products and services, with a 
strong emphasis on individual responsibility, and instilled with 
political strategies to introduce market logic to the public sector, 
seeking healthcare and medication takes on new forms. The Inter-
net is transforming how the pharmaceutical market is organized 
and how knowledge moves (Sugiura 2018). This is seen in many 
societies with neoliberal politics, and not least in Sweden from 
where our empirical material is taken.
In considering the empirical problem of the widespread avail-
ability of SF medical products and the increasing number of people 
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buying medicines illegitimately, we examine both the online and 
offline scenarios which may lead to the purchase of medicines in 
extra-legal markets. One observation is the emergence of a net-
work where knowledge from a variety of sources is collected and 
synthesized, produced and consumed. Rather than being confined 
to a healthcare context, we find that this network also expands 
and becomes entangled with daily consumption praxis. It enables 
knowledge to flow seamlessly from one context to another. Many 
respondents are well aware of the risks of removing themselves 
from formal healthcare, and this explains why many of them feel 
dependent on medical professionals’ expertise to access the right 
medicines. But simultaneously, they maintain their right to doubt 
authority. This implies that the reliance on medical authority should 
be interpreted differently from that in the traditional, paternalistic 
doctor–patient relationship. As authority no longer comes from a 
single source, knowledge can be understood as constructed using 
diverse channels. Although knowledge possessed by medical pro-
fessionals is still deemed important, it increasingly becomes part 
of a ‘personalized repertoire’ (Kristensen et al. 2016, 496). There 
is a pattern to our findings, where respondents prosume knowl-
edge and craft their skills before they decide which medicines to 
buy and where. In this prosumption process, individual agency is 
performed in various ways: by equipping oneself with necessary 
medical knowledge, by doubting medical diagnoses, or even by 
refusing to use authorized online pharmacies. All these suggest 
an ephemeral or loosening attachment to the authorities and their 
expertise.
While laypeople may have turned themselves into skilled prosum-
ers—active, empowered, free agents, making choices according to a 
market logic—they may also risk becoming ‘an agent of increasingly 
complex forms of possessive individualism’ (Comor 2011, 322), 
only entrenching the status quo. As studies of the phenomenon of 
medical travel remind us, agency and victimhood constitute one 
another. People who seek organ transplants, fertility treatments, or 
stem cell treatments in the grey markets or even black markets are 
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actually driven by a desire to conform to normalized images. These 
images—having a healthy body or accomplishing parenthood—are 
imposed by society on individuals (for example, Humbracht et al. 
2016; Lundin 2015; Pande 2014). These deeply rooted normalities 
in sociocultural structures enact agency in those people who are 
commonly considered as victims. Our study of illegitimate medicine 
purchases aligns with this argument; it is especially apparent when 
respondents are asked to consider when they would leave formal 
healthcare. Our findings further demonstrate that victimhood 
also inherently resides in the enactment of agency. Becoming pro-
sumers, people are tasked with anchoring themselves with a moral 
standpoint to fit with the constantly shifting imagery of a healthy 
body. However, as our respondents said, at times they experience 
the formal healthcare system as inflexible and bureaucratic. It is not 
surprising, then, that people begin to oscillate between institutions 
and markets, in search of an authoritative and trusted voice.
Care, after all, is a collaborative practice (Mol 2008). Even in a 
society that endorses the rise of consumerism, advocates individual 
empowerment, and is increasingly informed by market thinking, a 
balanced doctor–patient relationship is still much desired among 
respondents. However, this particular service encounter has to be 
a relational one that allows for different degrees of dependence as 
well as the negotiation of power (Trnka & Trundle 2014). To do so, 
we have to acknowledge the multistability of knowledge produc-
tion. Applied to the phenomenon of SF medical products, failing to 
perceive knowledge in its multifaceted forms may lead prosumers 
to seek healthcare and medication elsewhere, even outside the 
formal public health system. A legal grey market then comes into 
sight where low-quality medicines can circulate and cause harm.
Notes
 1 All quotes in this chapter are taken from our study ‘Where and how do you buy 
medicine’, part of the research project ‘Illegal drugs: Gathering information from the 
public and doctors: A preliminary evaluation of the implementation of knowledge 
in society’, supported by the Erik Philip Sorensen Foundation 2017 (H2016-015) 
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and VINNOVA (VLU14-1006, V16-0307). Another part of the research was focused 
on physicians’ attitudes towards a liberal pharmaceutical market and evolving con-
sumption patterns in Sweden (see Funestrand et al. 2019). 
 2 Digital care has grown dramatically in Sweden after we conducted our study, and a 
growing number of people are turning to e-doctors (Ekman et al. 2019).
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